Decision making in civil disputes: the effect of role and frame. by Gilliland, Victoria
Decision Making in Civil Disputes:
The Eect of Role and Frame
Victoria Gilliland
A thesis submitted in fullment of the requirements




Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Litigation: The Applied Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Crisis Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.1 Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.2 Expected Utility Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.3 Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.4 Heuristics and Biases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2.5 Prospect Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 Litigation 36
2.1 Economic Models of Suit and Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
i2.2 Prospect Theory and Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 Prospect Theory and Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3.1 Basic Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3.2 One-Shot Scenario Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4 Overview of Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 One-shot Scenario Evaluations 63
3.1 Study 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.1.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2 Study 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3 Re-Analysis of Studies 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3.1 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.3.2 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Summary of Studies 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4 Simulated Negotiations 104
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.1.1 Organisational Con
ict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1.2 Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
ii4.2 Study 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.2.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.2.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.3 Study 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.3.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.3.3 Plotting Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5 Legal Fees and Framing 147
5.1 Predicting the Eect of Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2 Study 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.2.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.2.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.3 Study 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.4 Study 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.4.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
iii5.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.4.4 Comparison of Studies 5 - 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.5 Summary of Studies 5, 6 and 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6 Discussion 178
6.1 General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.1.1 Studies 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.1.2 Studies 3 and 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.1.3 Studies 5-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.1.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.1.5 Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.2 Future Research: Questions & Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.2.1 If not prospect theory then what? . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.2.2 Additional Points of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
References 194
Appendices 203
A Published Paper 204
B Study 1 Scenarios 221
C Study 3 Scenarios 228
ivD Study 4 Framing Interventions 242
E Study 5 Scenarios 244
F Study 6 Scenarios 254
vList of Figures
1 Subjective value function, as adapted from Kahneman & Tver-
sky (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2 The s-shaped weighted decision function from Tversky & Kah-
neman (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Model of litigation settlement based on Kahneman and Tver-
sky's prospect theory (1983). The plainti's decision (upper
right quadrant) is represented as a choice between gains, while
the defendant's decision (lower left quadrant) is presented as
a choice between losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 Plainti's evaluation of outcomes from two reference points,
A and B. Outcomes are evaluated as gains relative to A but
are evaluated as losses relative to B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5 Defendant's evaluation of outcomes from two reference points,
A and B. Outcomes are evaluated as losses relative to A but
are evaluated as gains relative to B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
vi6 Outcome structures used by Korobkin & Guthrie (1994). Pos-
itive or gain frame (top) and negative or loss frame (bottom). 56
7 The probability of settlement for each role/frame condition for
each scenario based on the yes/no data from experiment 1 of
Gilliland & Dunn (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal
role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative)
averaged across scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
9 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
and frame for each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10 Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function
of role/frame condition for each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal
role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative)
averaged across scenarios for Study 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
12 Average reservation price as a function of role and frame for
each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
13 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of Study
(1 vs. 2), legal role and frame, averaged over scenarios. . . . . 88
14 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of Study
(1 vs. 2), legal role and frame, for each scenario. . . . . . . . . 88
vii15 Average subjective probability of losing at trial as a function
of Study, legal role and frame for each scenario. . . . . . . . . 90
16 Hypothetical distributions of the subjective probability of los-
ing at trial in relation to settlement criteria for positively
framed (dashed line) and negatively framed (solid line) judg-
ments. The probability of settling in each distribution is given
by the area to the right of the corresponding criterion, (1 r+)
for positively framed judgments and r  for negatively framed
judgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
17 The probability of accepting the settlement oer as function
of role, frame, and the subjective probability of losing for each
scenario and Study. The dashed line shows the best tting
constant variance function for positively framed conditions.
The solid line shows the best tting constant variance function
for negatively framed conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
18 Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function
of legal role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs.
negative) averaged across scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
19 Average reservation price for each condition across all scenar-
ios for Study 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
viii20 Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function
of legal role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs.
negative) averaged across all three scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . 136
21 Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function
of legal role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs.
negative) for each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
22 Average reservation price for each condition across all scenar-
ios for Study 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
23 Plainti oers plotted against defendant oers (both in $1000s).
As shown in (a), the reservation point denes the settlement
window and settlement occurs if the negotiation reaches the
settlement line (P = D). The eect of a positive frame is
demonstrated in (b) and a negative frame is shown in (c). . . . 139
24 Plainti oers plotted against defendant oers (both in $1000s)
for the P D  condition. Figure (a) shows trajectories and
reservation points for pairs that reached a settlement (n = 12),
while (b) shows the pairs that were unable to settle (n = 11).
Settlement occurs if the negotiation reaches the settlement line
(P = D). The dashed lines in (b) highlight unco-operative be-
haviour that was `punished' by the other party (the associated
reservation points are marked by *). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
ix25 Plainti oers plotted against defendant oers (both in $1000s)
for the P+D+ condition. Figure (a) shows trajectories and
reservation points for pairs that reached a settlement, while
(b) shows the pairs that were unable to settle. Settlement oc-
curs if the negotiation reaches the settlement line (P = D).
The dashed lines highlight negotiations which included non-
monetary oers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
26 Two possible value functions showing the dierential eect of a
costs regime on litigant behaviour. Figure (a) illustrates how
costs could lead positively framed litigants to show a clear
preference for settlement. Figure (b) presents an alternate
function which lessens the dierence in value between trial and
settlement and shows how positively framed litigants could
prefer trial over settlement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
27 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal
role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative)
averaged across scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
28 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
(plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) for
each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
29 Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function
of role/frame condition averaged across all scenarios. . . . . . 156
x30 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal
role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative)
averaged across scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
31 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
(plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) for
each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
32 Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function
of role/frame condition averaged across all scenarios. . . . . . 163
33 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal
role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative)
averaged across all scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
34 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
(plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) for
each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
35 Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function
of role/frame condition averaged across all scenarios. . . . . . 169
36 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal
role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative)
averaged across scenarios for Studies 5, 6 and 7. . . . . . . . . 171
xi37 Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal
role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative)
for the defamation dispute for each of the scenario evaluation
studies. This scenario was presented to participants rst in
Studies 1 and 2 and last in Studies 5-7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
38 Distribution of subjective probability estimates (chance of de-
fendant winning) collapsed across scenario for Studies 5, 6 and
7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
xiiList of Tables
1 Overview of experimental manipulations across all 7 studies
presented in this thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2 Latin Square arrangement of condition for each version of the
questionnaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3 The average subjective probability of the plainti winning,
reservation price and the number and average size of settle-
ments for each scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4 The number of negotiations and settlements for each role/frame
pair combination of negotiators, as well as the average size of
the settlements and the mean number of rounds completed. . . 124
5 Number of negotiations for each scenario and paired combina-
tion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6 The number and size of settlements for each role/frame pair
combination of negotiators, as well as the mean number of
rounds completed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
xiiiAbstract
This thesis presents seven experiments that investigate the application of
Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory (1979) to litigation, paying par-
ticular attention to the role of framing. Litigation is treated as a form of
crisis bargaining which varies signicantly from negotiation undertaken in
more normative circumstances (for example, managerial con
ict and two-
party price negotiations). The rst two experiments made use of the scenario
evaluation paradigm, used in previous studies by Rachlinski (1996), van Kop-
pen (1990) and Korobkin and Guthrie (1994, 1998), in which they argued
that framing is dependent on litigant role with plaintis adopting a positive
or gain frame and defendants adopting a negative or loss frame. The aim of
these experiments was to manipulate the reference points of both plaintis
and defendants in order to determine whether it is possible to alter the frame
adopted by each. The results revealed that it is possible for defendants and
plaintis to be induced to adopt a positive frame and negative frame re-
spectively. Furthermore, regardless of role, positively framed litigants were
signicantly more likely to settle than their negatively framed counterparts
(an average increase of approximately 20 percent). This is a new nding in
litigation research.
Studies 3 and 4 sought to determine whether the dissociation of role and
frame is still evident in a more realistic experiment using simulated negotia-
tions. This methodology has previously been used by Margaret Neale, Max
xivBazerman and others in the eld of organisational con
ict, and by Linda
Babcock and colleagues (1997) in considering bias in litigation. However, the
studies presented here are the rst to use simulated negotiations to investi-
gate the eects of framing during litigation. In contrast to the scenario-based
studies, Study 3 found no eect of either role or frame. Study 4 was con-
ducted in order to determine if this was due to the requirement, to maintain
comparability with the scenario-based experiments, that the parties ignore
court costs and legal fees. However, despite including a schedule of fees,
Study 4 also found no evidence of framing eects.
The aims of studies 5, 6 and 7 were to determine whether the failure to
observe framing eects in studies 3 and 4 could be attributed to the imple-
mentation of costs and other changes or whether the direct manipulation of
reference points simply does not transfer to more dynamic negotiation en-
vironments. While the results of these experiments did not reach a clear
outcome on this question, it was possible to conclude that prospect theory's
prediction of framing eects is not a major determinant of litigant behaviour.
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Introduction
\In 1986, a civil jury in Philadelphia awarded Judith Richardson
Haimes $986,000 in compensatory damages after she claimed she
lost her psychic powers as a result of a CAT scan" (Adams &
Bourgeois, 2006, p. 1)
Civil litigation has become a costly and unavoidable part of modern life.
Despite the prevalence of litigation, relatively little is known about how indi-
viduals evaluate their prospects, and decide whether to settle or go to trial.
The following research presents seven experiments which consider this issue
from the perspective of Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory (1979).
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The rst chapter reviews the rel-
evant literature, starting with the history of decision making research, from
the conception of risk and probability, through to the heuristics and biases
proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. Chapter 2 provides a brief history of
1psychological thought on the issue of decision making in legal contexts, and
provides a theoretical basis for the subsequent experimental work. The third
chapter outlines a preliminary investigation into the application of prospect
theory to litigation. The two studies presented in this section were conducted
online using the one-shot scenario evaluation methodology and demonstrate
how role, frame and subjective probability can in
uence a litigant's propen-
sity to settle. Chapter 4 presents two experiments which represent a rst
step towards investigating the role of prospect theory in real settlement ne-
gotiations. The fth chapter begins with an investigation into the possible
eects of legal costs, and presents three further studies using the scenario-
evaluation paradigm. The nal chapter contains a detailed discussion of the
research presented, summarises the major ndings and identies the theo-
retical and practical issues yet to be resolved in this eld. However, before
considering the origins of decision making research, it is important to rst get
a working denition of litigation and the applied problem this thesis seeks to
investigate.
1.1 Litigation: The Applied Problem
Litigation is a process of court sanctioned dispute resolution which takes
place when one party (the plainti) brings a civil action against another
party (the defendant). The plainti accuses the defendant of some form of
wrongdoing that has injured them in some way, whether emotionally, physi-
2cally or nancially. The plainti is seeking compensation (usually monetary)
from the defendant. The defendant cannot avoid the con
ict once the alle-
gation has been made, but they may choose to bring their own counter-suit
against the plainti, depending on the circumstances leading to the claim.
Litigation generally involves a process of negotiation before parties pro-
ceed to trial (some jurisdictions explicitly require that this takes place). Dur-
ing these negotiations, both parties are obliged to exchange information and
evidence through the process of discovery. These pre-trial processes are aimed
at encouraging parties to settle out of court. This is due to the belief that
early settlement is benecial to all involved as it is generally quicker and
cheaper than a trial (there are, however, those who disagree with this as-
sumption, see for example Fiss, 1984).
1.1.1 Costs
Ever since the `litigation explosion' of the 1980s (Galanter, 1987) the growing
prevalence of litigation has been of great concern to the private sector, indi-
viduals and the community as a whole. Recent gures suggest that nearly
90 percent of US businesses are involved in litigation, with corporations en-
gaged in an average of 37 lawsuits at any one time (Insurance Journal, 2007).
Given this signicant increase in prevalence, it is estimated that the cost of
litigation has been steadily rising by approximately 12 percent per annum
since 1980 (Luu, 1993). Detailed research into the cost of litigation is rare
(Marks, 1999) and it is dicult to access current gures on total litigation
3spending, and how this money is distributed.1 Gathering such information
is time consuming and expensive and issues of privacy and condentiality
make it dicult to access information from the private sector. For this rea-
son, many of the more recent estimates come from private companies in the
legal services industry who have access to the records of a large number of
law rms.
According to Forrester Research (as reported by private rm Lexadigm,
2008), worldwide spending on litigation is approximately $250 billion (US)
per year. The United States alone accounts for $170 billion of this. An-
other rm in the legal services industry, eLawForum, estimates the litigation
spending of Fortune 500 companies to be approximately $210 billion (US)
per year (Henry, 2008). This equates to approximately one-third of Fortune
500 prots. As Henry (2008) points out, by comparison, this gure dwarfs
the salaries and bonuses given to CEOs, an issue which has recently received
much criticism and media attention (approximately $7.5 billion annually).
In Australia, litigation spending is markedly lower than in the US. This
could be because Australia is thought to have a less litigious culture (Hoadley,
1992, although some commentators disagree), and partly because Australia
implements a largely `loser pays' allocation of legal costs (also known as
1Concern over a lack of recent statistical information was highlighted by the Australian
Law Reform Commission in 1995, and resulted in a recommendation to implement a
co-ordinated data collection program across Australia. Currently, however, none of the
recommendations from that report have been implemented.
4the cost indemnity rule).2 According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics,
the legal services industry contributed approximately $11 billion to the Aus-
tralian economy for the scal year 2007/08. The Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC, 1995) estimates that 35 percent of the income gener-
ated by the legal services industry relates to litigation. This gure equates to
approximately $3.85 billion, which has more than doubled since 1992/93. In
terms of the public cost, in 1997/98 the Australian government spent $470
million nancing the civil dispute resolution agencies (including courts, tri-
bunals and other dispute resolution bodies) for the Federal jurisdiction (this
does not include the government's own legal expenses). This gure is put
into perspective when one considers that 96 percent of all cases are led (and
usually resolved) in State and Territory courts which are outside the Federal
jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the same year, 300 000 disputes were resolved
in the Federal jurisdiction. This means that for Federal courts alone, there
was roughly one civil dispute lodged for every 63 people in Australia.
Recent information on the allocation of legal costs is also dicult to come
by. One government review (Oce of Regulation Review, 1995) suggests that
only one in ten disputes end up in trial (however, this approximation traces
back to a 1989 review by Cooter and Rubineld). More recent estimates
do not appear to be available in Australia, although Henry (2008) suggests
that only three percent of Fortune 500 cases go to trial. Generally it is
2An in-depth analysis of the implications of the diering cost allocation methods is
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for further information see Hughes & Snyder,
1995 and ALRC 75, esp 4.6-4.29 and appendix D.
5suggested that total legal costs vary from 17-30 percent of the associated
claim. According to one report, the biggest determinant of cost in a civil
dispute is the stage at which it is resolved (Williams & Williams, 1994).
The total costs for cases which go to trial in Australia are generally two to
four times higher than those which settle beforehand (Williams & Williams,
1994).
The available data therefore suggest that while only a small proportion
of litigants do not negotiate a settlement, these cases account for possibly
the single greatest cost associated with the civil legal system. It is therefore
these cases which are of most interest to researchers concerned with reducing
the burden of litigation. The aim of the following literature review is to
consider various models of decision making and how they may be applied to
the practical problem of reducing the cost of litigation. In particular, this
review will demonstrate why prospect theory was singled out for examination.
1.1.2 Crisis Bargaining
One of the greatest challenges for research into litigation is in properly den-
ing the form of the negotiation. As will be shown, litigation is not a type
of normative bargaining, as considered by the economic literature. Instead,
there is a growing body of research which suggests that litigation represents a
form of crisis bargaining. The term `crisis bargaining' refers to a negotiation
process that is structurally dierent from standard negotiations which occur
under normative bargaining conditions (Donohue & Roberto, 1993). Nor-
6mative bargaining conditions refer to circumstances where parties are moti-
vated by the assumption of mutual benet. That is, both parties negotiate
in good faith, based on the belief that the process of negotiation and group
problem-solving will yield a mutually satisfactory resolution to the dispute.
As a result, parties act co-operatively, exchanging information, making pro-
posals, conducting thoughtful discussion and focusing on the issues at hand
(Donohue & Roberto, 1993).
Crisis negotiations, however, occur under very dierent conditions. Per-
haps the simplest denition of crisis bargaining is that proposed by Donohue
and Roberto (1993): \a negotiation aimed at coercing the other to comply
with some course of action" (p. 181). It is possible to argue that this deni-
tion could be applied to any form of con
ict { if each party was not trying
to achieve their individual goals, there would be no dispute. Indeed, the
basis of Nash economic game theory is that each party will seek to maximise
their own gains (Nash, 1950). However, as will be discussed, the nature of
a crisis situation often causes coercive behaviour to extend beyond rational
self-interest to a point where it becomes detrimental to both parties.
Past research recognises three main types of crisis bargaining - hostage
negotiation (Donohue, 1978; Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991;
Donohue & Roberto, 1993), international peace negotiations (Donohue &
Roberto, 1993) and litigation (Welsh & Coleman, 2002). While there are
other circumstances which could result in crisis, these three types of nego-
tiations share three major characteristics which dene a crisis situation -
7exclusivity, risk of an uncontrolled outcome, and time constraints.
Exclusivity refers to a situation where the parties must deal with each
other. In economic literature, standard models assume there is an innite
(or a `suciently large') number of buyers and sellers. For example, Mary
wants to buy a lawnmower and John wants to sell a lawnmower, but if they
cannot agree on the terms of sale, they can both go elsewhere. Normative
bargaining models assume that there are an innite number of other buyers
to whom John can sell his lawnmower, and that likewise, there are an innite
number of sellers from whom Mary can buy a lawnmower.
This is not always representative of true market conditions. For example,
litigation can be viewed as a form of buying and selling, where the plainti
is essentially `selling' their right to a trial, and the defendant is `buying' that
right. Unlike the lawnmower situation, there are not an innite number of
defendants for the plainti (the seller) to sue. They may sue only the person
who infringed their rights. Similarly, the defendant (the buyer) cannot choose
to be sued by some other plainti. The parties can therefore deal only with
each other.
Similarly, in the context of hostage negotiations, the police negotiator
cannot choose to deal with another hostage taker, and neither can the hostage
taker choose to deal with a group other than the police. The parties must
deal with each other exclusively. This can have an impact upon the course
of negotiations, and ultimately in
uences the consequences of an impasse.
The second characteristic of a crisis negotiation relates to the threat of
8an uncontrolled and uncertain outcome which will occur if parties fail to
reach an agreement. In the lawnmower example above, there is no negative
outcome if Mary and John fail to agree on a price (that is, if negotiations
result in impasse), Mary and John will simply go their separate ways and nd
other sellers and buyers, respectively. However, in a crisis situation, impasse
will result in some form of risky, uncertain outcome which neither party can
control or avoid. For example, if a plainti and defendant fail to negotiate
a settlement, the dispute will be resolved by a court trial. While the facts
of the case may be indicative of a particular outcome, neither party can be
certain in whose favour the judge will rule, or how much compensation will
be awarded. They also cannot reject the ruling once it has been delivered
{ they are both bound by it. Therefore both parties know that if they fail
to settle, the dispute will go to court and there is some chance they will
win, and some chance they will lose. It is for this reason that settlement
negotiations are sometimes referred to as taking place `in the shadow of the
law' (Coursey & Stanley, 1988).
Hostage negotiation represents a similar situation. If the hostage taker
and the police negotiator fail to resolve the crisis, a tactical response will
ensure a resolution. However, in doing this, neither the police nor the hostage
taker can be sure of victory. Both parties simply know that there is some
chance of the hostage taker escaping and some chance of death or injury to
the hostage taker, the hostages and/or the police. Thus it can be seen that in
a crisis situation, impasse results in a risky, uncertain outcome, which neither
9party can control or escape. This feature distinguishes crisis situations from
normative bargaining conditions and may in
uence the negotiation process.
The third major characteristic of a crisis negotiation is some form of
constraint upon the length of time for which parties may negotiate. For ex-
ample, while litigation can often be a time consuming process, there are sev-
eral stages in the negotiation process which create administrative deadlines.
Similarly, with hostage situations, negotiation cannot continue indenitely -
eventually a tactical resolution will be sought, creating a deadline for both
the hostage taker and the police negotiator. Therefore, depending on the
exact circumstances of the con
ict, time can play a greater or lesser role in
the outcome of a crisis situation.
As demonstrated, hostage negotiation and litigation are structurally sim-
ilar, and share three main characteristics. In addition to this, in each form of
con
ict, the hostage taker and the plainti can be viewed as analogous roles,
as can the police negotiator and the defendant (Welsh & Coleman, 2002).
For example, the plainti and the hostage taker, as protagonists, both drive
the con
ict. That is, if not for actions of the hostage taker, there would be no
con
ict. Further, if the hostage taker were to `give up', there would no longer
be any con
ict. Similarly, in litigation it is the plainti, as the complainant,
who brings the action. There will be no dispute unless the plainti chooses
to pursue an action. The plainti can choose at any time to drop their claim,
ending the con
ict. In contrast, the police negotiator and the defendant are
both antagonists. The con
ict is being brought to them, and they have little
10choice about whether or not to participate.
As a result of this, the hostage taker and the plainti (the protagonists)
and the police negotiator and the defendant (the antagonists) will often share
similar goals. The protagonists will aim to use whatever coercive or tactical
options are available to them to achieve their desired outcome. The form of
the `desired outcome' varies between individuals, and can range from concrete
outcomes, such as economic gain, to more abstract goals such as social and
political statements. Conversely, the goal of the antagonists will be to resist
these outcomes. Furthermore, individual antagonists will generally have the
same motivation, which is best described as `damage minimisation'. Desired
outcomes will tend to be dened in more concrete terms, such as minimising
nancial loss or preventing injury or loss of life (Welsh & Coleman, 2002).
It can therefore be seen that litigation is best thought of as a type of
crisis bargaining. One of the advantages of dening litigation in this way is
that it provides a framework through which ndings from litigation can be
generalised to other forms of crisis bargaining and vice versa. Unfortunately,
the crisis bargaining literature is not yet developed enough to provide predic-
tions about the specic phenomena currently under examination. Therefore,
the central focus of this thesis is to examine litigation and the specic chal-
lenges that it presents, and to consider how any ndings may inform crisis
bargaining research.
111.2 Decision Making
Litigation is primarily about making choices: whether to pursue a claim, how
much to ask for, which lawyer to hire, which negotiation strategy to adopt.
Central to this thesis is the choice to settle or to proceed to trial. This
decision involves a consideration of risk: litigants can either accept a certain
settlement or go to court where there is some probability of winning and some
probability of losing. While this idea will be discussed in much greater detail
in subsequent sections, the important point to note is that considerations of
risk and therefore probability are inherent to legal decision making. Given
this, an appropriate review must begin with the rst conceptions of risk and
probability.
1.2.1 Risk
Bernstein (1996) argues that human mastery of risk is what denes the mod-
ern era: \the ability to dene what may happen in the future and to choose
among alternatives lies at the heart of contemporary societies" (p. 2). He
further posits that a theoretical understanding of risk requires two elements:
rstly, a numerical system which allows for the conception and calculation of
probabilities; and secondly, a belief that the future is determined by some-
thing other than nature and the gods. The rst exists in the form of the
Hindu-Arabic counting system which became popular in the West in the 13th
century; however the second did not come until the European Renaissance
12of the 15th and 16th centuries.
In 1494, a Franciscan monk proposed the following problem: \A and B
are playing a fair game of balla.3 They agree to continue until one has won
six rounds. The game actually stops when A has won ve and B three. How
should the stakes be divided?" This problem became known as the `problem
of points' and considers how to fairly divide the stakes in an incomplete game.
Mathematicians ercely debated this problem for more than 150 years after
its original inception.
In 1654, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat provided a solution for
the problem of points which was to form the rst complete theory of risk
(Bernstein, 1996). Fermat sought a solution through algebra, while Pascal
considered the geometric arrangement of binomial co-ecients, now known
as Pascal's triangle. The collaboration produced expected value theory (al-
though not called such at the time).
Pascal's triangle reveals the probability of an event occurring given the
possible number of outcomes. For example, the second line of the triangle
is 1 1, and the third is 1 2 1. If a couple wants to have one child, there
are two possibilities { one chance of a boy and one chance of a girl. This is
indicated by the second line of the triangle which shows there are two possible
outcomes, both with an equal probability of occuring (1, 1). Therefore there
is a 50-50 chance of the child being either sex. If a couple wants to have two
3Balla is a medieval game of chance between two players, where both players have the
same chance of winning each round.
13children, there are three possibilities (assuming order does not matter), as
indicated by the third line { one chance of two boys, two chances of a boy
and a girl, and one chance of two girls. Thus, the triangle predicts that there
is a 50 percent chance the couple will have one boy and one girl, and only
a 25 percent chance each of producing two boys or two girls. The expected
value of a choice can therefore be calculated by multiplying the value of each
possible outcome by the probability of its occurrence.
This theory of value calculation led Pascal to propose his famous wager:
if God exists, the reward for being faithful is innite, if God does not exist,
being faithful loses you nothing. This became known as Pascal's wager, and
may be considered a forerunner to the St Petersburg paradox which would
later provide the impetus for Bernoulli's expected utility theory.
1.2.2 Expected Utility Theory
Expected utility theory was rst proposed by Swiss mathematician Daniel
Bernoulli in 1738, and is an adaptation of Pascal's model. Bernoulli's theory
was presented as a solution to the St Petersburg Paradox (originally pro-
posed in 1713), which, in the same manner as Pascal's wager, has an innite
expected value. Bernoulli's solution (which was not translated into English
until 1954) introduced the principle now known as diminishing marginal util-
ity, which has a concave subjective utility function that predicts risk aversion.
The basic premise of expected utility theory is that the value of money
is relative to an individual's wealth. As Bernoulli put it, \a gain of 100
14ducats is more signicant to a pauper than a rich man," (1738/1954, p. 24)
even though the absolute value is the same for both parties. Bernoulli there-
fore proposed a concave value function (as opposed to the linear function
of expected value), so that the dierence between $100 and $200 is more
valuable (has a higher utility) than the dierence between $1100 and $1200
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In Bernoulli's own words: \the utility re-
sulting from any small increase in wealth will be inversely proportionate to
the quantity of goods previously possessed" (1738/1954, p. 25). This sub-
jective utility function allows for risk averse decision making in risky choice
problems. Risk aversion will be considered below in more detail, but is
broadly dened as a preference for a certain outcome over a gamble of equal
or greater value. For example, consider the following gamble: a 50 percent
chance of winning $20,000 (or nothing), or a sure gain of $10,000. Here, the
two prospects have the same expected value ($10,000). However, given a
concave utility function, a gain of $10,000 may be more than 50 percent of
the subjective value of $20,000. In this case, a risk averse choice (a certain
$10,000) would be considered reasonable.
Bernoulli's expected utility theory introduces the concept of a risk taker
for the rst time - an individual who is able to choose whether or not to
take a gamble and how much to risk in doing so (Bernstein, 1996). This was
the rst step towards creating not just a mathematical theory of risk, but a
behavioural theory which can dene individual motivations.
Bernoulli's theory also implicitly dened the concept of a `rational' de-
15cision maker. The concept of rationality is an integral part of the history
of risk, and its etymology should be properly explained. Rationality has its
origins in the Enlightenment and largely grew out of a philosophy known
as `political economy', or economics. However, it is important to note that
the history of risk and the rise of economic theory are in no way distinct.
In fact, it is the ability to calculate risk and probability which led to the
creation of the insurance industry, which ultimately provided the funding for
the Industrial Revolution. As Bernstein points out, \insurance is a business
that is totally dependent on the process of sampling, averages, independence
of observations and the notion of normal" (Bernstein, 1996, p. 88). Thus,
economics is a discipline whose origins can be found in the conception of risk
calculation.
1.2.3 Rationality
Traditional economic theories (including those of Pascal and Fermat, and
Bernoulli) rely on the assumption that decisions are made by the `economic
man', a concept which makes assumptions about both the decision maker
and the decision environment (Simon, 1955). The term `economic man' was
coined by John Kells Ingram in 1888, while the Latin incarnation homo eco-
nomicus was rst used by Vilfredo Pareto in 1906 (Persky, 1995). The
principle to which the term refers has its origins in Adam Smith's `The
Wealth of Nations'. Smith is considered to be the world's rst `truly aca-
demic economist' (Mills, 2003) and in his most famous essay he points out:
16\it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest" (Smith,
1776). This principle was later expanded upon by philosopher John Stuart
Mill: \[Economics] does not treat of the whole of man's nature as modied by
the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. It is concerned
with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable
of judging the comparative ecacy of means for obtaining that end" (cited
in Persky, 1995, p. 223). Thus, for Smith and Mill, `economic man' referred
simply to one who acts out of self-interest. However, `economic man' became
more sophisticated in the century following Mill's pronouncement.
The dening characteristic of economic man is rationality. Daston (1988)
points out that the idea of rationality has evolved over time, and can mean
dierent things in dierent contexts. For Smith, rationality simply meant
preferring more to less - an idea which is apparent in the above quote from
The Wealth of Nations. This idea retains the basic assumption of rationality:
that a decision maker always acts to maximise outcomes (utility). Decisions
which do not seek to maximise something (it need not be money) are deemed
irrational (Edwards, 1954). A second element is implied by this assumption:
the transitivity of ordinal preferences (Arrow, 1986). That is, when choosing
between possible outcomes, if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C,
then A must be preferred to C. Indierence towards outcomes is acceptable,
but must also be transitive (Edwards, 1954). That is, if an individual is
indierent to A and B, and indierent to B and C, then they must also be
17indierent towards A and C.
The concept of transitivity suggests two further principles which are re-
quired by all analyses of rational choice: dominance and invariance (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1984). Dominance means that if A is at least as good as B in
every way, and better than B in at least one way, then A should be pre-
ferred over B. The principle of dominance therefore describes how outcomes
should be ordered. The second principle (which is of key importance to this
thesis) is that of invariance. This states that an individual's preference for
an outcome should not be in
uenced by the way it is described. For exam-
ple, describing a glass of water as either half full or half empty still refers
to the same volume of liquid. Therefore, the description chosen should not
in
uence an individual's preference for the water. The extent to which this
assumption holds is a central issue in this thesis and will be examined in
more detail below.
Another important characteristic of classical rationality is the assumption
of perfect (or complete) information. This assumption has implications for
both the environment in which decisions are made, as well as the cognitive
abilities of the decision maker. The requirement of omniscience assumes that
information about the possible states of the world is available and that it
is known to the decision maker. Furthermore, there is an implication that
individuals will be able to perform the calculations required by expected util-
ity theory and then use this information to guide their decision processes.
The denition of rationality has received much criticism from psychologists,
18as discussed below. However, expected utility and the presumption of ra-
tionality is one of the more enduring decision theories and is still used by
psychologists and economists as a normative standard of human behaviour.
Risk and Uncertainty
In 1921, Frank Knight published his doctoral thesis entitled \Risk, Uncer-
tainty and Prot". According to Bernstein (1996), this was the rst published
work to consider decision making under uncertainty. Knight (1921) distin-
guishes between two types of chance: risk and uncertainty. Decision making
under risk refers to a situation where the probability of a particular out-
come occurring is known4. For example, a litigant may be advised that their
probability of being awarded x dollars in court is fty percent. Choosing to
accept a settlement oer for a certain (but lesser) amount, rather than going
to trial, is therefore a risky choice. Uncertainty refers to situations where the
related outcome probabilities are not known. For example, when a litigant
chooses to go to trial they know that there is some chance of winning, and
some chance of losing, but it is impossible to predict the exact probability of
either outcome. The decision is therefore `uncertain'.
From these denitions, which are now well integrated into economic and
psychological literature, it is not dicult to see that many decisions (particu-
4Runde (1998) argues that Knight actually dened two categories of risk, making three
categories of chance in total. In doing so, Knight distinguished between situations where
there was a denite mathematical probability associated with an outcome (such as rolling
dice or tossing a coin), and situations where the assigned probability is based on prior
observation. However, since this thesis deals primarily with decisions made under uncer-
tainty, the traditional interpretation of Knightian theory will suce.
19larly those made in a legal context) are made under conditions of uncertainty.
These conditions are not adequately accounted for by theories based upon
rationality, such as expected utility and game theory. Rationality's reliance
upon perfect knowledge forms the basis of the critique by Knight and others
of classical economics. In particular, the requirement of perfect knowledge
is problematic on a practical level. The remainder of this section will be de-
voted to a discussion of the shortcomings of the assumptions of rationality,
and the main body of research which has replaced it - bounded rationality,
and the development of cognitive research on heuristics and biases.
The Assumption of Rationality
The issue of rationality is what caused a split between economists and psy-
chologists in their approach to modelling human decision making (Goldstein
& Hogarth, 1997). Economists have largely accepted expected utility theory
(although it can take many forms) and use such models to determine optimal
(normative) decision making strategies. That is, these models are used to
determine how people should make decisions, not how they actually do. The
latter approach refers to descriptive models of decision making, and these
are traditionally contained within the eld of psychology.
Psychologists' objections to expected utility models of rationality come
in three forms. Firstly, there were the thought experiments which yielded
paradoxes as troubling for expected utility as the St Petersburg problem was
for Pascal's expected value theory. The most famous of these is the Allais
20paradox, proposed by Maurice Allais in 1953. In his paradox, Allais demon-
strates how individuals tend to overweight certain events, and underweight
outcomes which are merely probable. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) refer
to this as the certainty eect, and it violates the transitivity assumption of
rationality. The paradox is as follows:
Gamble 1
Choice A: 100% chance of $1 million
Choice B: 89% chance of $1million, 1% chance of nothing, 10%
chance of $5 million
Gamble 2
Choice A: 89% chance of nothing, 11% chance of $1 million
Choice B: 90% chance of nothing, 10% chance of $5 million
Allais postulated that most people will prefer choice A in the rst gamble
and choice B in the second (this was later empirically veried by Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979). According to the assumptions of expected utility theory,
this violates the substitution axiom (proposed by Savage, 1954). That is, if B
is preferred to A, then any probability of B should be preferred to the same
probability of A (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Eliminating the common
consequence of both outcomes in each gamble (an 89% chance of $1 million
in gamble 1 and an 89% chance of nothing in gamble 2) reveals that gamble
1 and 2 are the same choice:
21Choice A: 11% chance of $1 million
Choice B: 1% nothing, 10% chance of $5 million
Thus, individuals who choose A in one gamble and B in the other are
behaving irrationally according to expected utility theory.
The second form of opposition to expected utility came from Herbert Si-
mon's (1957) conception of `bounded rationality'. Although not necessarily
new in itself, Simon's work generated interest in an entirely new direction
of decision making research. Simon (1956) argued that there are two fac-
tors which prevent individuals from acting in a purely rational way. Firstly,
the structure of the environment does not allow for perfect information as
required by expected utility and game theory models. This was not a com-
pletely novel idea - as discussed, Knight (1921) had distinguished between
risk (where probabilities are known) and uncertainty (where probabilities
cannot be known). The second part of Simon's argument was that humans
do not possess the computational abilities which are required to achieve per-
fect rationality. Simon was also not the rst to criticise expected utility on
this basis. The contribution of Simon's thesis, however, was in combining the
two concepts to create a new theory of decision making. Simon used his now
famous `scissors' metaphor to describe how both of these two factors - the
limited capacity of human cognition and the structure of the environment
in which decisions are made - must be considered in order to formulate a
descriptive model of decision making. Studying one blade is not enough -
22both are required to cut. Furthermore, Simon believed that while individuals
may not be strictly rational, they are not completely irrational either. Hence
he coined the term `bounded rationality' (Simon, 1957) to convey the idea
of a decision maker who attempts to behave in a reasonable manner, given
certain cognitive and environmental constraints.
Simon also suggested some possible models which may account for be-
haviour. His idea was that there are underlying structures, or patterns, in
the environment that individuals could use as short cuts, or rules of thumb,
when making decisions (Simon, 1956). While the specic models that Simon
proposed have not been supported by empirical experimentation, his work
sparked interest in the new eld of heuristics and biases (discussed below).
This eld has been a dominant force in cognitive psychology for the latter
half of the 20th century and has enjoyed some success in explaining and
predicting human behaviour.
The third criticism against expected utility, and ultimately the most com-
pelling, came in the form of experimentation. During the 1950s and 1960s,
psychologists conducted a series of experiments which asked participants to
choose between simple gambles. These experiments (some of which will be
discussed in more detail in the next section) all shared the same key nding:
time and again, individuals made choices which violated the principles of ra-
tionality (for a review of this literature see Slovic, Fischho, & Lichtenstein,
1977). Thus, there is overwhelming evidence that individuals frequently vio-
late the principles of rationality when making decisions under both risk and
23uncertainty. These experiments ensured that expected utility was relegated
to the realms of normative decision making, rather than descriptive.
1.2.4 Heuristics and Biases
Simon's work led to the eld of heuristics and biases. Heuristics refer to
the mental shortcuts, or rules of thumb that individuals use when making
decisions. These heuristics are generally helpful, however under certain con-
ditions they can lead to systematic errors of judgment, or biases. Some of
the most well-designed and illuminating investigations into heuristics (and
biases) were performed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tver-
sky. Their collaboration began in the mid 1960s, when Kahneman related his
experiences training 
ight instructors on the basic psychological principles of
learning. Kahneman explained to the instructors that reward is more eec-
tive than punishment in training (a nding which had been demonstrated by
numerous studies on rats and pigeons). One of the instructors contradicted
Kahneman, pointing out that in his experience, a pilot who was criticised for
poor performance almost always improved on the next 
ight, while the sub-
sequent performance of a pilot who received praise almost always worsened.
Kahneman and Tversky postulated that this belief re
ected an inability to
perceive a natural regression to the mean. That is, if a pilot performs excep-
tionally well on one 
ight, his next performance is likely to be closer to his
average performance, and vice versa for a poor performance, regardless of
any reward or punishment received. Kahneman and Tversky postulated that
24if individuals were unable to perceive that particular eect { an assertion
they later veried empirically (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) { there may
be others which are also ignored, thus causing systematic errors in judgment.
1.2.5 Prospect Theory
In addition to heuristics and biases, Kahneman and Tversky proposed prospect
theory as a way of explaining the systematic errors of judgment which can
occur in decisions made under conditions of uncertainty. Prospect theory
explains the failure of invariance as a result of the evaluation of prospects
(outcomes) in terms of gains and losses. Through a series of experiments,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were able to show how the decision making
process is aected by the way a potential outcome is described, or `framed'.
They demonstrated how varying the frame could induce decision makers to
change their preference for a given outcome, thereby violating the assumption
of invariance. More specically, these experiments illustrated how individu-
als commonly evaluate prospects in terms of gains and losses from a given
reference point. Describing outcomes in terms of potential gains is called a
positive frame, while a description which emphasises potential losses is re-
ferred to as a negative frame. Thus, prospect theory denes two phases to
the decision making process: editing, which includes the framing of prospects
based on a given reference point; and evaluation, which is the mechanism
through which framing aects the decision making process and alters risk
preferences.
25Framing and Reference Points
According to prospect theory, individuals evaluate outcomes in terms of gains
and losses from a given reference point, rather than in terms of nal states
of wealth (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A reference point serves as a zero
point on the value scale for assessing outcomes, and moving this point can
alter whether an outcome is viewed as a gain or a loss. Prospect theory
therefore utilises a relative value scale, where x dollars can equal zero value,
rather than the absolute scale used in expected utility theory (zero dollars
equals zero value). Reference points can be implicitly or explicitly stated,
and they are commonly (often na vely) employed in every day speech. For
example, the classic conundrum as to whether the glass is half full or half
empty is based upon reference point manipulation. The former position sets
the reference point at an empty glass and therefore describes a gain; the
latter contemplates a full glass and therefore describes a loss. Regardless
of the description, however, the glass contains the same volume. Another
demonstration of framing is provided by credit card lobbyists in the United
States during the 1970s. The lobbyists insisted before Congress that any
dierence between the cash and credit card price should be referred to as a
`cash discount', rather than a `credit surcharge' (Thaler, 1980). This suggests
that the lobbyists intuitively believed that consumers would be more likely
to forgo a gain (a cash discount) than to accept a loss (credit card surcharge),
even though the absolute value is the same.
Despite being an integral part of reference-dependent models such as
26prospect theory, the actual process of reference point adoption has been
relatively understudied (Koszegi & Rabin, 2006). Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) originally proposed that decision makers usually adopt the status quo
as their reference point, but that this can be aected by either the formu-
lation of the problem (as in the examples of framing discussed above), or
by the expectations of the decision maker themselves. For example, an indi-
vidual who is expecting to receive a $20 payment may view a $10 payment
as a loss, even though the amount still represents a gain from the status
quo. However, Kahneman and Tversky do not suggest any way of predicting
which reference point an individual will adopt. This led Butler (2007) to
observe: \there is no theory of reference points.... prospect theory assumes
that individuals simply have a relevant reference point"(p. 229).
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) attempted to overcome this shortcoming by
proposing a similar but more instructive theory of reference point adoption
which posits that reference points are \fully determined by the expectations
a person held in the recent past" (p. 1141). As Koszegi and Rabin point
out, an individual who expects to undergo a painful and expensive dental
procedure may feel they have gained something if they learn it is no longer
necessary. The expectation model explains how this situation is contextually
distinct from someone who never anticipated the procedure in the rst place
(even though their status quo is the same). The issue of reference point
adoption will be re-visited later when the process of litigation is examined in
more detail.
27Risk Preferences
During the `evaluation' phase, framing aects decision making under uncer-
tainty by manipulating risk preferences. Individuals often experience risk-
aversion when facing potential gains, or positive frames. That is, individuals
will show a \preference for a sure outcome over a gamble that has higher or
equal expectation" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983, p. 2). Conversely, individ-
uals facing losses, or negative frames, will be more risk-seeking. Risk-seeking
behaviour is dened as the \rejection of a sure thing in favour of a gamble
of lower or equal expectation" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983, p. 2). This
concept is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the subjective value function
in terms of gains and losses, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1983).
The shape of this function demonstrates that framing alters risk preferences.
As can be seen, the value function in the domain of gains is concave, gen-
erating risk aversion. In contrast, the convexity of the value function in the
domain of losses leads to risk-seeking behaviour. The shape of the value
function causes an asymmetry between positive and negative frames - the
function is steeper for losses than for gains. That is, the loss of x dollars is
more aversive than a gain of x dollars is attractive.
28Figure 1: Subjective value function, as adapted from Kahneman & Tversky
(1983).
Perhaps the most striking demonstration of risk preference reversal caused
by framing is the `Asian disease' problem, originally proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1981):
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alterna-
tive programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume
that the exact scientic estimate of the consequences of the pro-
grams are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people
will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favour?
29This articulation of the outcomes involves an implicit frame. Describing
the options in terms of `lives saved' creates a positive frame and causes in-
dividuals to choose from amongst gains. Prospect theory therefore predicts
that individuals should prefer the risk averse outcome. When giving this
problem to undergraduate students, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) found
that 72 percent preferred Program A. Since both programs have equal ex-
pected value, Program A represents the risk averse choice as it contains a
certain outcome. Tversky and Kahneman then re-framed the problem as
follows and asked a second group of students to choose a program:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody
will die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 will die.
This version of the problem creates a negative frame by describing the
outcomes in terms of `people dying'. Respondents are therefore choosing
amongst losses and were expected to exhibit a preference for risky outcomes.
This prediction was supported by the results, with only 22 percent of students
now choosing the risk averse option (Program C), compared to 78 percent
who preferred the risk seeking option presented in Program D. As the only
dierence between the two versions of the problem is the description, the
almost complete reversal of risk preferences is due to framing. Kahneman
and Tversky (1983) describe this eect as being both pervasive and robust.
30Decision Weights and Cumulative Prospect Theory
Another feature of prospect theory is the s-shaped probability weighting
function, depicted in Figure 2. According to prospect theory, the value of an
outcome should be multiplied by the weighted probability of its occurrence.
This is referred to as the decision weight and is a non-linear function of
actual probability. The s-shape function allows for the over-weighting of
low probability events and the under-weighting of high probability events, a
phenomenon rst observed by Allais in 1953, as mentioned previously. There
are two forms of prospect theory: the original (rst proposed in 1979) and a
later modication called cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). The dierence between the two relates to how the decision weights
are used.
Figure 2: The s-shaped weighted decision function from Tversky & Kahne-
man (1992).
31In the original conception of prospect theory, the decision weights are
treated individually for each possible outcome. This means that all high and
low probability events are under and over-weighted, respectively. Cumu-
lative prospect theory, however, relies on a rank-dependent function which
uses cumulative decision weights. This means that only low (high) proba-
bility events which are at the extreme ends of the outcome range are over
(under) weighted. For example, imagine a lottery with a continuous range
of outcomes from $0 to $100. The probability of winning a single amount,
say $37, is relatively low compared to the probability of winning an amount
either greater or less than $37. Therefore, according to prospect theory, the
probability of winning $37 is overweighted (and in this case more aversive)
relative to the possibility of winning less than $37. This is intuitively unap-
pealing as it leads to violations of stochastic dominance, and is not supported
by empirical data (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). However, using a cumula-
tive decision function means that only the extreme outcomes { $0 or $100
in this case { are overweighted, and the mid-range `average' outcomes are
underweighted. Cumulative prospect theory therefore gives rise to what has
become known as the fourfold pattern of risk preferences: for high probability
outcomes, risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses; for low proba-
bility outcomes, risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992).
However, as will become evident, the distinction between prospect theory
and cumulative prospect theory is not important to this thesis. The experi-
32mental work presented in chapters 3 and 4 deals with xed binary outcomes
(ie. winning or losing in court rather than a continuous range of outcomes)
which have mid-range probabilities (40-60 percent). In this circumstance,
prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory make the same predictions.
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, only the original form of prospect theory
is considered for the remainder of this thesis.
Applications of Prospect Theory
As has been shown, prospect theory provides a descriptive explanation of
human decision making as it acknowledges the cognitive biases which allow
framing variables to manipulate risk preferences under uncertainty. Prospect
theory has been successfully applied to many dierent types of decision mak-
ing. In particular, the medical profession has benetted from the use of
framing to increase the eectiveness of health messages. Researchers have
argued that detection behaviours, which pose the risk of indicating disease,
create negative frames and cause risk seeking behaviour (Rothman & Sa-
lovey, 1997). Preventative behaviours, however, are the risk averse option as
they pose no threat to an individual's current beliefs about their health. For
example, Latimer et al. (2008) conducted an experiment which showed that
health messages involving information about only the benets of physical
activity (a gain frame) were more eective than those conveying the costs of
inactivity (a loss frame), or even both (mixed frame). These results are con-
sistent with ndings relating to activities such as HIV testing, breast cancer
33screening, sunscreen use and smoking (Latimer et al., 2008). This suggests
that health messages should emphasise the preventative value of the targeted
behaviour in order to improve their impact and likelihood of adoption.
Prospect theory has also been used to explain consumer behaviour re-
lating to the purchase of insurance. The insurance industry oers a natural
test-bed for prospect theory since, as mentioned earlier, insurance is inher-
ently related to probability and risk calculation. Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros,
and Kunreuther (2000) conducted an experiment into consumer preferences
for dierent types of insurance policies. Participants were presented with
one of two hypothetical insurance policies and asked to state whether or not
they would purchase the policy. The two policies ultimately cost the same
amount and oered the same coverage. The rst policy cost $1,000 per an-
num and charged a $600 excess fee, totalled across all claims for the year.
The second policy cost $1,600 and charged no excess, but instead provided
a $600 rebate per year, minus any claims made. That is, if no claims were
made, the rebate was $600; if there were claims totalling more than $600, no
rebate was received. Thus, the policies are identical in terms of nal wealth.5
The results showed that 44.3 percent of participants were willing to purchase
the policy with the excess, while 67.8 percent of participants were willing to
purchase the policy with the rebate. Johnson et al. argue that this is due
to framing: policies which charge an excess induce risk seeking behaviour as
5 Johnson and colleagues point out that the rebate policy is actually nancially inferior
as consumers cannot receive any interest on the $600, while the excess policy holders do.
34they involve the potential for future loss (over and above paying the initial
premium). The policy providing the rebate, however, suggests that possibil-
ity of a future gain, which is more appealing to consumers and encourages
risk averse behaviour (ie. the purchase of insurance).
Prospect theory has also been applied to litigation, and other elds more
structurally similar to litigation, such as work place negotiation and interna-
tional relations. This research will be reviewed in detail in the next chapter.
35Chapter 2
Litigation
Having reviewed the theoretical decision making literature, this chapter will
consider the problem posed by litigation, and how prospect theory may be
applied in order to explain litigant behaviour. The chapter consists of three
sections. The rst section will brie
y consider the economic models of legal
decision making and explain why these are not appropriate for litigation.
Having discarded these models, the second section will consider how prospect
theory can be applied to litigation and review the relevant literature in this
area. Given that empirical research into the application of prospect theory to
litigation is limited, practical applications in similar elds are also considered.
Experimental work in the eld of two-party price negotiation, especially that
conducted by Margaret Neale and Max Bazerman, is of particular interest
here. The nal section of this chapter will outline the basic premise of this
thesis and provide an overview of the experimental work which follows.
362.1 Economic Models of Suit and Settlement
Early models of litigation sought to explain litigant behaviour in terms of
expected utility (see for example Gould, 1973; Posner, 1973; Shavell, 1982).
Such models are known as economic models of suit and settlement and con-
tinue to dominate the eld of empirical legal studies (Rachlinski, 1996). This
section will show that these models are inadequate for two main reasons.
Firstly, because they cannot account for alterations to an individual's risk
preferences; and secondly (on a more practical note) because they provide
no means through which the rate of settlement may be manipulated. De-
spite this, these models will be (brie
y) reviewed in order to provide context
for the direction of current research. Also worth noting is that while it has
become increasingly accepted that economic models do not do a particularly
good job of explaining litigant behaviour, it is not clear that there is a better
theoretical alternative. Thus, economic models still enjoy some popularity,
particularly amongst legal practitioners, although they are increasingly being
supplemented by more psychologically motivated concerns.
According to Cooter and Rubineld (1989), researchers rst incorporated
economic models into legal theory in the 1960s { an idea which became
an \intellectual fad" in the 1970s (p. 1067). Interestingly, however, the
rst application of economic models to legal problems actually came three
centuries earlier. Pierre de Fermat, who collaborated with Pascal to create
expected value theory, was a lawyer by profession. His interest in the problem
37of points was a legal one: he was seeking a way to fairly resolve legal disputes
between individuals (Bernstein, 1996).
The combination of law and economics is a logical one, given their struc-
tural and theoretical similarities. For example, `economic man' is very similar
to the `reasonable person' of legal philosophy. Similarly, both elds deal with
situations involving rivalry, communication, side payments and interdepen-
dency (Cooter & Rubineld, 1989).
According to economic models of suit and settlement, a litigant's deci-
sion to accept a settlement oer is based on its expected utility (Gould, 1973;
Posner, 1973; Shavell, 1982). This view of legal decision making is perva-
sive, and has been embraced by legal practitioners. For example, US Federal
Court Judge Randall Rader proposed that litigants determine the value of
a lawsuit by multiplying the probability of winning in court by the amount
they are likely to win and then subtracting the legal costs (Rader, 2000).
Based on this calculation, a settlement oer is accepted if it is higher than
the expected value of the trial. Therefore, a disputant will go to court if, and
only if, it is the option with the highest expected utility. On this view, nego-
tiations fail due to diering estimates of the probability of winning at trial
by plaintis and defendants. Furthermore, the model suggests that relative
wealth, size of the trial outcome and probability of winning do not in
uence
the likelihood of two parties reaching a settlement, only the amount of the
settlement (for a review see Gould, 1973). The analysis also demonstrates
how risk averse litigants should be willing to pay more to achieve a riskless
38outcome (settlement).
However, despite their appeal, these models fail to account for litigant
behaviour. As stated, there are two main reasons for this. Firstly, models
of suit and settlement contemplate only risk-averse and risk-neutral decision
making and cannot account for risk-seeking behaviour. This is because indi-
viduals are assumed to be rational and seek to maximise their outcomes. On
this basis, individuals should be risk neutral, although the concave nature of
the utility function (described above at 1.2.2) also allows for risk-averse deci-
sion making. Therefore, the main proponents of suit and settlement models
(Gould, 1973; Posner, 1973; Shavell, 1982) do not seriously consider the pos-
sibility of an individual making risk-seeking decisions as such behaviour is
viewed as irrational. For example, Gould surmises that risk-seeking litigants
\would be better o not going to court and making the bet on the outcome of
a suitably chosen random number generator" (1973, p. 292-3). The failure
to contemplate the possibility of risk-seeking behaviour is problematic as it is
not consistent with human behaviour. As discussed, there is much empirical
evidence to support the proposition that individuals violate the principles of
rationality and exhibit risk-seeking behaviour (see above at 1.2.3 and 1.2.5).
The second problem with expected utility in this context 
ows as a con-
sequence of the rst: even if these models could account for all three types of
risk preference (aversion, neutrality and seeking), they still provide no way
of predicting which state individuals will adopt. While it is never explicitly
discussed, utility models of suit and settlement tend to treat risk preferences
39as being an internal, stable trait of individuals (that is, rational individuals
will be either risk averse or risk neutral). Thus, such models can only demon-
strate that risk averse or risk neutral decisions are optimal, but they cannot
predict them. Prospect theory, however, treats risk preferences as more tran-
sient states which are created (at least in part) by external in
uences. This
allows for the possibility of altering or manipulating risk preferences, which
according to prospect theory, can be done through the manipulation of ref-
erence points. This is one of the major advantages of prospect theory over
standard utility models.
Thus, while models of suit and settlement are able to explain both risk-
neutral and risk-averse decisions, they cannot explain, predict or control
the risk-seeking behaviour which individuals exhibit under circumstances of
uncertainty. Therefore, as Rachlinski (1996) points out, \modifying the eco-
nomic model with the theories of cognitive psychology would create a richer
and more accurate model of suit and settlement" (p. 116).
2.2 Prospect Theory and Negotiation
Acknowledging the need for a behavioural approach, negotiation researchers
have considered the ndings on heuristics and biases. As discussed, pre-trial
litigation is a form of negotiation and while it is structurally distinct from
normative bargaining, it is important to understand how the negotiation
literature overlaps with and in
uences litigation research.
40The scientic exploration of how people negotiate began in the 1960s, and
was investigated largely by social psychologists. According to Bazerman,
Curhan, Moore, and Valley (2000), the \cognitive revolution" of the late
1970s caused a decline in negotiation research, until Raia's 1982 book \The
Art and Science of Negotiation". Here, Raia distinguishes between the
\art" { dened by an individual's skill and experience { and the \science"
{ the systematic analysis of problem solving { of negotiation (Raia, 1982).
Bazerman et al. (2000) argue that Raia's work was a turning point for ne-
gotiation research for two reasons. Firstly, it explicitly acknowledged that
negotiators tend not to be fully rational and do not intuitively follow ra-
tional strategies. Secondly, in acknowledging this, Raia created a dialogue
between prescriptive and descriptive negotiation researchers. As Bazerman
et al. point out, there is a \prescriptive need to descriptively understand how
negotiators actually make decisions" (p. 292). This began a new eld of in-
vestigation which became known as `behavioural decision research'. Two of
the most prolic proponents of this literature have been Margaret Neale and
Max Bazerman, who have largely dened the eld of negotiation research
(especially in managerial and other two-party con
icts). This literature has
demonstrated support for the heuristics and biases approach in an applied
setting. For example, research indicates that negotiators tend to be dispro-
portionately in
uenced by readily available information (ie. the availability
heuristic, see for example Neale, 1984; Pinkley, Grith, & Northcraft, 1995)
and that they tend to be heavily in
uenced by anchoring (Kahneman, 1992;
41Northcraft & Neale, 1987).
Prospect theory has also been found to explain some negotiator be-
haviour. For example, Neale and Bazerman (1992) found that in simulated
negotiations, participants for whom the potential gains had been emphasised
(a positive frame) were more likely to reach an agreement and exhibited more
concessionary behaviour than their negatively framed counterparts who fo-
cused on their potential losses. Findings such as these are based on studies
from the literature on two-party price negotiations and managerial con
icts.
Thus, there is a rm theoretical basis upon which to consider the applica-
tion of prospect theory to negotiation. However, it is important to note that
two-party price negotiation and managerial con
icts are generally conducted
under normative bargaining conditions, whereas litigation is a form of crisis
bargaining (as discussed above at 1.1.2). Given this structural distinction, it
is unclear which (if any) of these ndings are generalisable to litigation and
it is this issue which is the focal point of this thesis.
In terms of experimental paradigms, there are two ways to investigate
the extent to which prospect theory can explain litigant behaviour. The
rst method involves the use of scenario evaluations (questionnaires) that
present the problem in explicit terms (for example, Rachlinski, 1996; Ko-
robkin & Guthrie, 1994, 1998). The second is a more dynamic but less
controlled approach that involves real-time, competitive simulated disputes,
similar to those used in the literature on two-party price negotiation. These
two paradigms { the scenario evaluation approach and the simulated nego-
42tiations { will form the experimental basis of the research presented in this
thesis. The remainder of this chapter will review this literature and make
clear the motivation for the experimental work which follows.
2.3 Prospect Theory and Litigation
2.3.1 Basic Application
The basic (theoretical) application of framing to litigation can be easily ex-
plained using Kahneman and Tversky's subjective value function (as shown
in Figure 3). For example, imagine a law suit where the plainti is suing the
defendant for $20,000 and both parties have an equal chance of winning in
court (50 percent). It is often assumed that plaintis generally face gains and
so are represented on the upper right quadrant of the value function. Dur-
ing pre-trial settlement negotiations, plaintis decide what is the minimum
amount of money they will receive in order to avoid a trial. During the trial
itself, the outcome will (usually) be expressed in terms of how much money
the plainti receives. Conversely, defendants are represented on the lower left
quadrant as it is often assumed that they usually face losses. This is because
during the pre-trial negotiations defendants must decide how much money
they will pay in order to achieve a settlement. Furthermore, the judgment
at trial will determine how much money (if any) the defendant will pay the
plainti.













Figure 3: Model of litigation settlement based on Kahneman and Tversky's
prospect theory (1983). The plainti's decision (upper right quadrant) is
represented as a choice between gains, while the defendant's decision (lower
left quadrant) is presented as a choice between losses.
4450 percent chance of winning and receiving $20,000 and a 50 percent chance
of losing at trial and receiving nothing. According to prospect theory, this
gamble can be represented as follows:
w(p):v($20;000) + w(1   p):v($0)
where w is the weighting function applied to the probability of winning in
court (p) and v is the subjective value. The exact weight assigned to each
probability is unknown but can be approximated so that w(p) = p. as the
probability of winning is 50 percent, the value of going to trial is therefore
1
2v($20;000)1, which is shown in Figure 3.
Similarly, for the defendant the decision to go to trial is a gamble with a
50 percent chance of winning and paying nothing, and a 50 percent chance
of losing at trial and paying $20,000. Therefore, using the some process as
for plaintis, the value of the trial is 1
2v( $20;000), which is also shown in
Figure 3
Imagine now that both parties are deciding whether or not to accept a
$10,000 settlement oer. The value of the settlement oer is v($10;000) as
according to prospect theory, w(1) = 1. The shape of the value function
shows that plaintis prefer the certain $10,000 over the gamble of a trial,
even though both outcomes have equal expected value. Prospect theory
therefore predicts risk aversion in plaintis as v($10;000) > 1
2v($20;000).
This is demonstrated in Figure 3. In contrast, defendants, facing losses, are
1The null term falls out since according to prosepct theory, v(0) = 0.
45expected to exhibit risk-seeking behaviour. This is because the value function
(which is convex for losses and concave for gains) means that the gamble is
relatively more attractive to defendants than the certain loss of $10,000, that
is v( $10;000) > 1
2v( $20;000). This is also shown in Figure 3.
2.3.2 One-Shot Scenario Evaluations
Van Koppen (1990) conducted an experiment to explore the extent to which
this framework can explain litigant behaviour. This was done using an experi-
mental paradigm which can be referred to as `one-shot scenario evaluations'.
The method is as follows, and most experiments using this paradigm (eg.
Rachlinski, 1996; Korobkin & Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie, 2000) follow approxi-
mately the same procedure. In the van Koppen study, participants (students
and lay people) were presented with a written legal scenario (approximately
half a page long), which brie
y outlined the facts of a contractual dispute
involving the purchase of a puppy from a breeder. The puppy died from a
congenital heart defect shortly after delivery, and the dispute is regarding
payment for the puppy. In this experiment, participants were placed either
in the role of the seller (breeder) or the purchaser, however the facts were
altered slightly so that either party could be the plainti or the defendant2.
2In one set of facts, the purchaser paid for the puppy upon collection, so that the
purchaser becomes the plainti who is suing the breeder (the defendant) for the cost of
the puppy. In the alternate version, the purchaser was due to pay two months after
collection, by which time the puppy has died, so payment is withheld. The purchaser
therefore becomes the defendant, who is being sued by the breeder for the cost of the
puppy.
46Some versions of the scenarios indicated the probability of winning (either
40 or 60 percent, depending on the condition) while others did not.
After reading the scenarios, participants were asked to estimate their
probability of winning in court (unless they were given that information)
and to indicate their `reservation price'. That is, if the defendant, the max-
imum they would be willing to pay to avoid going to court. If the plainti,
the reservation price is the minimum payment they would accept to avoid
going to court. Consistent with the analysis presented above (Figure 3), van
Koppen (1990) predicted that plaintis would be risk averse and therefore
indicate low reservation prices in order to avoid court. That is, setting a low
reservation price increases the probability of obtaining the certain outcome
(a settlement), as the lower the plainti's oer, the greater the likelihood
that the defendant will accept. Conversely, defendants are facing losses and
should exhibit risk seeking behaviour, which will also be in the form of low
reservation prices. This is because the defendant is relatively willing to risk
a trial and therefore has little motivation to increase their reservation price
above the expected value of the trial.
Van Koppen found support for these propositions in two out of four ex-
periments, providing preliminary support for the application of framing to
litigation. One problem with van Koppen's experiment however, was that
the facts were altered between the dierent versions of the scenario in order
to allow both the breeder and purchaser to be allocated the role of plainti
or defendant. This means that role and frame were perfectly confounded.
47That is, even though both buyers and sellers could be plaintis and defen-
dants, plainti outcomes were always described in terms of gains (positive
frame) and defendant outcomes were always described in terms of losses (neg-
ative frame). This makes it dicult to distinguish between the eects of role
and frame. It is therefore not possible to attribute the observed dierences
entirely to framing.
Rachlinski (1996) further supported van Koppen's ndings using a legal
scenario which was closer in form to Kahneman and Tversky's Asian dis-
ease problem. Participants were presented with the same legal dispute from
the point of view of either the plainti or the defendant. After reading the
materials, the participants were asked to choose between two options; ac-
cepting a xed settlement or risk going to trial with an equivalent expected
outcome. There were eight experimental conditions which varied both the
probability of each party winning at trial and the amount of money involved.
For example, in one scenario the amount in dispute was $100,000 and the
choice was between accepting a settlement oer of $30,000 or to go to trial
where there was a 30 percent chance of winning and receiving $100,000 and
a 70 percent chance of losing and eectively receiving nothing. Overall, the
results were consistent with dierential framing of plaintis and defendants
with 82 percent of plaintis choosing to settle compared with only 45 percent
of defendants.
Rachlinski (1996) also used court records to show that real settlement ne-
gotiations are consistent with prospect theory. Rachlinski analysed over 500
48civil court proceedings, only using cases where information on the preceding
settlement negotiations was available. Each case was coded into one of three
categories. Cases were coded as `plainti error' if the trial outcome was below
the defendant's nal oer. That is, if the plainti would have been better
o (nancially) if they had accepted the out of court settlement oer, rather
than going to trial. Cases were coded as `defendant error' if the trial outcome
was higher than the plainti's nal oer. That is, when the defendant would
have been better o accepting the nal settlement oer. The third classi-
cation was `no error', given to cases where the trial outcome fell between
the plainti and the defendant's nal oer. Across the 500 cases analysed,
Rachlinski found that plainti errors were more common (56 percent) than
both defendant errors (23 percent) and no errors (21 percent).
Despite plainti errors occurring more frequently, Rachlinski found that
defendants, on average, lost more money by choosing to go to trial. By
multiplying the mean size of each error (that is, the average dierence be-
tween the other party's nal oer and the trial outcome) by its probability
of occurrence, Rachlinski found that plaintis lost an average of $15,532 per
case by choosing to go to trial. In contrast, failure to reach a settlement
cost defendants an average of $81,638 per case. This analysis suggests that
defendants are more risk seeking as their oers were too low to induce set-
tlement. According to Rachlinski, this risk seeking behaviour is indicative of
a negative frame. Conversely, plaintis were considered risk averse as their
mean `error' was smaller than that of defendants. Plainti settlement oers
49were therefore much closer to their average outcome in court. According to
prospect theory, this risk aversion is due to a positive frame.
Role, Frame and Reference Points
Previous research therefore suggests that prospect theory may provide an ex-
planation for litigant behaviour. This synopsis also highlights the underlying
assumption which has driven litigation research to date { that role dierences
are due to framing dierences. This assumption appears to have begun with
Hogarth (1987), who is credited with making the rst link between prospect
theory and litigation (Guthrie, 2000). In his multi-disciplinary guide to deci-
sion making, Hogarth states that \perspectives or frames are implied by the
role a person brings to a situation" (1987, p. 105). He further hypothesised
that plaintis and defendants face mirror-image, zero-sum decisions. More
specically, plaintis adopt a positive frame and are therefore risk averse,
while defendants' risk seeking behaviour arises from their negative frame. As
demonstrated, this idea has since been adopted and empirically tested by
van Koppen (1990), and Rachlinski (1996).
Prospect theory, however, does not predict that plaintis and defendants
will necessarily adopt positive and negative frames (respectively). Frame
adoption depends on the evaluation of outcomes in terms of gains and losses
from a given reference point. Indeed, there is no research which suggests that
role denitively determines frame. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the process of reference point adoption is relatively understudied (Butler,
502007) and therefore not well understood. The assumption that plaintis
and defendants will be positively and negatively framed relies on the further
assumption that both parties will adopt the status quo as their reference
point. This is demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5, for plaintis and defendants
respectively. Figure 4 illustrates the situation where a plainti suddenly
experiences signicant damage (represented on the y-axis by a loss of wealth
from $0 to  $20,000) allegedly caused by the defendant as a result of the
circumstances which gave rise to the legal dispute. From that post-incident
position (the status quo, marked by A), the plainti is choosing amongst
gains (creating a positive frame). Figure 5 illustrates how the situation is
reversed for the defendant, whose status quo reference point (also marked by
A) means that they are choosing between losses, thus leading to a negative
frame.
The status quo is just one possible reference point that parties may adopt.
Kahneman and Tversky themselves point out that an individual's expecta-
tions could be just as important in the determination of reference points {
a proposition that was further supported by Koszegi and Rabin (2006). If
expectations in
uence reference points, there are many situations which may
cause litigants to evaluate their options based on their `pre-incident' posi-
tion. For example, imagine the plainti who is making a personal injury
claim against an insurance company following a motor-vehicle accident. Be-
lieving the accident to be the other driver's fault, the plainti may expect





















Figure 4: Plainti's evaluation of outcomes from two reference points, A and






















Figure 5: Defendant's evaluation of outcomes from two reference points, A
and B. Outcomes are evaluated as losses relative to A but are evaluated as
gains relative to B.
52repairs and medical treatment. If, after commencing litigation, they discover
they will not be fully reimbursed, the plainti will be choosing amongst losses
and may exhibit risk-seeking behaviour, as caused by a negative frame. This
is illustrated in Figure 4 by the pre-incident reference point B.
Similarly, there is no reason why a defendant could not adopt a positive
frame based on their pre-incident position. For example, imagine the de-
fendant who expects to lose a certain amount of money as a result of their
actions - anything less than anticipated would therefore represent a gain. A
common example of this type of defendant would be the editor of a tabloid
magazine who knowingly decides to print defamatory articles. Such editors
expect to be sued by the defamed individual but calculate that they will sell
enough extra magazines to ensure a prot. Therefore, any settlement oer
which is less than the calculated loss could be viewed as a gain. Another
example of this type of reasoning is the calculation of insurance premiums
and the assessment of associated claims.3 Thus, there is no reason to assume
a defendant will necessarily adopt a negative frame. Instead they may adopt
a positive frame and become more risk averse. This situation is summarised
in Figure 5 by the pre-incident reference point B. From this position, both
a win at trial and the settlement oer appear as gains.
This analysis suggests that role and frame are independent constructs.
If this is true, there is no theoretical reason to assume that plaintis and
3Prospect theory has been successfully applied to decision making in the insurance
industry, both in terms of claim assessment and individual preference for dierent types
of cover. See for example Johnson et al. (2000).
53defendants need to adopt opposite frames. Indeed, if it is possible for both
parties to adopt positive frames the chance of negotiating a settlement should
increase. That is, plaintis should be risk averse and therefore willing to
accept a lower settlement oer. Similarly, defendants would also want to
avoid court, thus providing higher maximum oers. In combination, this
should increase the likelihood of overlap between the two parties' reservation
prices, resulting in a higher settlement rate.
One previous study by Korobkin and Guthrie (1994) attempted to apply
this pattern of framing to plaintis. In this study, participants were told
that they had been involved in a motor vehicle accident in which they had
sustained damages worth $28,000 and that according to their lawyer they
would receive either $10,000 or $28,000 at trial, depending on how the judge
interpreted a clause in the relevant insurance policy. They were also told that
the defendant (the insurance company) had made a nal oer of $21,000, and
were asked to indicate whether they would accept such an oer. Participants
were then given further information that placed them in either a positive or
negative frame. In the positive frame, participants were told that their total
damages consisted of $14,000 in medical bills that had already been paid
by their health insurance fund and a further $14,000 corresponding to the
value of their motor vehicle. In the negative frame, participants were told
that their total damages consisted of $4,000 in medical bills that had already
been paid by their health insurance fund and a further $24,000 corresponding
54to the value of their motor vehicle.4 Faced with these alternatives, Korobkin
and Guthrie found that 90 percent of positively framed plaintis would either
probably or denitely accept the oer, while only 64 percent of the negatively
framed plaintis responded in the same way.5
Although Korobkin and Guthrie concluded that framing can alter a plain-
ti's propensity to settle, their results are not easily interpreted for two
reasons. Firstly, the two `frames' create an objective dierence in terms of
outcomes. That is, if the plainti in the positive frame accepts the oer, they
will be $7,000 better o than before the accident. Conversely, the settlement
oer represents an objective nal loss of $3,000 for negatively framed plain-
tis. This is not a true framing manipulation as it alters objective outcomes,
not just reference points.
The second issue with this study is that the reference point for both
positive and negative frames is ambiguous. Figure 6 presents the structures
of the positive and negative frames used by Korobkin and Guthrie (1994) in
the same form as shown in Figures 4 and 5. It is apparent that unlike the
Asian disease problem, the scenarios used by Korobkin and Guthrie create
4The type of motor vehicle was varied between the two versions in order to account for
the dierence in value. In the positive frame, the plainti was driving a Toyota Corola,
while in the negative frame they had a BMW. Therefore, in addition to providing multiple
reference points (explained below), Korobkin and Guthrie (1994) also varied the facts of
the scenarios between frames. Methodologically, this adds further possible confounds to
the interpretation of their results.
5Similar results were reported for the other two scenarios which were presented in the
same study. These involved a property dispute with a neighbour and a child custody
dispute between parents. The framing manipulations followed a similar pattern to that of















































Figure 6: Outcome structures used by Korobkin & Guthrie (1994). Positive
or gain frame (top) and negative or loss frame (bottom).
56three events on the timeline. These are dened by the incident, corresponding
to the total damages incurred through the accident, initial recompense of
medical bills, and the nal prospect. As a result, there are three distinct
reference points, A, B, and C, and only from point B do the outcomes of the
prospect dier between the two frames. This means that if the dierence in
settlement rates is to be attributed to the dierence in framing, it can only
be because some proportion of participants chose to evaluate the prospect
from the pre-incident point B. The problem here is that there is nothing in
the scenario which would suggest that they should do this.
If plaintis were to adopt a pre-incident reference point (B), it would con-
tradict the interpretation oered by both van Koppen (1990) and Rachlinski
(1996) of their results for which they assumed that plaintis would evalu-
ate the prospect from the post-incident point A (or C). It is also apparent
that from any of the three reference points, the values of the outcomes dif-
fered between the two framing conditions. It is therefore dicult to attribute
these results to the eect of framing alone. This leaves the issue of whether
prospect theory can be applied to litigation is still largely unanswered.
The possibility that role and frame may be independent constructs was
explored by Gilliland and Dunn (2008).6 The study sought to investigate
the relationship between role and frame by framing plaintis and defendants
in terms of both gains and losses. This was done by placing participants
6 As explained at the beginning of the next chapter, experiment 1 of Gilliland and
Dunn (2008) was conducted as part of my honours research.
57Figure 7: The probability of settlement for each role/frame condition for each
scenario based on the yes/no data from experiment 1 of Gilliland & Dunn
(2008).
in the role of either a plainti or defendant and asking them to consider a
legal scenario. The scenario included the basic facts of the case, details of a
settlement oer and a lawyer's advice regarding the probability of winning
in court. Participants were then asked to indicate whether or not they would
accept the oer and settle out of court. Participants responded in each of
the four conditions - positively framed plainti, negatively framed plainti,
positively framed defendant and negatively framed defendant.
The results of Gilliland and Dunn (2008) suggest that role and frame
are indeed independent constructs and that the eects of framing are not
contingent upon role. These ndings are inconsistent with previous research
as they suggest that frame can alter preference for normatively equivalent
58outcomes for both plaintis and defendants. The results of this experiment
are presented in Figure 7, which show framing to have a systematic and
highly signicant eect across all scenarios. The eect was always in the
same direction, with positively framed litigants more likely to settle than
their negatively framed counterparts. The magnitude of the eect was also
fairly consistent - on average, positively framed litigants were approximately
25 percent more likely to accept the settlement oer. This is demonstrated
in Figure 7.
The results found by Gilliland and Dunn (2008) are consistent with
the predictions of prospect theory, as proposed by Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979). Indepndent of role, negatively framed litigants, for whom the
potential losses have been highlighted, are more risk seeking and therefore
less likely to settle out of court. Conversely, positively framed litigants are
more risk averse as they are choosing amongst gains, and therefore nd the
certainty of settlement more attractive than the gamble of going to court.
Gilliland and Dunn (2008) found that role had only a minor overall eect
on settlement decisions. This is most likely because the direction and mag-
nitude of the eect diered for each scenario (evident from Figure 7), with
neither party consistently more likely to settle than the other. This eect was
not predicted by either economic theory or past research. Thus, the starting
point for this thesis is to further explore the results of Gilliland and Dunn
(2008, Experiment 1), with an overall aim to consider how framing may be
used to induce settlement during legal disputes.
592.4 Overview of Experiments
The primary aim of this thesis is to consider whether Kahneman and Tver-
sky's prospect theory can explain litigant behaviour and, in doing so, to
consider whether framing might be used to increase the likelihood of parties
negotiating an out of court settlement. Studies 1 and 2 build on the ndings
of Gilliland and Dunn (2008) by appropriately applying prospect theory to
litigation, based on the original formulation of the Asian disease problem.
These studies suggest that role and frame are independent constructs, and
that positively framed litigants are more likely to settle than their negatively
framed counterparts.
Study 3 attempted to apply the ndings from the one-shot paradigm
to a more dynamic approach { simulated negotiations. This study uses a
procedure similar to that employed by Neale and Bazerman (1985, 1992)
and others in relation to two-party price negotiation and managerial con
ict.
Study 4 follows the same form as Study 3, but introduces court costs and
legal fees. To the author's knowledge, Studies 3 and 4 are the rst exami-
nation of framing eects in litigation during live negotiations. Studies 5, 6
and 7 return to the one-shot scenario evaluation paradigm in an attempt to
determine whether the results found in Studies 3 and 4 are due to the change
in methodology, the introduction of court costs, or some other factor.
The experimental work presented in this thesis, including the major inde-
pendent variables, is summarised in Table 1. The `design' variable re
ects the
60experimental paradigm used, where SE refers to the one-shot scenario eval-
uation studies, while SN denotes simulated negotiations. `Costs' indicates
whether or not participants were asked to consider legal fees in their decision
making process (yes/no). `Judgment' refers to how participants were told
the trial decision would be made   either based on evidentiary concerns (E)
or dependent on which judge presides over the trial (J). The nal variable
presented in Table 1 is `scenarios' which refers to the cover stories used in
each study. The cover stories were either the originals (O) used by Gilliland
and Dunn (2008), or adapted scenarios (A), which follow the same general
pattern as the originals. Studies 5, 6 and 7 (marked A*) used three of the
adapted scenarios and one of the originals.
61Table 1: Overview of experimental manipulations across all 7 studies pre-
sented in this thesis.
Study n Design Costs Judgment Scenarios
1 192 SE N E O
2 216 SE N E O
3 20 SN N J A
4 56 SN Y J A
5 144 SE Y J A*
6 112 SE N J A*
7 189 SE N E A*
62Chapter 3
One-shot Scenario Evaluations
Note Regarding Published Work
Much of the work for Studies 1 and 2 (including their subsequent com-
bination and re-analysis) is contained within a paper published in Judgment
and Decision Making in October, 2008. `Experiment 1' in that paper (which
is discussed in the previous chapter) refers to work relating to my honours
project, and does not form part of this thesis. `Experiment 2', however, is
made up of the rst two studies presented here, which marks the beginning of
my doctoral candidature. The paper, as published, is contained in Appendix
A for reference.
633.1 Study 1
This study seeks to extend the work of Gilliland and Dunn (2008). As dis-
cussed, experiment 1 of Gilliland and Dunn (2008) was the rst to illustrate
that role and frame were independent constructs. In addition to this, the ex-
periment revealed an unexpected result which provides the impetus for the
current study. Although analysis revealed that there was little or no overall
dierence between plaintis and defendants in their propensity to settle, the
eect of legal role varied considerably between the dierent factual scenar-
ios used. In marked contrast to the view that plaintis are always more risk
averse than defendants, the results of Gilliland and Dunn (2008) showed that
it is possible, under some circumstances, for plaintis to be less likely to settle
than defendants, independently of how they frame the dispute. For example,
in scenario 3 of their study, Gilliland and Dunn found that, on average, the
probability of a plainti settling was 52 percent, whereas defendants chose
to settle in 75.5 percent of cases.
A supercially similar result was reported by Guthrie (2000), who found
that defendants were more willing to settle than plaintis in `frivolous' liti-
gation, in which plaintis have little or no chance of winning at trial. In this
case, according to prospect theory, plaintis over-weight their small prob-
ability of winning while defendants under-weight their high probability of
winning, leading to a preference inversion. This mechanism does not directly
explain the results of Gilliland and Dunn since both plaintis and defendants
64were told that they had equal chances of winning at trial.
Although the probability of winning at trial was xed at 50 percent, it is
possible that participants departed from this gure in estimating their own
subjective probability of winning, although not to the extent examined by
Guthrie (2000). This estimation could have been based on the content of each
scenario and the participants' general knowledge and experience of the law. If
there were systematic dierences between scenarios in the subjective chance
of winning at trial, this would aect settlement rates and could account for
the variable eect of role. Study 1 investigates this possibility by asking
participants to provide estimates of their chance of winning at trial.
Another possible explanation for the seemingly inconsistent role eect is
that participants may have been basing their responses on perceptions of
justice and morality. As van Koppen (1990) points out, paying participants
can aect their motivations and hence alter their decision making process.
Participants in Experiment 1 of Gilliland and Dunn (2008) were unpaid and
were not gambling with their own money. It is possible this caused partic-
ipants to give socially desirable responses, based on perceptions of fairness,
rather than more personal motives such as nancial success. If true, this
would make the seemingly more righteous parties less willing to settle - a
hypothesis which, prima facie, ts the data. For example, in the contractual
dispute of scenario 3, the facts can be read so as to suggest that the defen-
dant dishonestly `ripped o' his business partner, the plainti. This could
explain why the defendants were signicantly more willing to settle - they
65felt they were on morally weaker ground.
It is important to realise that this explanation is dierent from suggesting
that parties inferred their own ideas about their chances of success at trial.
To say that an individual may feel they are morally wrong is dierent to
saying that they feel they would lose in court. Indeed, there is no necessary
link between morality and the law. Van Koppen (1990) found some support
for the hypothesis that parties who feel they will lose at court are more risk-
seeking and hence less likely to settle than those who feel they will win. While
counter-intuitive, this nding is consistent with prospect theory literature.
For example, prospect theory has been used to explain why investors will
often sell shares which increase in value, and hold onto those whose value
declines - a similar concept to refusing to settle out of court despite expecting
to lose.
This `fairness hypothesis' could also explain scenario 2, which exhibited
no role eect. The defendant wrongly built on the plainti's land, but the
plainti exhibited greed by attempting to elicit more compensation than the
land was worth. Thus, respondents favoured neither party. Using the same
scenarios, Study 1 will explore this idea further by asking participants to




The participants were 192 psychology students (49 males) at the University
of Adelaide who received course credit for their participation. They were
aged between 16 and 39 (M = 19:6, SD = 4:01) and were randomly assigned
to one of four groups. There were no other exclusion criteria.
Materials
Participants completed a paper questionnaire consisting of four legal scenar-
ios. Each scenario was presented in one of four test conditions dened by
the factorial combination of role (plainti or defendant) and frame (positive
or negative). Thus, each scenario could be presented to participants either
as a positively framed plainti (P+), a negatively framed plainti (P-), a
positively framed defendant (D+) or a negatively framed defendant (D-).
The assignment of scenarios to each role/frame combination was counter-
balanced across four dierent versions of the questionnaire. In each version,
the four scenarios were always presented in the same order, and the order
of each role/frame condition was counter balanced using a Latin square ar-
rangement, as shown in Table 2.
Each scenario outlined the facts of a legal dispute which could plausibly
be presented in both positive and negative frames for both the plainti and
67Table 2: Latin Square arrangement of condition for each version of the ques-
tionnaire.
Scenario
Version 1 2 3 4
1 P+ P- D- D+
2 D- D+ P+ P-
3 P- D- D+ P+
4 D+ P+ P- D-
the defendant. Version 1 of the questionnaire is presented in Appendix B and
includes samples of all four scenarios. The rst scenario involved a defama-
tion claim between a shop owner and a newspaper. The second scenario
outlined a property dispute between an investor and a bed-and-breakfast op-
erator. The third scenario was a contractual dispute between two business
partners regarding entitlement to income and the fourth scenario described
an inheritance dispute between two cousins. In each case, it was stated that
the plainti was suing the defendant for $20,000 and that the chance of win-
ning at trial was 50%. If the plainti won at trial then the defendant would
have to pay the full $20,000. Alternatively, if the plainti lost at trial then
the defendant would have to pay nothing. For simplicity, there were no legal
costs associated with the case.
Each scenario established the relevant legal role by means of an initial
statement of the form: `You are the plainti/defendant in a litigation suit'.
The relevant frame was established through alternative wording of the trial
outcomes and the oer. For example, in the rst scenario, the trial outcome
68in the P+ condition is described as follows:
`Your lawyer has estimated that you have a 50% chance that the
judge will rule in your favour and you will receive $20,000 in
compensation and a 50% chance that the judge will rule against
you and you will receive nothing in compensation.'
In the D- condition, the phrase, `receive in compensation' was replaced by
the phrase `pay in compensation'. In the P- condition, this phrase was
replaced by the phrase, `lose in income', while in the D+ condition, it was
replaced by the phrase, `keep in new income'.
The Settlement Oer. After reading the facts of the case, participants
were informed that their opponent had made a nal oer to settle for $10,000.
They were told that it was `the night before the trial was due to begin' and
that the decision to accept or reject the oer must be made immediately,
and that it would be nal. This was done in order to avoid any attempt
at strategic behaviour, such as holding out for a better oer. As with the
facts of the scenarios themselves, the wording used to convey the settlement
oer was dependent upon the role/frame condition. For example, the P+
condition, participants were told: `If you accept this oer, you will receive
$10,000 in compensation.'
Following the same format as outlined above, negatively framed plaintis
were warned that accepting the oer would mean losing the new income. The
decision was presented to defendants in a corresponding format.
Subjective Probability of Winning. After indicating whether they
69would accept the settlement oer, participants were asked the following ques-
tion:
`Your lawyer has advised that you have a 50% chance of win-
ning in court. Based on the details provided, what chance (as a
percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court?'
It was hoped that this would provide an estimate of each participants'
subjective probability of winning for each role/frame condition.
Moral `Right'. After completing all four scenarios, participants were
asked to indicate, on a ve point scale, which party they thought was morally
justied (`in the right') for each scenario. The scale ranged from 1 (`plain-
ti denitely in the right') to 5 (`defendant denitely in the right'), with 3
indicating `plainti and defendant equally right'. The scale, as presented to
participants, is contained in Appendix B. This task was presented at the end
of the questionnaire, after participants had completed all previous questions,
so that it would not interfere with their initial judgment of the scenarios.
Design and Procedure
This Study was presented via a pencil and paper test, and participants were
randomly allocated to one of four groups, corresponding to the version of
the questionnaire they received. They were asked to read and respond to
all four scenarios in the order in which they were presented. They were
further instructed to consider each scenario separately and to make their
70decision solely on the basis of the details provided, without regard to legal
fees or court costs. They were also asked not to view the scenarios as moral
dilemmas, as both plaintis and defendants would feel that their position was
correct (even though they are asked to make such a judgment at the end of
the experiment, it was hoped that this instruction would prevent participants
from considering this while making judgments about settlement).
3.1.2 Results
Settlement Rates
Figure 8 shows the overall proportion of accepted settlements collapsed over
scenario as a function of legal role and frame. The data were analysed using
logistic regression with each response treated as an independent observation.
The pattern of results is similar to that found in Experiment 1 of Gilliland
and Dunn (2008), with the analysis revealing a signicant eect of frame,
2(1) = 30:22, p < :001; a marginally signicant interaction between role
and frame, 2(1) = 4:45, p = :035; and no eect of legal role, 2(1) = 0:17,
p = :682:
Figure 9 shows the pattern of results for each scenario. Although the
frame eect appears to be less pronounced in these data, the variable eect
of role was replicated. The eect of frame was signicant (p < :05) in three of
the four scenarios, 2(1) = 4:33, 26:76, 4:78, 2:42; respectively. The exception









































Figure 8: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role




















Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 9: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role and
frame for each scenario.
72likely to settle than negatively framed litigants. In contrast to experiment 1
of Gilliland and Dunn (2008), the eect of role was signicant (p < :01) in all
four Scenarios, 2(1) = 22:79, 8:94, 24:95; and 20:58, respectively. Collapsed
across frame, plaintis were more likely to settle in scenarios 1 and 3, and
less likely to settle in Scenarios 2 and 4. The interaction between role and
frame was not signicant in any scenario.
Subjective Probability of Winning
Figure 10 shows the average subjective probability of a plainti win as a
function of role/frame condition and scenario. This reveals two main results.
First, there are substantial dierences between the scenarios in terms of the
estimated chance of the plainti winning, 2(3) = 168:13, p < :001; by
Friedman's test. Overall, participants tended to agree that the plainti had
the greatest chance of winning at trial in scenario 3, followed, in decreasing
order, by scenarios 2, 1, and 4. In fact, despite being informed that there
was always a 50% chance of winning at trial, participants provided a wide
range of estimates for what they believed to be the actual chance. These
estimates covered the full range from 0% to 100%, and were approximately
normally distributed with an overall mean of 52.1% and a standard deviation
of 21.9%.1
The second main result was that the estimated chance of the plainti
1The assumption of normality is not technically appropriate here, given that probability
is a bounded range, which may cause the tails of the distribution to be condensed. However,
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Figure 10: Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function of
role/frame condition for each scenario.
winning at trial was only slightly aected by role and frame. By and large,
both plaintis and defendants formed a similar opinion of the likelihood of
each winning at trial. That is, while there were some dierences in subjective
probability of winning between conditions, the size of these eects were very
small, explaining only 2.2% of the variance in probability estimates. Despite
this, however, there were some small and intriguing eects. First, there
is some evidence of a self-serving bias with plaintis tending to estimate
their chances of winning as being higher than that estimated by defendants,
especially in the negative frame condition. Second, being in a negative frame
increased the subjective estimate that one would win at trial. This is revealed
in Figure 10 by an increase in the estimated probability of a plainti win
for plaintis in a negative frame coupled with a decrease in the estimated
74probability of a plainti win, and hence an increase in the probability of a
defendant win, for defendants in a negative frame.
Subjective Probability and Settlement Rates
In order to test the hypothesis that variation in the eect of role across sce-
narios is due to variation in the subjective probability of winning at trial,
the data from each scenario were re-analyzed using subjective probability
as a covariate. The results of the overall analysis (across all scenarios)
showed, as would be expected, that perceived probability of winning is a
strong predictor of settlement, 2(1) = 340:88, p < :001: Furthermore, once
variation in subjective probability has been controlled for, the role eect
disappears, 2(1) = 1:27, p = :26; and only the eect of frame remains,
2(1) = 21:75, p < :001: The interaction between role and frame was un-
changed, 2(1) = 1:94, p = :163:
Analysis of the individual scenarios revealed a similar pattern, with sub-
jective probability highly signicant (p < :001) for all scenarios. With the
covariate removed, the eect of frame remained signicant (p < 0:05) in sce-
narios 1, 2 and 3, 2(1) = 4:38, 18:29, 5:74; respectively. In contrast, the
eect of role was eliminated in each scenario except scenario 3, 2(1) = 1:45,
1:14, 4:85 (p = :028); and 1.72, respectively. The interaction between role
and frame did not approach signicance in any scenario.
75Moral Right
Analysis of the data from the `moral right' likert scale reveals a strong, pos-
itive correlation2 between perceived moral justication and the subjective
probability of winning (r = :795; p < :001). This suggests that the higher
the (subjective) chance of the defendant winning, the more likely they are to
be considered morally justied in their position, and vice versa.
3.1.3 Discussion
The main discussion for this study is contained in section 3.3, where the data
from Studies 1 and 2 are re-analysed together. As discussed below, this is
due to the possible contamination eects caused by asking participants to
report their subjective probability of winning after stating whether or not
they would accept the $10,000 settlement oer. As one anonymous reviewer
pointed out, it could be that participants were tting their estimates to their
decisions. For this reason, Study 2 reverses the order of presentation and the
results are discussed below.
However, before moving onto Study 2, the implications of the moral right
data should be brie
y discussed. The data show a strong relationship between
perceived moral justication and the subjective probability of winning. It is
not clear which factor is driving the relationship, and there is much to be
2Pearsons correlation is not the correct mode of correlation for one ordinal and one
continuous variable. However, it is a robust test and treating an ordinal variable as
continuous makes little dierence when considering eects of this magnitude.
76learnt about people's perception of the relationship between morality and
the law. This line of research is beyond the scope of this thesis. What is
important to note for now is that in terms of the decision making process, it
is apparent that the moral right scale is providing little information over and
above the subjective probability of winning. Therefore, the issue of moral
justication will not be pursued in subsequent experiments.
3.2 Study 2
While maintaining the main design from the previous study, Study 2 con-
tained some slight changes to the methodology and sought to further de-
ne the dierences between the experimental conditions of role and frame.
Firstly, for reasons largely relating to eciency, this Study was presented
to participants online, rather than via paper and pencil test. The facts of
each scenario were presented in a single screen, along with their associated
questions. This prevented participants from retrospectively altering their
responses after reading a new scenario. It was expected that this would in-
crease the likelihood that participants would treat each scenario individually,
minimising interference from previous decisions.
In a similar vein, the order of the questions relating to settlement and
subjective probability were reversed. Participants were rst asked to consider
what they believed their chance of winning was, and then asked whether
they would accept a $10,000 settlement oer. It was hoped that this would
77overcome any potential contamination eects caused by participants tting
their subjective probability to match their response to the settlement oer.
In addition to this, the description of the objective probability was altered
for all scenarios. The range of subjective probabilities reported in Study 1 was
surprising, given that all parties were provided with an objective 50% chance
of winning. As one anonymous reviewer commented, the scenarios contained
`very few facts that would provide a basis for the subjects to question that
estimate. It is remarkable they did not all say 50%'. One possible reason
for participants' reluctance to accept the objective estimate could be that
50% sounds too arbitrary or unrealistic, given the seemingly unpredictable
nature of the law. If this is the case, people may simply be ignoring the
provided estimate in favour of their own understanding of the law. With
this in mind, the scenarios in Study 2 were altered to provide an estimate of
40-60% chance of winning. While obviously this estimate still converges on
50%, it was expected that providing such a range would more successfully
anchor responses to the 50% criterion.
Study 2 also attempted to gain further insight into each party's reser-
vation price, or `bottom line'. Asking whether participants will accept a
specic oer (in this case, $10,000), provides only a point estimate of their
willingness to settle. Asking plaintis the minimum amount of money for
which they would prefer to settle rather than risk court proceedings, should
provide a probability distribution which can be compared between frames.
The same is true for defendants, however their reservation price is the max-
78imum amount of money they are willing to pay in order to avoid going to
court. It was hoped that these measures would provide a better basis upon
which the experimental manipulations of role and frame may be compared.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
The participants were 216 psychology students (64 males) at the University of
Adelaide who received course credit for their participation. They were aged
between 17 and 49 (M = 19:97;SD = 4:49) and were randomly assigned to
one of four groups.
Materials and Design
This study was presented online3 and used the same four scenarios as Study
1. However, the description of the chance of winning in court was altered
for all scenarios. Participants were informed they had a `40-60% chance of
winning in court', regardless of their role or frame. Additionally, participants
were asked to provide their subjective probability of winning directly after
reading the facts of the case, rather than after the settlement oer, as was
the case in Study 1.
Finally, after indicating whether or not they would accept a $10,000 set-
tlement oer, participants were asked to consider what their nal oer (reser-
3The open source software LimeSurvey was used, and is available at www.limesurvey.org
79vation price) would be, in order to avoid going to court. For plaintis, this
would be the minimum amount of money they would demand in order to
avoid proceeding to trial. Conversely, for defendants, this would be the max-
imum amount of money they would be willing to pay the plainti in order
to settle out of court. Participants were asked to indicate their bottom line
`regardless of whether they had accepted or rejected the settlement oer'.
Participants were not asked to provide an index of moral justication as in
Study 1.
3.2.2 Results
Given that part of the reason this study was conducted was to explore pos-
sible order eects in Study 1, most of the formal analysis of settlement rates
and subjective probability will be reported in section 3.3 below. That section
presents a re-analysis of data from Studies 1 and 2 combined, and contains a
lengthy discussion of these results. However, before considering the combined
data, the main results of this experiment will be summarised.
Settlement Rates
Figure 11 demonstrates the overall proportion of accepted settlements col-
lapsed over scenario as a function of legal role and frame. The overall pattern
is similar to that found in Study 1. Statistical analysis revealed a signicant
eect of frame, 2(1) = 32:38; p < :001 and a marginally signicant eect of









































Figure 11: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
(plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) averaged across
scenarios for Study 2.
Subjective Probability of Winning
In this study, participants were told they had a 40-60% chance of winning
in court (compared with 50% in Study 1), which seems to have had only a
limited aect on subjective estimates. Independent t-tests were conducted
between Study 1 and Study 2 probability estimates to conrm this. The
analyses reveal only two signicant results: for positively framed plaintis in
scenario 1 (p = :035) and negatively framed plaintis in scenario 2 (p = :023).
However, the eect size for these dierences are very small (2 = :033 and
:039, respectively). Thus, it seems likely that these results are simply an
artefact of the larger number of observations. It is worth noting, however,
that in all cases, the variance of the probability estimates in Study 2 were
81less than those in Study 1 (as demonstrated by the standard deviations and
several signicant results for Levene's Test for equality of variance). Thus,
while the experimental manipulation did not alter the mean or the range
(both experiments yielded the full range from 0 to 100%), it does seem to
have provided some anchoring for the estimates.
Reservation Price
Analysis revealed that 138 participants (accounting for 220 out of 864 ob-
servations) were inconsistent on at least one occasion when reporting their
reservation prices. Plaintis were considered inconsistent if they reported a
reservation price above $10,000 but accepted the subsequent $10,000 settle-
ment oer, or if they had a minimum price below $10,000 and subsequently
rejected the oer. Similarly, defendants were considered inconsistent if they
rejected the settlement oer after stating their maximum price was above
$10,000, or if they accepted the oer when their maximum price was below
$10,000. There appears to be no systematic eect of scenario or condition
on the proportion of inconsistencies.
One explanation for the relatively high proportion of inconsistencies is
that participants were providing estimates that were more representative of
their expectations than their actual reservation prices. This idea is supported
by the positive and negative correlations between subjective probability esti-
mates and reservation price for plaintis and defendants, respectively. That
is, as plainti's subjective probability of winning in court increases, so does
82the minimum price they will accept (r = :223, p < :001). Conversely, as
defendants become more condent of winning in court, the maximum they
are willing to pay decreases (r =  :316, p < :001). The possible eects of
expectations on decision making will be considered in the discussion below
at 3.2.3.
The average reservation prices for each role/frame condition for each sce-
nario are presented in Figure 12. This Figure shows that the average reserva-
tion price for plaintis (M = $14;631, SD = $11;578) was higher than that
for defendants (M = $10;723, SD = $7;269) creating a negative settlement
window of approximately $3,900. Furthermore, there is only a small and
intermittent eect of frame (other than for defendants in scenario 2) and the
dierence is usually in the opposite direction of that predicted by prospect
theory.
3.2.3 Discussion
As previously mentioned, the main results of this study will be discussed
in combination with those of Study 1 (below at 3.3). However, the data
on reservation price is unique to this study and will now be considered.
Reservation prices determine the settlement window within which parties
can negotiate. A positive window should indicate a high rate of settlement,
while a negative window predicts impasse. The overall settlement window in
this study was negative, however there was still a relatively high settlement


























Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 12: Average reservation price as a function of role and frame for each
scenario.
willingness to violate the reservation price, suggests that participants were
indicating a gure more representative of their expectations than their actual
bottom line. This hypothesis appears to t the data, given the positive and
negative correlations between subjective probability and reservation price for
plaintis and defendants, respectively.
According to Babcock, Farber, Fobian, and Shar (1995), expectations
regarding adjudicated outcomes are critical both to the setting of reservation
prices, and to how the negotiation proceeds. Blount-White and Neale (1994)
suggested that reservation price and expected price operate together to dene
an individual's aspiration zone.4 Blount-White and Neale (1994) dened the
aspiration point as \the highest valued outcome at which the negotiator
4In this context there is little distinction between `expectation' and `aspiration'.
84places some non-negligible likelihood that that value would be accepted by
the other party" (p.305). The aspiration point is therefore not a true limit
(a better oer would likely be accepted), but a practical one. Thus, for a
plainti, the reservation price denes the lowest acceptable settlement, while
their expectation denes an upper `limit'. Conversely, for defendants the
reservation price determines the maximum acceptable settlement, while their
aspiration point denes the lower bound. An individual's oers are expected
to be constrained between these two limits. Furthermore, Blount-White and
Neale (1994) suggested that high aspiration prices can cause impasse, even
when a positive settlement window exists. They argued that aspiration price
acts as an anchor, which negotiators are reluctant to move too far from,
causing asymmetries in the bargaining process.
This `aspiration' hypothesis is also consistent with the data as it ex-
plains the inconsistencies caused when a participant accepted a settlement
oer that left them worse o than their reported `reservation price'. For
example, consider the case where a plainti accepts the $10,000 settlement
oer after stating that their reservation price was $12,000. Interpreting this
gure instead as an aspiration price removes the inconsistency by allowing
for the possibility of an actual but unknown reservation price, presumably
below $10,000. Thus, the oer falls within the aspiration zone (as dened
above) and is therefore accepted. A similar analysis can be applied to the
defendant who accepts the settlement oer after stating a `reservation price'
below $10,000. Re-interpreting the indicated reservation price as an aspi-
85ration price explains approximately 60 percent (131 of 220) of the observed
inconsistencies. It therefore seems likely that this is the appropriate interpre-
tation of the data, and will be considered further in the studies on simulated
negotiations (Chapter 4).
3.3 Re-Analysis of Studies 1 and 2
The data for this analysis came from the 408 participants presented in studies
1 (n=192) and 2 (n=216). They were aged between 16 and 49 (M = 19:6,
SD = 4:03) and were randomly assigned to one of four groups within each
of the two studies. No participant responded to the questionnaires in both
Studies 1 and 2.
As noted in previous sections, Studies 1 and 2 diered slightly in their
methodology. With reference to the data under consideration, there were
three relevant dierences. As will now be discussed, these dierences may
account for some minor discrepancies between the two data sets. Where
appropriate, the following analyses highlight these dierences between the
two data sets.
The rst and most obvious distinction between the studies was the mode
of presentation. Study 1 was presented via paper and pencil test, while Study
2 was presented online. While this is not expected to have any aect, the
possibility cannot be eliminated. Secondly, the scenarios in Study 1 described
the chance of winning as 50%, while Study 2 stated that participants had a
86`40-60% chance of winning in court'. As discussed above in section 3.2.2, it
appears that this change has had little eect, other than to slightly anchor
the estimates of Study 2, compared with Study 1. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, participants were asked to provide their subjective probability
of winning at dierent stages in the decision making process. In Study 1,
participants were asked to consider their chance of winning after responding
to the settlement oer. Alternatively, in Study 2 participants were presented
this question before being made aware of the settlement oer. The possible
impact of this dierence has been considered above in section 3.2.
3.3.1 Results and Discussion
Figure 13 shows the proportion of accepted settlements averaged over sce-
nario as a function of study, legal role, and frame. The pattern of results is
similar to those found by Gilliland and Dunn (2008) in experiment 1. The
data were analyzed using logistic regression with factors of study, scenario,
role, and frame. This revealed a signicant eect of frame, 2(1) = 64:05,
p < :001; and, in contrast to Gilliland and Dunn (2008), a signicant eect
of role, 2(1) = 10:55, p = :001: The interaction between scenario and role
was also signicant, 2(3) = 199:62, p < :0001; as in Gilliland and Dunn.
However, there was also a signicant interaction between scenario and frame,
2(1) = 14:21, p = :003: No other main eects or interactions were signi-
cant.






















Figure 13: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of Study (1


















Positive (1) Negative (1) Positive (2) Negative (2)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 14: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of Study (1
vs. 2), legal role and frame, for each scenario.
88variable eect of role and frame across the four scenarios. Separate analyses
of questionnaire type, role, and frame for each scenario revealed that the
eect of frame was signicant in all four scenarios, 2(1) = 13:13, 63:12, 7:50;
and 9:96; respectively. In each case, a positively framed litigant was more
likely to settle than a negatively framed litigant. In contrast to Gilliland and
Dunn (2008), the eect of role was signicant (p < :02) in all four scenarios,
2(1) = 61:31, 6:60, 58:72; and 88:34; respectively. Plaintis were more
likely than defendants to settle in scenarios 1 and 4, and less likely to settle
in scenarios 2 and 3. No other eect was signicant (p < :01) in any scenario.
Despite being informed that there was always the chance of winning at
trial (an average of 50%), participants provided a wide range of estimates
for what they believed to be the actual chance. Figure 15 shows the average
subjective probability of losing at trial as a function of questionnaire type,
role, and frame for each scenario. These estimates covered the full range from
0 to 1 and were approximately normally distributed with an overall mean of
0:476 and a standard deviation of 0:197: Analysis of variance revealed a
main eect of frame, F(1;1600) = 7:81, MSE = 2166:1, p = :005; with
a positive frame leading to a greater subjective probability of losing than
a negative frame (M = 0:488 and M = 0:465; respectively). There was
also a main eect of role, F(1;1600) = 60:39;MSE = 16742:1, p < :001;
with plaintis perceiving themselves as having a greater chance of losing
than defendants (M = 0:509 and M = 0:444; respectively). As Figure 15
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Figure 15: Average subjective probability of losing at trial as a function of
Study, legal role and frame for each scenario.
F(3;1600) = 188:85, MSE = 52360:6, p < :001: No other eects were
signicant.
As was illustrated in Study 1, the re-analysis also revealed evidence of
a self-serving bias - the propensity for individuals in a given role to over-
estimate their probability of winning at trial. In order to investigate this,
the defendant's subjective probability of losing was converted into the subjec-
tive probability of winning which corresponds to the defendant's subjective
probability that the plainti should lose. Any eect of role in the analysis
of these data would indicate a self-serving bias (or its opposite). Analysis
of variance revealed such a main eect, F(1;1600) = 32:0, MSE = 8871:3,
p < :0001; with plaintis estimating their chance of losing as being less than
that estimated by defendants (M = 0:509 and M = 0:556; respectively).
90There was also a small but signicant interaction between role and frame,
F(1;1600) = 7:81, MSE = 2166:1, p < :01; with frame aecting plaintis'
perceived chances of losing (Ms = 0:527 and 0:489 for positive and negative
frames, respectively), while having little or no eect on defendants' perceived
chance of the plaintis losing (Ms = 0:558 and 0:553 for positive and negative
frames, respectively).
It is clear from a comparison of Figure 14 and Figure 15 that variabil-
ity in the eect of role on the probability of accepting a settlement across
scenario is strongly related to corresponding variation in the subjective prob-
ability of losing at trial. For both plaintis and defendants, a high perceived
chance of losing at trial is correlated with an increased chance of accept-
ing the settlement oer. In order to test this hypothesis more formally,
the data from Studies 1 and 2 were re-analyzed using subjective probabil-
ity of losing (or winning) as a covariate. This revealed, as expected, that
perceived probability of winning is a very strong predictor of settlement,
2(1) = 533:5, p < :0001: Furthermore, once variation in subjective proba-
bility has been controlled for, the main eect of role is completely eliminated,
2(1) = 0:03, p = :873: In contrast, the eect of frame remains signicant,
2(1) = 68:78;p < 0:0001; as is the interaction between frame and scenario,
2(3) = 11:06, p = :011: There is now a signicant main eect of scenario,
2(3) = 8:67;p = :034; and the interaction between scenario and role, while
much reduced, remains statistically signicant, 2(1) = 18:9, p < :001:
Analysis of the individual scenarios revealed a similar pattern, with sub-
91jective probability highly signicant (p < :001) in all scenarios. When the
eect of this covariate is removed, the eect of frame remains signicant
(p < :01) in three of the four scenarios, 2(1) = 14:68, 54:2, 10:37 and 6:58;
respectively. The eect of role, while still signicant (p < :01) in two of
the four scenarios, was substantially reduced, 2(1) = 6:65, 0:10, 9:10 and
4:96; respectively. The interaction between role and frame is not signicant
(p < :01) in any scenario.
The eects of role, frame, and perceived chance of losing
It is possible to combine the results of Studies 1 and 2 in a single gure
that demonstrates the eects of role, frame, and perceived chance of winning
on the probability of accepting the settlement oer. According to prospect
theory, the oer will be accepted if its subjective value is greater than the
subjective value of going to trial. An individual in a positive frame, whether
plainti or defendant, should therefore settle if,
w(1):v($10;000) > w(p):v($20;000) + w(1   p):v($0)
where v() is a subjective value function that takes a quantity (money in this
case) as its argument, and w() is a weighting function applied to the subjec-
tive probability of winning at trial, p: According to Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), people tend to assign greater weight or importance to probabilities
close to zero and relatively less importance to probabilities close to one. A
92similar equation can be written for an individual in a negative frame. In this
case, such an individual should settle if,
w(1):v( $10;000) > w(p):v( $0) + w(1   p):v( $20;000)
In other words, they will settle if the perceived value of the settlement
oer is greater than the expected value of going to trial. This, in turn, is
determined by the weighted subjective probability of winning at trial, and
losing nothing, and the weighted subjective probability of losing at trial and
losing the full amount.
In Studies 1 and 2, the objective values of the settlement oer, $10,000,
and the award, $20,000, were both xed. According to prospect theory,
the subjective values of these quantities are therefore also xed for a given
individual. Assuming that these values are also xed across individuals, after
re-arranging the terms in the above equations,5 for an individual in a positive
frame, the settlement oer will be accepted whenever,
w(p) < v($10;000)=v($20;000) = r+
while for an individual in a negative frame, the oer will be accepted when-
ever,
w(1   p) > v( $10;000)=v( $20;000) = r 
5The null term in each equation falls out since, according to prospect theory, v(0) = 0:
It is further assumed that w(1) = 1:
93As Figure 15 shows, the average subjective probability of losing at trial
varies across the set of conditions dened by the levels of role, frame, and sce-
nario. It is assumed that within each such condition, subjective probability
is approximately normally distributed with a mean and standard deviation
corresponding to the observed mean and standard deviation for that condi-
tion. Assume, as a rst approximation,6 that w(p) = p: In this case, the
above two equations can be expressed in terms of the subjective probability
of losing, q = 1   p: Thus, an individual in a positive frame should settle
whenever q > 1   r+; and an individual in a negative frame should settle
whenever q > r ; from which it follows that if (1   r+) < r  then a framing
eect will be observed.7 According to prospect theory, the value function
v(), is concave for gains and convex for losses which means that r+ > 0:5
and r  > 0:5. Therefore, prospect theory predicts that (1   r+) < r :
Figure 16 illustrates the proposed relationship between framing, subjec-
tive probability of losing at trial, and the probability of accepting the set-
tlement oer. The distribution indicated by a dashed line describes the
probability of losing at trial in a positively framed condition of the present
experiment. The distribution indicated by a solid line describes the proba-
bility of losing at trial in a negatively framed condition corresponding to the
same scenario, role, and questionnaire type. The distributions are shown as
6Similar results obtain if alternative weighting functions are assumed.
7It should also be noted that a framing eect may also be observed if the subjective
probability of losing in a positive frame is greater than the subjective probability of losing
in a negative frame. Such a dierence emerged in the present Studies and made a small
contribution to the overall framing eect that was observed.
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Figure 16: Hypothetical distributions of the subjective probability of losing
at trial in relation to settlement criteria for positively framed (dashed line)
and negatively framed (solid line) judgments. The probability of settling
in each distribution is given by the area to the right of the corresponding
criterion, (1   r+) for positively framed judgments and r  for negatively
framed judgments.
being slightly dierent to accommodate the nding that the perceived chance
of losing was greater when in a positive frame than when in a negative frame.
The variances of the two distributions may also dier. The two vertical lines
correspond to the criteria, (1   r+) and r , dened above.
According to the proposed model, the probability of accepting the set-
tlement oer in the positively framed condition is equal to the area under
the corresponding distribution to the right of the positive criterion, (1 r+).
Similarly, the probability of accepting the settlement oer in the negatively
framed condition is equal to the area under the corresponding distribution
95to the right of the negative criterion, r . For the purposes of tting this
model, it was assumed that subjective probability was normally distributed
within each condition, dened by a unique combination of questionnaire type,
scenario, role, and frame, and that the two criteria, r+ and r , were inde-
pendently normally distributed with a constant standard deviation across
conditions. This has the eect of augmenting the variance of each distri-
bution of subjective probability in each condition by a xed amount.8 Let
mi and si be the mean and the augmented standard deviation of the sub-
jective probability of losing at trial for condition i. Let Pi be the proba-
bility of accepting the settlement oer in condition i, and let (:) be the
normal cumulative distribution function. Then, for positively framed con-
ditions, Pi = ((1   r+   mi)=si), while for negatively framed conditions,
Pi = ((r    mi)=si):
Figure 17 shows the observed probability of accepting the settlement oer
as a function of the subjective probability of losing at trial for each combina-
tion of role, frame, scenario, and questionnaire type. The model t the data
reasonably well, 2(29) = 40:97, p = :069, although, as Figure 17 shows,
there are features of these data that it fails to capture. Figure 17 also shows
two curves corresponding to functions that approximate the tted model.
For these functions, displayed for illustrative purposes only, the variance was
constrained to be constant across all conditions (i.e., si = s for all i). Since








0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1














Figure 17: The probability of accepting the settlement oer as function of
role, frame, and the subjective probability of losing for each scenario and
Study. The dashed line shows the best tting constant variance function for
positively framed conditions. The solid line shows the best tting constant
variance function for negatively framed conditions.
variance estimates did not dier substantially between the dierent condi-
tions, these functions also t the data quite well. The dashed line corresponds
to positively framed conditions while the solid line corresponds to negatively
framed conditions derived from the best tting maximum likelihood esti-
mates of r+ and r , respectively. These values were found to be 0:634 and
0:475, and according to the derivations given above, may be interpreted as
the relative value of a gain or loss of $10,000 compared to a similar gain or
loss of $20,000. The values that were obtained indicate that for this sample
of participants and conditions, a gain of $10,000 is perceived as equivalent to
9763.4% of a gain of $20,000 while a loss of $10,000 is perceived as equivalent
to 47.5% of a loss of $20,000. The estimate of r+ is thus consistent with
prospect theory which proposes that the subjective value function is nega-
tively accelerating for gains. The estimate for r  is not as consistent since it
is less than 0.5 and thus indicates a negatively, rather than positively, accel-
erating value function for losses. However, the estimate is very close to 0.5
and, if the true value is slightly greater than 0.5, this would be consistent
with the proposal from prospect theory that the value function for losses
is both positively accelerating and relatively steeper (i.e. accelerating less)
than the value function for gains.
Figure 17 also illustrates two additional eects. First, it demonstrates the
general trend for participants to become less risk taking as their subjective
probability of losing increases. This agrees with both prospect theory and
commonsense - if you think you are going to lose at trial then, if you are
the defendant, you are more likely to pay a relatively higher sum to settle
and, if you are the plainti, you are more likely to accept a relatively smaller
sum to settle. Yet these results directly contradict the conclusion reached by
van Koppen (1990) that litigants become more risk taking as their subjective
probability of losing increases. The present nding is also inconsistent with
Guthrie (2000), who proposed that risk preferences are a function of only
role and the probability of losing.
The second eect shown by Figure 17 concerns the relative eects of fram-
ing and legal role. One of the principal results of the present Study is that
98while there is a consistent eect of framing on the probability of accepting
the settlement oer across all scenarios, there is no overall eect of role. How-
ever, that being said, there remains a signicant interaction between role and
scenario, even after accounting for dierences in the perceived chance of los-
ing. As the data shown in Figure 17 suggests, there may be a residual eect
of role in dierent scenarios. In this case, role may interact in idiosyncratic
ways with the contents of the particular case to aect propensity to settle
independently of the perceived chance of losing. This appears to be most
apparent in Figure 17 in relation to the two data points corresponding to D-.
These points both relate to Scenario 4 and suggests that there is something
about the content of this scenario that encourages defendants to settle over
and above the eects of framing or the perceived chance of losing. There is
no obvious explanation for this particular eect.
3.3.2 Conclusions
The principal result of this analysis is that the likelihood of accepting an
oer to settle out of court is determined by two factors; the frame or refer-
ence point from which the oer is evaluated and the subjective probability
of losing (or winning) at trial. This is the rst Study that examined the
eect of frame independently of role and helps to clarify the results of earlier
studies of decision making by litigants. In two studies involving over 400
participants, plaintis and defendants were equally susceptible to framing
manipulations, a result that is inconsistent with the view that plaintis are
99always risk-averse and defendants are always risk-seeking. Although it may
very well be the case that plaintis will tend to adopt a gain frame and de-
fendants similarly a loss frame, the present results suggest that this is not
immutable and that some latitude exists to re-frame the respective parties.
In so doing, the likelihood of reaching a settlement may increase, particularly
if the defendant can be induced to adopt a positive or gain frame. It is im-
portant to note, however, that no attempt was made in the present Study to
place plaintis and defendants in dierent frames within the same dispute.
Rather, individuals were asked to evaluate a xed settlement oer in each
of the two roles. To pursue this question further, it would be necessary to
place plaintis and defendants involved in the same dispute into dierent
frames in a manner analogous to similar work in the area of two party price
negotiations (see for example Neale & Bazerman, 1992).
It was possible to manipulate frame relatively easily in these experiments
as the participants were all involved in simulated legal disputes. As is the
problem with most applied research conducted in the laboratory, it is unclear
the extent to which participants took on the roles they were given, and how
easy it would be to manipulate frame in real disputes. It is also unclear what
eect the instruction to disregard legal fees had on participants and how this
might be dierent for real litigants.
1003.4 Summary of Studies 1 and 2
The aim of Studies 1 and 2 was to apply Kahneman and Tversky's prospect
theory to litigation based on the same formulation as the Asian disease prob-
lem. The results of these studies are consistent with those found by Gilliland
and Dunn (2008, experiment 1), illustrating that role and frame are inde-
pendent constructs. Furthermore, these studies build on previous ndings
by showing how beliefs about subjective probability of winning, moral justi-
cation and reservation prices in
uence a litigant's decision making process.
Study 1 largely replicated the ndings of Gilliland and Dunn (2008), in
that positively framed litigants were more likely to settle than their nega-
tively framed counterparts. The results further demonstrated how partic-
ipants' beliefs about their chances of winning in court varied signicantly
from the objective estimates provided. Estimates of subjective probability
revealed a high degree of agreement between participants, regardless of their
role/frame condition, which was only slightly in
uenced by a self-serving bias.
Furthermore, Study 1 revealed that the role eect is largely attributable to
a litigant's subjective probability of winning. Study 1 also investigated the
role of moral justication and found that there is a signicant relationship
between subjective probability and beliefs about moral justication. This
suggests that participants perceived an inherent link between morality and
the law, however further research is required to investigate this further.
As well as seeking to overcome a potential confound caused by order
101eects, Study 2 supported the ndings of Study 1 and also investigated the
reservation price of plaintis and defendants prior to the commencement of
negotiations. Analysis of these data suggest that participants respond to
this question in a manner more indicative of their expectations than their
actual `bottom line'. Nevertheless, these data revealed a sizeable negative
settlement window between plaintis and defendants, with no clear eect of
frame.
In combination with Gilliland and Dunn (2008, experiment 1), Studies
1 and 2 provide strong evidence that it is possible for plaintis and defen-
dants to adopt both positive and negative frames. This nding is contrary
to previous literature, such as van Koppen (1990), Rachlinski (1996) and
Korobkin and Guthrie (1994), which can be shown to rely on an incomplete
application of prospect theory to litigation. This body of research has also
failed to implement an adequate representation of reference point adoption
and to consider how this eects frame. Studies 1 and 2 have overcome this by
explicitly emphasising the pre and post-incident position in order to create
both positive and negative frames for both plaintis and defendants.
Studies 1 and 2 are based on the one-shot scenario evaluation experimen-
tal paradigm. This methodology is useful as it provides a good means of
testing theoretical assertions as it maximises experimental control. However,
as is often the case, this control comes at the cost of external validity. It
is an obvious criticism of this methodology to suggest that participants are
not adequately engaged in what is a fairly contrived task, and that therefore
102the results may not re
ect the processes involved in real settlement negoti-
ations. For this reason, having considered the theoretical question (role and
frame do appear to be independent constructs), the next chapter will exam-





The eect of framing has been explored extensively in negotiation research,
especially in the elds of two-party price negotiation and managerial con-

icts (referred to for ease as `organisational con
ict'). Findings in this area
have mostly been based on the results of simulated negotiations, which are
more engaging and realistic than scenario evaluations, but still maintain a
degree of experimental control. While there are a few studies which have
explored the process of litigation generally through simulated negotiations,
to my knowledge none of these have considered framing and litigation within
this paradigm. Thus, this chapter presents two studies which represent a
rst attempt at exploring this issue. Given that there is no direct body of
research from which to draw predictions, the following review will consider
104framing eects in dierent forms of bargaining and also the general ndings
on litigation in simulated negotiations.
4.1.1 Organisational Con
ict
Similar to the approach taken in Studies 1 and 2, the literature on organi-
sational con
ict has sought to distinguish the eects of role and frame. The
ndings on each construct will now be reviewed.
Frame
One of the rst studies to consider the eects of framing during live nego-
tiations was conducted by Neale and Bazerman (1985).1 It centred on an
industrial dispute in which participants, assigned the role of a management
representative (the union representatives were confederates), were asked to
negotiate a ve-issue contract. The issues for negotiation were vacation pay,
health insurance, wages, paid sick leave and an increased hourly wage for
night shifts.
The framing manipulation was implemented through the use of reserva-
tion prices. That is, before the negotiation commenced, participants were
given a list of settlement points which the company they were representing
would nd acceptable (i.e. reservation prices, although they were not dened
as such). Positively framed participants were told that any improvement on
1This study also considered the eects of overcondence, however those results are not
of direct relevance to this thesis.
105those points would be a gain for the company, while negatively framed nego-
tiators were informed that anything less than those points would represent
a loss for the company. Once the negotiation commenced, participants had
twenty minutes to secure the best contract possible. Confederates adopted a
strategy of reciprocal concessions in order to ensure consistency. Participants
were informed that impasse would result in arbitration.
The results of this experiment suggest that framing signicantly in
uences
negotiator behaviour. Neale and Bazerman (1985) reported that negatively
framed negotiators demonstrated little concessionary behaviour. Conversely,
positively framed negotiators implemented more successful outcomes, where
success was measured by the number of issues resolved, the monetary value
of the negotiated contract and the negotiators' perception of the fairness of
the contract.
In a similar experiment, Bazerman, Magliozzi, and Neale (1985) found
that positively framed negotiators completed more transactions and nished
with a higher net prot than their negatively framed counterparts in an open-
market environment (participants could negotiate with as many dierent
parties as they were able within the designated time period). This study
had no transaction costs and due to the open-market context there were no
negative consequences to impasse. Thus it can be seen that positively framed
negotiators generally outperform their negatively framed counterparts. This
proposition has been further supported by numerous other studies using a
similar methodology, including Neale and Bazerman (1992); Neale, Huber,
106and Northcraft (1987) and De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans, and Vliert (1994),
and are considered to be reliable eects (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).
According to Bottom and Studt (1993), there are a number of studies
(see for example Schurr, 1987) which have found that positively framed ne-
gotiators will sometimes exhibit less concessionary and more competitive
behaviour than their negatively framed counterparts. These ndings appear
to be inconsistent with both the previous literature and with prospect theory
itself. However, Bottom and Studt (1993) explained that these ndings are
the result of a particular set of circumstances which cause risk averse ne-
gotiators to prefer the alternative to settlement. That is, positively framed
negotiators will prefer not to settle when there is a possibility the negotiated
agreement will leave them worse o than the certain alternative. This is
the situation that arises when settlement is associated with uncertainty, but
impasse is not.
Bottom and Studt (1993) provide the example of the sale of land con-
taining a mineral deposit. The size (and therefore the value) of the deposit
cannot be known in advance of the purchase. Given this uncertainty, a risk
averse negotiator may be inclined not to settle, to avoid the risk of purchas-
ing land with only a minimal deposit that could leave them worse o than if
they had not acquired the land. They are therefore likely to demand a price
that is less than the expected value of the land. The opposite is true of a
risk-seeking negotiator, who will, in these circumstances, prefer settlement
over impasse. This explanation is consistent with both the data and the
107theoretical framework provided by prospect theory.
Importantly, such a situation will not arise in litigation - the consequence
of impasse (trial) will always be uncertain. Thus, the predictions of framing
for litigation are unaected by this apparent `inconsistency'. That is, based
on the literature presented, positively framed litigants should be risk averse
and will exhibit more concessionary behaviour, and are more likely to settle
than their negatively framed counterparts.
Role
One of the rst studies to consider the relationship between role and frame
was Neale and Bazerman (1985, details of the experiment are above at 4.1.1).
In the context of an industrial dispute, they suggested that as unions are
generally advocating improved conditions, they may naturally adopt a gain
frame. While this was not articulated, Neale and Bazerman (1985) implicitly
assumed that negotiators would adopt the status quo as their reference point.
Alternatively, given management are often required to make concessions to
union demands they may tend to adopt a negative (loss) frame.
This issue was further explored by Bazerman et al. (1985), whose open-
market experiment asked buyers and sellers to negotiate a three-issue con-
tract. Despite role information being completely symmetrical, the researchers
found that the allocation of the term `buyer' or `seller' in
uenced perfor-
mance. Specically, buyers outperformed sellers in terms of quality and
quantity of settlements completed. The authors suggested that this could
108be due to perceived market power on behalf of the buyers, even though the
symmetrical nature of the design meant there was no objective power dif-
ferential. This eect was also observed by Neale and Northcraft (1986) and
Huber and Neale (1986).
Neale et al. (1987) conducted an experiment to try and unravel the dif-
ference between role and frame. Like Bazerman et al. (1985), Neale et al.
suggest that role operates in a similar way to frame, by emphasising gains
and losses dierently. They explored this issue through a series of simu-
lated negotiations, where some negotiating pairs were given role information
(buyers and sellers) and others were not. Participants in the role-present
condition were told they were buyers (sellers) and that they were to negoti-
ate a three-issue contract regarding the purchase (sale) of a refrigerator. In
the role absent condition participants were given an alien cover-story, and
were assigned the role of either `Phrably' or `Grizzat'. They were asked to
negotiate an application for land (which required a partnership agreement)
based on the three issues of `slatkins', `drigglers' and `nmals'.
The results of this experiment suggest that role and frame are independent
and that both can aect the negotiated outcome. That is, positively framed
negotiators completed more transactions than their negatively framed coun-
terparts, independent of the presence or absence of role information. There
was also an interaction between role and frame: mean protability was in
u-
enced by frame only when role information was absent. When role informa-
tion was present, protability was not aected by frame. Thus, the ndings
109from this body of literature support the assertion that frame is not deter-
mined by role, and can therefore be independently manipulated to in
uence
the outcome of a negotiation. However, as it is dicult to imagine a legal
scenario where parties will not know whether they are plainti or defendant,
it could be that any eect of frame is over-shadowed by role information.
Implications for Litigation
It is not dicult to see the similarities between negotiation in an organisa-
tional environment and litigation. However, as discussed (above at 1.1.2),
litigation is a form of crisis bargaining and is therefore structurally distinct
from other forms of con
ict. In relation to the literature just reviewed, there
are three key distinctions: the consequences of impasse, exclusivity of the
parties and the number of issues under examination.
As identied in the crisis bargaining literature, one of the main dier-
ences between negotiations under normative and crisis conditions are the
consequences of impasse. As with all forms of crisis bargaining, impasse in
litigation is resolved by intervention from a third party which is uncontrolled,
uncertain and often costly to both parties. In contrast, many of the stud-
ies reviewed on organisational con
ict have no real consequences of impasse,
other than perhaps the time delay before an alternate arrangement can be
made. An exception to this was Neale and Bazerman (1985), which incor-
porated an option for arbitration for negotiators who could not come to an
agreement. Arbitration is similar to a trial to the extent that the outcome is
110determined by a third party and is legally binding. As discussed, the results
of that experiment do not dier signicantly from other ndings with regard
to the eect of frame. This suggests that the literature on organisational
con
ict can provide a basis upon which to make some tentative predictions
about litigation.
A separate but related distinction between organisational con
ict and lit-
igation is negotiator selection and exclusivity. That is, many of the studies
reviewed above (such as Bazerman et al., 1985; Neale et al., 1987) simulate
open-market conditions. This means that if agreement does not appear likely,
negotiators (generally designated as buyers and sellers) can move freely be-
tween partners with little eort or cost. This is not the case in litigation.
Plaintis and defendants are obliged to negotiate exclusively with each other,
despite having little or no common ground. Indeed, litigation often arises be-
cause of this very situation. Thus, it is expected that litigation may vary from
the patterns observed in two-party price negotiations.
The nal distinction between organisational con
ict and litigation is the
use of multi-issue contracts. As stated, many of the simulations in this
area ask participants to negotiate three or even ve issue-contracts. Such
a process allows negotiators to dierentially weight the value of each issue
(whether based on their own determinations or those built into the experi-
mental design). This encourages parties to negotiate in a more co-operative
and integrative fashion and makes the process less adversarial in nature.
That is, if a particular negotiator is more concerned about maximising issue
111A and places less value on issue B, they can concede on B in exchange for a
more favourable outcome on A.
This form of concession is rarely available in litigation. Even if they do
not start out that way, law suits are ultimately about money. While there
are other remedies available from the courts (such as injunction, orders for
specic performance and rescission of contract) these are generally accompa-
nied by monetary claims. Thus, litigation is almost entirely a zero-sum game




The two experiments presented in this chapter represent the rst attempt
to explore framing eects in litigation using live, simulated negotiations.
However, another series of experiments has used this methodology to examine
other issues raised by litigation. These studies are valuable in that they
suggest that this paradigm can in fact be used to explore litigation in an
experimental setting.
Linda Babcock and colleagues conducted a series of experiments using
simulated negotiations to explore the eect of self-serving bias in litigation
(see for example Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997; Babcock, Loewenstein, &
Issacharo, 1997; Loewenstein, Issacharo, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993). This
was done using the `Texas Tort Case' as a basis for the negotiation (for a
review see Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997).
112The Texas Tort Case materials were developed from a real case involving a
personal injury claim following a collision between a motor cyclist (plainti)
and a motor vehicle (driven by the defendant). The claim was for $100,000.
While there were a number of experimental manipulations, the basic proce-
dure for the negotiations was as follows. Subjects were randomly assigned
to the role of plainti or defendant and placed into pairs. Participants were
given a one-page explanation of the experiment, including the rules of the
negotiation and the court costs associated with the claim. Participants were
then given 27 pages of materials relating to the case. The materials were
taken from the actual trial and included witness testimony and police re-
ports.
The negotiation itself lasted for 30 minutes. Participants were paid rel-
ative to the outcome they achieved (they received $1 for every $10,000 they
negotiated). Court costs increased as time went on, so that parties had an in-
centive to settle early. Impasse between parties resulted in a pre-determined
`judge's decision'. The settlement rates depended upon the experimental
manipulations being used, but were generally in the range of 60-85 percent.
Using this paradigm, Babcock and colleagues have found evidence that
a self-serving bias can cause impasse in litigation (Babcock, Loewenstein,
Issacharo, & Camerer, 1995) but that an intervention can help mitigate this
eect (Babcock et al., 1997). Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) were able to
provide further support for the negative impact of self-serving assessments by
demonstrating that the experimental ndings are consistent with real-world
113data on wage negotiations for public school teachers. Thus, the relative
success of these experiments suggests that simulated negotiations can be
used to explore cognitive bias in litigation.
In summary, it can be seen that litigation is comparable to organisational
con
ict, and a similar experimental methodology can be applied to both
forms of negotiation, although it is not clear that the same pattern of results
will emerge. Thus, the aim of Studies 3 and 4 is to determine whether the
ndings from the organisational literature can be applied to litigation.
4.2 Study 3
Study 3 was conducted as a pilot for Study 4. The aim was to explore the
eect of framing on litigation outcomes by transforming the scenario evalu-
ations used in Studies 1 and 2 into simulated negotiations, similar to those
used by Neale and Bazerman and colleagues (above at 4.1.1) and Linda Bab-
cock and colleagues (above at 4.1.2). To this extent, legal scenarios (of the
form used in Studies 1 and 2) were created so that participants were desig-
nated to the roles of plainti and defendant, in both positive and negative
frames.
After reading the facts of the case, participants were paired in opposing
roles and asked to negotiate a settlement. This process creates four paired
conditions for the negotiations: the plainti and defendant could either both
be positively framed (P+, D+) or both be negatively framed (P , D ), or
114pairs could contain a combination of both (P+, D  and P , D+). As dis-
cussed in previous sections, prospect theory predicts that risk averse litigants
should be more willing to settle than their negatively framed counterparts.
Based on this, pairings of positively framed litigants (P+, D+) should exhibit
a higher propensity to settle than the negative equivalent (P , D ). If true,
this should be evident experimentally through both the rate of settlement for
each pairing, as well as the reservation prices (and therefore the settlement
windows) and the amount of bargaining behaviour (number of oers) which
occurs.
The exact ordering of the remaining two pairs in terms of propensity to
settle is unclear, however the rate should be below P+, D+ and above P ,
D . Furthermore, the value of settlement in the P+, D  pairing should be
lower than in the P , D+ pairing. This is because a risk averse plainti
(P+) should exhibit relatively more concessionary behaviour against a neg-
atively framed defendant, driving the settlement price down. The opposite
is true for a negatively framed plainti, who should demand a higher price,
while a positively framed defendant should be more concessionary, pushing
the settlement price upwards. This experiment seeks to investigate these is-




There were ve groups of four participants (20 in total, 7 of which were male),
recruited through the acquaintance of the researcher. The participants were
aged between 20 and 56 (M = 27:1;SD = 8:24), and many were acquainted
with each other prior to the commencement of the experiment (this data was
not formally recorded).
Design
The general procedure for this study is as follows: participants were given a
set of facts outlining a legal dispute, including the role (plainti or defendant)
which they were to take on, and were paired with another participant. Each
pair was then given the opportunity to negotiate a settlement. Participants
were recruited in groups of four and were randomly allocated to the positions
of players 1 through 4. Players negotiated in pairs, so that there were two
independent negotiations taking place at once. There were three rounds of
negotiations therefore allowing all three paired combinations of players. At
the beginning of each round, players were allocated the role of plainti or
defendant, and were paired with a player of the opposite role. Players nego-
tiated with each other in the following order:
116Round 1: 1 v 2; 3 v 4
Round 2: 1 v 4; 2 v 3
Round 3: 1 v 3; 2 v 4
The counter-balancing of role operated so that of their three negotiations,
each player was a plainti at least once and a defendant at least once. The
same method was used for frame, so that each player was in a positive and a
negative frame at least once, although players were naive to this manipula-
tion. A dierent legal scenario was used in each round (there were three in
total) and the order of their presentation was counter-balanced.
Materials
Scenarios. Before commencing negotiations, participants were asked to
read through a set of facts outlining a legal dispute. These scenarios were
similar to those used in Studies 1 and 2, and allocated the role/frame con-
dition in the same way. The three scenarios used, as well as the written
instructions provided to participants can be found in Appendix C. As with
Study 1, participants were told that they had a 50% chance of winning in
court. However, instead of being told that the outcome would depend on
the evidence presented, they were told that the result would depend entirely
upon which judge heard the case. Participants were told that one judge was
likely to rule in favour of the plainti, the other in favour of the defendant. It
was hoped that presenting the possibilities this way would encourage partic-
ipants to base their decisions on a 50% chance of winning, although partici-
117pants were still asked to state their own subjective probability. Participants
were also asked to record their reservation price. That is, the minimum (if a
plainti) or maximum (if a defendant) they would accept in order to avoid
court. This was presented after the subjective probability estimate was pro-
vided. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, there was no mention of a last-minute $10,000
settlement oer. As with the scenario evaluation studies, participants were
asked not to consider court costs (both when answering the questions and
when negotiating).
The main addition to the scenarios from the online studies was the fol-
lowing statement:
`Obviously, this scenario may not re
ect a situation you person-
ally have faced, however they are based on actual situations that
people have found themselves in. It is important to the study
that you think about what it would be like to be in this situa-
tion, so before proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes
to imagine yourself in this situation. Try to think about how you
would want to act if you really had to deal with this scenario.'
This statement was included both in the instruction sheet and in each sce-
nario in an attempt to get participants to think carefully about the scenarios
and to engage with them as much as possible.
Recording Negotiations. In order to make a record of their nego-
tiations, each pair of negotiators was given a record sheet on which they
recorded their role (plainti or defendant), their current oer, the time at
118which each oer was made (each pair had a stop-watch) and any comments
they wished to make to their opponent.
Procedure
This study was conducted face-to-face in the lab, with four participants and
one experimenter seated around a table. Upon arrival, participants were
randomly allocated a player number (1 - 4) and were asked to read an in-
formation sheet, sign a consent form and provide some demographic details
(age, gender). Participants were told that they would be conducting three
separate negotiations, each with a dierent partner and each based around
a dierent legal dispute. They were told that for each round they would be
allocated to the role of plainti or defendant, and paired with a player in the
opposite role, who was given the same set of facts, altered only slightly to
suit their perspective.
Before commencing each negotiation, participants were given the legal
scenario for that round. They were given as much time as they required
(usually around three to ve minutes) to read the facts of the case, and
to consider the questions regarding their subjective probability of winning
and their reservation price. Players were informed that they did not need
to adhere to their reservation price if they changed their mind during the
course of the negotiation. An example scenario (the defamation dispute used
in Studies 1 and 2) was given to participants in order to ensure that everyone
was familiar with the task, and to provide an opportunity to ask questions.
119Negotiations. Before the rst round, participants were informed that
each round would last for ve minutes and that they must negotiate in silence,
so that all correspondence was recorded on the sheets provided. Participants
were instructed that they could make as many or as few oers as they liked,
and that they did not necessarily need to negotiate sequentially. For example,
a player could reject an oer without making a counter-oer. Pairs which
reached either settlement or impasse (if players chose not to communicate any
further) simply had to wait until time ran out. They were further instructed
that they could make as many or as few (written) comments as they liked.
The experimenter started two stop-watches (one for each pair) at the
beginning of each round. Players were asked to record the (approximate)
time of each oer they made. The timers ran up to ve minutes and players
were given a warning when there was one minute remaining and then again
with ten seconds remaining. If players were half-way through making an oer
when time ran out, they were able to nish the oer and their opponent was
given the opportunity to either accept or reject it.
Interventions. At the end of each ve minute round of negotiations,
the experimenter delivered a framing intervention to both pairs (regardless
of whether or not they had settled). The cover story provided to participants
was that before out-of-court settlements become legally binding, a court of-
cial must look over them and make sure that both parties are satised.
Similarly, players who did not negotiate a settlement were told that before a
dispute can proceed to trial, a court ocial must ensure that both parties un-
120derstand the possible risks associated with pursuing a matter in court. The
intervention was delivered verbally by the experimenter and attempted to
either reinforce a player's existing frame, or to provide a new frame entirely.
Therefore, the interventions were either positively or negatively framed (de-
termined randomly), and their form depended on whether a pair had reached
a settlement or not. If a pair had reached a settlement ($x), the following
form was used for a positive frame:
You have agreed upon a settlement where the defendant will pay
the plainti $x Before you sign the court documents which will
make this contract legally binding, I need to make sure that you
both fully understand the deal you have made.
Plainti, this means that you will receive $x in compensation.
Defendant, this means that you will get to keep $(20;000   x).
The negative form was constructed by reversing the reference points in
the following way:
Plainti, this means that you will lose $(20;000   x) in lost in-
come.
Defendant, this means that you will lose $x.
If a pair had not reached an agreement, the following form was used for
a positively framed intervention:
You have decided to proceed to trial rather than settling this
case. Before you do so, I need to make sure that you both fully
understand the possible consequences of going to court. You have
121been informed that cases similar to this have been decided on a
roughly equal basis.
Plainti, if the judge rules in your favour, you will receive $20,000
in compensation; if the judge rules against you, you will receive
nothing in compensation.
Defendant, if the judge rules in your favour, you will get to keep
the $20,000; if the judge rules against you, you will get to keep
none of the money.
The negative form was constructed in the same way as above. Following
the intervention, both pairs had a further three minutes to negotiate. Pairs
which had settled were informed that they were able to retract their oers and
re-enter negotiations. Post-intervention negotiations proceeded in the same
manner as the main round, with written communication only and warnings
when there was one minute and then ten seconds remaining.
During round one, players were not expecting the intervention and ad-
ditional time. They were deliberately kept na ve in order to prevent them
behaving as if it was simply an eight minute negotiation, rather than two
distinct phases to the negotiation (as evident by comparing the results from
round one to those from the subsequent rounds).
At the end of the post-intervention round, participants were told that
the negotiation was nished and all materials were collected. Players then
received their new scenarios for the next round and were paired with their new
partners. Following the third and nal round of negotiations, players were
debriefed about the aims of the experiment. Each group took approximately
one hour to complete all three rounds of negotiations.
1224.2.2 Results
Settlement
During this study, a total of 30 negotiations were completed by paired com-
binations of participants, of which 16 (53.3%) resulted in a settlement. Of
these settlements, nearly one third (5 out of 16) were reached prior to the
intervention, in the rst ve minutes. Three of these pairs were in their rst
round of negotiations and thus were unaware that they would be given extra
time. This suggests that after the rst round, pairs simply used the extra
time to continue negotiations, rather than viewing it as two distinct phases.
There was one pair that reached a settlement prior to the intervention, but
chose to re-enter negotiations after the intervention and were unable to reach
another agreement within the allocated time. There was not enough data to
formally consider dierences between scenarios, however descriptive data for
the probability of winning, the reservation prices and the number and size of
settlements for each scenario are presented in Table 3.
The settlement rates for each paired combination are summarised in Table
4. As can be seen, contrary to expectations the positive pairing (P+, D+)
had the lowest settlement rate (37.5%), and the negative pairing (P , D )
had the highest (62.5%). These trends are in the opposite direction of what
was predicted, however more data is required before further conclusions can
be drawn.
The average negotiated settlement was $9,015, and the average agreement
123Table 3: The average subjective probability of the plainti winning, reserva-
tion price and the number and average size of settlements for each scenario.
Scenario
1 2 3 All
Chance of plainti win (%) 46.5 45.75 51.25 47.83
Defendant's Maximum ($) 4,800 8,000 8,400 7,067
Plainti's Minimum ($) 12,600 13,150 12,750 12,833
No. of settlements 6 5 5 16
Average settlement ($) 7,334 10,800 9,251 9,015
Table 4: The number of negotiations and settlements for each role/frame
pair combination of negotiators, as well as the average size of the settlements
and the mean number of rounds completed.
Paired Combinations
P+D+ P D+ P+D  P D  All
No. of negotiations 8 10 4 8 30
Settled (%) 3 (37.5) 6 (60) 2 (50) 5 (62.5) 16 (53.4)
Settlement ($) 8,833 9,351 10,500 8,333 9,015
Rounds 6.5 7 7.75 8.13 7.27
124reached by each pair combination is also summarised in Table 4. With the
exception of the P+D  pair, where the average settlement was $10,500, each
pair combination had an average settlement below $10,000. As participants
were told not to consider legal costs in their negotiations, and each party
had an equal objective chance of winning in court, the expected value of the
negotiation for each player was $10,000. Therefore, an average settlement
below that value suggests that the defendants were outperforming plaintis
during the negotiations. This nding is consistent with the literature on
organisational con
ict, which has found that buyers outperform sellers in
symmetrical negotiations (e.g. Bazerman et al., 1985, where plaintis and
defendants can be equated to sellers and buyers, respectively). However as
this was only a pilot study more data are required before any rm conclusions
can be drawn.
Subjective Probability
The subjective probability of the plainti winning for each role and frame
condition, averaged across all scenarios, is presented in Figure 18 (there is
not enough data to analyse each scenario separately). As with the previous
studies, individual beliefs about the subjective probability of winning varied
widely, with responses ranging from 20-90%. These data were approximately
















































Figure 18: Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function of
legal role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) averaged
across scenarios.
Reservation Price
Figure 19 shows the mean reservation price given by each condition. Pos-
itively and negatively framed plaintis demanded a similar minimum price
($13,250 and $12,555 respectively), which was approximately $6,000 above
the maximum price both positively and negatively framed defendants were
willing to pay ($7,500 and $6,416, respectively). Overall, this creates a neg-
ative settlement window (where the plaintis' minimum is greater than the
defendants' maximum), which may partially explain the relatively low set-
tlement rate of just over 50%. In addition to this, Figure 19 shows little
to no apparent framing eect. A framing eect for reservation price should

































Figure 19: Average reservation price for each condition across all scenarios
for Study 3.
should make both parties more risk averse (in this case resulting in a stronger
desire to reach a settlement), therefore increasing a defendant's maximum
oer while decreasing a plainti's minimum price, and vice versa for a neg-
ative frame. This pattern is not evident in Figure 19, however these results
are broadly consistent with those of Study 2.
Interestingly, 80% of players (16 out of 20) were willing to violate their
reservation price during the course of negotiations. A violation occurs when
a player makes or accepts an oer that is below their stated minimum (if
the plainti) or above their stated maximum (if the defendant). In total,
25 of the 60 reported reservation prices were violated during the course of
negotiations, 11 of which came from plaintis and 14 from defendants. This
127explains how pairs managed to negotiate settlements despite having negative
settlement windows. These data also lend further support to the suggestion
expressed in Study 2 (above at 3.2.2), that participants are reporting an
amount more indicative of their expectations (aspiration price) than of their
actual reservation price.
Bargaining Behaviour
Pairs completed a total average of 7.2 rounds for each negotiation (across
the entire eight minutes). A round is dened as one oer and the associated
yes/no response, but does not include any counter-oer which may follow.
A counter-oer forms the rst half of the next round, allowing for the situ-
ation where the respondent party chooses not to propose a new settlement.
Negotiations that resulted in a settlement averaged approximately the same
number of rounds as those that did not (7.5 versus 7 rounds, respectively).
Overall, plaintis made slightly more oers (M = 4:07, SD = 1:53) than
defendants (M = 3:23, SD = 1:5), and this dierence is signicant despite
the small sample, t(58) = 2:129, p = :037. The number of rounds completed
by each paired combination is summarised in Table 4. Consistent with the
trend shown by the settlement data, the P D  combination averaged the
highest number of rounds (8.1), while the P+D+ pairing averaged the low-
est (6.5). This could be indicative of a framing eect, however it is in the
opposite direction of that predicted by prospect theory.
1284.2.3 Discussion
Although conceived as a pilot, Study 3 revealed two important points. Firstly,
it highlighted the necessity of incorporating legal costs into the decision mak-
ing process. During informal post-experiment interviews, many participants
revealed that the details of the dispute provided them with little motiva-
tion to accept a settlement oer. Many participants appear to have adopted
the attitude that without any negative consequences (other than the verdict
itself) they might as well take their chances in court. This hypothesis is
supported by the data, which demonstrate a settlement rate that is signi-
cantly lower than that found in similar studies. For example, Babcock and
colleagues report settlement rates which vary between 60 and 85 percent,
compared with just 53 percent in the current study. For this reason, Study
4 included legal fees into the scenarios.
The second point is that participants seemed to have little trouble engag-
ing with the task. Evidence for this comes from the length and the content
of the qualitative data, provided in the form of comments accompanying the
oers and responses. These data were collected purely to increase levels of en-
gagement and interaction, with no intention to analyse it formally. However,
quotes such as the following, which accompanied an oer of compensation
for a dead racehorse (scenario 2), demonstrate genuine engagement in the
negotiation process: \Seventeen thousand, but if you let me down, you'll end
up in the same place as the horse." While this level of investment is clearly in
no way comparable to that of real litigants, it is a strength of the design that
129participants were enthusiastic about the task and not simply attempting to
exert the minimal eort required to complete the study.
The fact that participants exhibited a high degree of engagement supports
the decision to provide participants with only a brief outline of the facts,
rather than more extensive materials which include detailed legal arguments
and witness testimony. The negotiation dialogue in this study demonstrates
that it is possible to achieve a high level of engagement without intensive
preparatory material.
4.3 Study 4
As with Study 3, the aim of this experiment is to investigate the eect of
role and frame during simulated legal disputes. This study introduced legal
fees in order to increase the rate of settlement by creating a more realistic
scenario with a more appropriate incentive structure. The introduction of
court costs should make settlement appear more attractive while simultane-
ously increasing the risk represented by going to court. It was also thought
that the low rate of settlement in the previous study could have masked any
eect of framing. It is therefore hoped that this study will be a better tool
for investigating these eects.
1304.3.1 Method
Participants
This study consisted of 56 participants (14 groups of 4), recruited through a
database for paid research participation. Participants were aged between 18
and 61 (M = 25:3, SD = 8:4) and there were 18 males. Participants were
paid $12 and the experiment took approximately one hour to complete.
Materials and Procedure
This study was the same as Study 3 except that participants were asked to
take into account legal fees and court costs. Participants (regardless of role
or frame) were told that the cost for settling would be $2,500 each, while the
cost of going to court would be $3,500 each, but distributed on a loser pays
basis. For example, a plainti who accepted a $10,000 settlement would end
up with only $7,500, while the defendant would have to pay a total of $12,500.
For a plainti, winning in court would mean receiving $20,000, while losing
would result in a $7,000 legal bill. Similarly, a defendant who wins in court
would pay nothing, but a losing defendant would pay a total of $27,000. This
was explained in detail to participants before the rst round of negotiations,
and the fee structure was consistent across all scenarios. Participants were
provided with 
ashcards outlining the fee structure for reference during the
negotiations.
The fee structure was also included in the intervention. The following is
131the positively framed intervention for parties who did not reach a settlement:
You have decided to proceed to trial rather than settling this case.
Before you do so, I need to make sure that you both fully under-
stand the possible consequences of going to court. You have been
informed that the outcome of this case depends entirely upon
which judge is allocated to the trial. If you do not negotiate a
settlement and instead proceed to trial, each party will be charged
a total of $3,500 in legal fees, which will be distributed on a loser-
pays basis.
Plainti, if the judge rules in your favour, you will receive the full
$20,000; if the judge rules against you, you will receive nothing,
but have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees.
Defendant, if the judge rules in your favour, you will get to keep
the $20,000; if the judge rules against you, you will keep nothing,
and have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees.
The other versions of the intervention (positive and negative frames for
parties who do and do not settle) are contained within Appendix D. Other
than the introduction of legal fees, the procedure was the same as that in
Study 3, as outlined at 4.2.1 above.
4.3.2 Results
A total of 84 negotiations were conducted by paired combinations of par-
ticipants. Table 5 summarises the number of negotiations in each paired
condition, and for each scenario. Of these negotiations, 55 (65.5%) resulted
in a settlement, 35 of which were reached in the rst phase of the negotia-
tions, prior to the intervention. Not included in these gures are the four
132negotiations which reached a settlement in the rst phase, but chose not to
maintain that agreement after the intervention.
The settlement rates for each paired combination are summarised in Ta-
ble 6. As with Study 3, the positive pairing (P+D+) yielded the lowest
settlement rate (52.4%). The P+D  combination had the highest settle-
ment rate, with 72.2% of pairs reaching an agreement (in Study 3 the P D 
pair had the highest settlement rate). The dierence in settlement rates be-
tween pairings is not signicant, 2(3) = 2:713, p = :438. As mentioned, four
pairs settled prior to the intervention but reneged afterwards. These four ne-
gotiations came from each of the four pairings, and were not counted towards
the nal settlement rates. The overall settlement rates are higher than those
of Study 3, suggesting that the introduction of court costs did encourage
settlement. However, this dierence did not reach statistical signicance,
2(1) = 2:807, p = :094.
Table 6 also summarises the mean settlement value for each paired combi-
nation. In contrast to Study 3, the settlements are all above $10,000 (except
for the P D+ combination), which suggests that the plaintis are negotiat-
ing better overall outcomes (as costs are the same for both parties $10,000
is still the midpoint). As with the rate of settlement, there is no signi-
cant dierence between pairs for the size of the settlement, F(3;51) = 1:334,
p = :274.
The mean number of rounds completed by each paired condition (totalled
across both phases of the negotiation) are also reported in Table 6. As
133Table 5: Number of negotiations for each scenario and paired combination.
Paired Combination
Scenario P+D+ P+D  P D+ P D  Total
1 6 3 11 8 28
2 7 9 4 8 28
3 8 6 8 6 28
Total 21 18 23 22 84
Table 6: The number and size of settlements for each role/frame pair com-
bination of negotiators, as well as the mean number of rounds completed.
Paired Combinations
P+D+ P D+ P+D  P D  All
Settled (%) 11 (52.4) 17 (73.9) 13 (72.2) 14 (63.6) 55 (65.5)
Settlement $11,359 $8,985 $10,469 $10,036 $10,078
Rounds 9.67 9.96 8.5 8.14 9.1
134with the other measures, there is no dierence in the number of rounds
based on pairing, F(3;64:311) = 0:922, p = :435 (Brown-Forsythe test).
Since agreement marks the end of a negotiation, a two-way ANOVA was
conducted to determine whether settlement had an eect on the number
of rounds for each pairing. The results show no interaction between pair
and settlement, F(3;76) = 0:679, p = :567, and no main eect of pair,
F(3;76) = 1:471, p = :229. The analysis suggested only a small eect of
settlement, F(1;76) = 5:344, p = :024.2
Subjective Probability
Figure 20 shows the subjective probability of winning for each role and frame
condition, averaged across all scenarios. Figure 21 presents the average sub-
jective probability of a plainti win for each role and frame condition for each
of the three scenarios. Analysis of variance revealed a signicant main eect
for role (F(1;155) = 17:44, p < :001), with plaintis reporting a greater
chance of winning than defendants (M = 58:21 and M = 45:37, respec-
tively). The analysis revealed no further eects for frame or scenario, nor
were there any interaction eects (p > :1 in all cases).
2The data for this analysis violated the assumption of homogeneity of variance (Levene's
Test, F(7;76) = 2:363, p = :031), suggesting that a more stringent criterion (p < :01)
should be used. Collapsing across pairings suggested that settlement had no eect on the
number of rounds prior to the intervention, nor after the intervention, but there was an
eect on the total (t(82) = 2:295, p = :024). It therefore seems likely that any eect is
















































Figure 20: Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function of
legal role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) averaged

















































Figure 21: Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function of
legal role (plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) for each
scenario.
136Reservation Price
Figure 22 shows the mean reservation price given by each condition. As with
the previous studies, there was a negative settlement window, with positively
and negatively framed plaintis stating a higher reservation price ($11,821
and $12,356, respectively) than defendants ($9,386 and $8,858 for positive
and negative frames, respectively). Interestingly, the introduction of court
costs decreased the size of the negative window. In Study 3 (no costs),
the average dierence between the defendant's maximum and the plainti's
minimum $5,767, compared with $2,973 in the current study. This suggests
that the introduction of costs has made parties more risk averse by increasing
their willingness to settle (as evident from more generous reservation prices).
Violations of the stated reservation price of one or both negotiators oc-
curred in 76% (64 out of 84) of the negotiations. This is consistent with the
results of Study 3 (violation rate of 80%). Plaintis made more violations
than defendants (46 and 33, respectively), however this dierence was not
signicant, 2 = 3:441, p = :064. Frame had no eect on the number of
violations.
Bargaining Behaviour
Pairs completed an average of 9.1 (SD = 4:33) rounds for each negotiation
(across the entire eight minutes), which is slightly higher than in Study 3
(7.2 rounds). As in the previous study, a round is dened as one oer and

































Figure 22: Average reservation price for each condition across all scenarios
for Study 4.
may follow. Negotiations that resulted in a settlement averaged fewer rounds
(M = 8:7, SD = 4:5) than those that did not (M = 10:1, SD = 3:8),
but this dierence was not signicant, t(82) = 1:42, p = :159. There was
no eect of role or frame on the number of oers made, which is contrary
to the results of both Study 3 and the previous literature which suggests
that plaintis and positively framed negotiators will exhibit more bargaining
behaviour (make more oers). The number of rounds completed by each
paired combination are summarised in Table 6. Consistent with the trend
shown by the settlement data, the P D+ combination averaged the highest
number of rounds. The P D  combination averaged the lowest number of




One way of examining sequential negotiation data is to plot it graphically
in order to reveal broad level trends in the data. As shown in Figure 23(a),
plainti oers (vertical axis) can be plotted against defendant oers (hori-
zontal axis). Negotiations commence at the point (0,20), when the plainti
demands compensation and the defendant refuses to pay. Settlement occurs
whenever the plainti's oer is equal to the defendant's oer, as dened by
the settlement line, P = D.
The reservation prices of plaintis and defendants can be combined to cre-
ate a `reservation point'. Reservation points can also be plotted to show the




























Figure 23: Plainti oers plotted against defendant oers (both in $1000s).
As shown in (a), the reservation point denes the settlement window and
settlement occurs if the negotiation reaches the settlement line (P = D).
The eect of a positive frame is demonstrated in (b) and a negative frame is
shown in (c).
139dow, where the plainti's minimum is less than the defendant's maximum. A
point above the line indicates a negative window where a settlement between
the parties is not predicted. Representing the reservation prices this way
clearly demonstrates the mechanism through which framing may in
uence
settlement rates. A positive frame should increase the probability of settle-
ment by making both parties more risk averse. This should create a larger
settlement window which, as shown in Figure 23(b), provides a broader range
of potential settlement points along the settlement line. A negative frame
should have the opposite eect, making parties more risk seeking and there-
fore less likely to settle. This is illustrated in Figure 23(c), which shows a
negative settlement window. At this point it is predicted that parties will
fail to reach the settlement line.
Plotting the data reveals the strategies used by negotiators. That is, Fig-
ure 24 shows the negotiations for the P D  pairing. Figure 24(a) shows the
pairs that were able to negotiate a settlement. Generally, these negotiators
have adopted a strategy of reciprocal concessions. This is characterised by
a relatively direct path towards the settlement line. This can be contrasted
with Figure 24(b), which highlights the unco-operative behaviour demon-
strated by one or both negotiators in the pairs that failed to settle. These
negotiations are characterised by steeper trajectories, which suggest that at
least one party is not acting co-operatively. It is apparent that a failure to re-
ciprocate concessions can result in the other negotiators responding with an
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Figure 24: Plainti oers plotted against defendant oers (both in $1000s)
for the P D  condition. Figure (a) shows trajectories and reservation points
for pairs that reached a settlement (n = 12), while (b) shows the pairs that
were unable to settle (n = 11). Settlement occurs if the negotiation reaches
the settlement line (P = D). The dashed lines in (b) highlight unco-operative
behaviour that was `punished' by the other party (the associated reservation
points are marked by *).
141the two negotiations represented with dashed lines in Figure 24(b). Inter-
estingly, most pairs, regardless of whether or not they settled, have negative
settlement windows.
Figure 25 shows the negotiations for the P+D+ pairs that settled (n =
11), compared with those that did not settle (n = 10). As with the P D 
pairs shown in Figure 24, the P+D+ pairs that settled, shown in (a), gener-
ally demonstrated more co-operative behaviour (i.e. a more direct trajectory
towards the settlement line) compared with those that did not reach an
agreement, shown in (b).
Figure 25 also shows two negotiations which involved non-monetary oers
(both marked by the dashed lines). These oers generally related to attempts
at maintaining an ongoing business relationship. One such negotiation re-
sulted in a settlement despite a large negative window (the reservation price
for that negotiation is marked  in (a)). Interestingly, the other pair that
made non-monetary oers was unable to reach a settlement, despite agreeing
on the level of nancial re-imbursement appropriate ($11,000).
This examination of the negotiations demonstrates the value of plotting
the sequential data in this manner. However, as with the formal analyses
presented at 4.3.2 above, it is apparent that there are no strong framing
eects. Only the P+D+ and P D  conditions were examined using the
plots as they are the most likely to demonstrate framing eects. Despite
this, a comparison of Figures 24 and 25 suggests that while there are visible
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Figure 25: Plainti oers plotted against defendant oers (both in $1000s) for
the P+D+ condition. Figure (a) shows trajectories and reservation points
for pairs that reached a settlement, while (b) shows the pairs that were
unable to settle. Settlement occurs if the negotiation reaches the settlement
line (P = D). The dashed lines highlight negotiations which included non-
monetary oers.
143appears to be no systematic eect of frame. This is evident from both the
negotiation trajectories and the reservation prices.
4.3.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to determine whether introducing legal fees in-
creased the rate of settlement, and whether there were any framing eects
which may have previously been masked by a low settlement rate. The intro-
duction of costs did increase the rate of settlement (65.5 percent compared
with 53.3 percent in Study 3). However, this dierence is not signicant and
is still in the lower range of settlement rates reported in similar studies, such
as Babcock and Loewenstein (1997), who report rates of 60 to 85 percent.
One possible reason for this low rate is that participants were too engaged
in the task. That is, the `fun' part of this experiment for participants was
the negotiation itself, which is evident from the qualitative data. Given that
settlement had neither a time incentive (participants had to remain until
time ran out) nor a real nancial incentive (payment was not contingent
upon outcome), it is possible the experimental design actually encouraged
participants not to settle. One way of overcoming this in the future would
be to make payment contingent upon outcome, using a similar fee structure
to that used in the dispute cover stories.
Despite the introduction of costs, this study did not nd any framing
eects. This is surprising given that the scenario evaluations on which the
cover stories were based revealed such strong eects, and that similar studies
144in the eld of organisational con
ict have found framing eects. There are
many possible reasons why no eects were found, and several of these are
explored in more depth in Chapter 5.
Firstly, it could be that the new scenarios which replaced those used in
Studies 1 and 2 were not conducive to framing manipulations. Although
the new scenario evaluations were closely based on those used in Studies 1
and 2, it is possible that the framing manipulation was not as eectve as
in the originals. If true, this would suggest that framing eects in litigation
are fragile and susceptible to minor alterations. This would make it unlikely
that framing could be used to explain or predict litigant behaviour.
A second possibility is that the introduction of legal fees altered the ex-
pected values of each outcome (settlement and trial) dierentially, which
may have eradicated the framing eect. This would be problematic for the
framing theory of litigation as legal fees are important for both internal and
external validity in this type of experiment, and a fee schedule will usually
involve an incentive to settle. This issue is investigated in more depth in
Study 6.
Another possibility is that the manipulation regarding the way the out-
come of the trial would be determined altered participant's responses, either
in the way they perceived the problem, or in the way they recorded their
subjective probability of winning. That is, Studies 1 and 2 informed partici-
pants that the outcome of the trial would be based on evidentiary concerns,
and that their lawyer had predicted either a 50 percent chance of winning
145(Study 1) or a 40-60 percent chance of winning (Study 2). As discussed, this
resulted in participants reporting the full range of subjective probabilities
from 0 to 100 percent. In the simulated negotiations, however, participants
were told that the outcome would depend entirely upon which judge heard
the case. Judge P would rule in favour of the plainti, while Judge D would
rule in favour of the defendant. Participants were advised that there was
no way of knowing in advance which judge would be selected. While par-
ticipants still yielded the full range of subjective probabilities, there was
anecdotal evidence to suggest that these probabilities were not necessarily
used during their decision making process. That is, the question regarding
subjective probability may have been interpreted as asking what the partic-
ipant thought the probability would be if not for a biased judge. It could be
that participants therefore provided a subjective probability but based their
decisions on the objective probability. If this is the case, the eect of frame
may have been masked. This possibility is explored in more detail in Study
7.
146Chapter 5
Legal Fees and Framing
A major issue arising out of the previous chapter, and an obvious gap in
the literature on litigation and framing, concerns the eect of costs. The
scenarios used in Studies 1, 2 and 3 explicitly told participants to ignore the
issue of costs. This was done for the sake of simplicity and to make clear any
role/frame eects. A similar approach had been taken in previous research by
Rachlinski (1996), van Koppen (1990), Korobkin and Guthrie (1994), Guthrie
(2000) and Babcock, Farber, et al. (1995), none of whom incorporated court
costs or legal fees into their vignettes. There has therefore been no empirical
research on the impact of legal fees on framing.
Research in other elds of negotiation (for example, industrial relations)
has considered the issue of transaction costs using the `shrinking pie' paradigm
(see for example, Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). Under this paradigm, both
parties share transaction costs, so that the longer the negotiation takes, the
147smaller the total amount of money (the `pie') becomes. This research has
mostly found that negotiators under these circumstances tend to evaluate of-
fers on the basis of equity, rather than absolute gains. For example, players
will often propose counter-oers which result in lower net gains than the pre-
viously rejected oer, but which are more equitable (Babcock & Loewenstein,
1997).
However, transaction costs in these settings are not comparable to le-
gal costs because the burden is not `shared' in litigation, and costs between
parties are not necessarily symmetrical. For example, most Australian juris-
dictions use the `loser pays' system of cost allocation. In theory, this means
that no matter how high the legal fees become, there is always value in going
to court, provided there is a non-zero probability of winning. For this reason
there is little insight to be gained from considering research on the eect of
transaction costs outside of the legal context.
5.1 Predicting the Eect of Costs
The main eect of legal costs on framing is that they unbalance the expected
values of dierent outcomes. One of the principle motives behind the exper-
imental work presented in this thesis was to properly measure the eect of
framing by balancing the expected values of settling and going to trial. A
failure to do this was identied as a shortcoming of previous research con-
ducted by van Koppen (1990), Rachlinski (1996) and Korobkin and Guthrie
148(1994, 1998).
The scenarios used in Studies 1 and 2 presented positively framed litigants
with the choice between a certain $10,000 (settlement) or a gamble with a
50 percent probability of winning $20,000 or nothing (trial). Thus, both the
certain and risky outcomes had the same expected value { $10,000. This
would not be the case if the costs regime from Study 4 (as described above
at 4.3.1) were implemented. The value of the settlement oer for positively
framed litigants would be $7,500, given that $2,500 in legal fees would be
subtracted from the nal award. Alternatively, going to trial would have an
expected value of $6,500. This is because litigants have a 50 percent chance of
winning $20,000, and a 50 percent chance of losing and having to pay $7,000
in legal fees (thus, 0:5($20;000) + 0:5( $7;000) = $6;500). Therefore, the
expected value of settlement is higher than that of the trial.
The reverse situation is true for litigants in a negative frame. In Studies
1 and 2, the expected values for settling and going to trial were both a loss of
$10,000 (a $10,000 pay out versus a 50 percent chance of winning and paying
nothing and a 50 percent chance of losing and paying $20,000). The addition
of costs would unbalance these expectancies. That is, a $10,000 settlement
would represent a loss of $12,500, while the trial would have an expected loss
of $13,500 (0:5($0) + 0:5( $27;000) =  $13;500).
It is not clear whether the inequality between the expected values will
overpower any possible framing eect. This is because while prospect theory
describes the general properties of the value function (i.e. steeper for losses
149than for gains), the exact shape is determined by individual decision makers
and is therefore unknown. This is demonstrated in Figure 26, where the
value function shown in (a) suggests that positively framed litigants should
prefer a trial, that is
w(1):v($7;500) < w(0:5) [v($20;000) + v( $7;000)]
while in (b) the outcome is the opposite (ie. the inequality in the equation
above is reversed) due to the precise shape of the value function.1
A similar curve can be constructed for litigants in a negative frame in
the domain of losses. That is, a negatively framed litigant will prefer trial to
settlement when
w(1):v( $12;500) < w(0:5) [v($0) + v( $27;000)]
As with the positive frame, a litigant in a negative frame will prefer settlement
when the inequality in the equation is reversed.
The above analysis demonstrates that prospect theory does not make
clear predictions about the impact of legal fees on the propensity to settle.
This is because the shape of the value function is unknown and unique to
individuals. It is for this reason that it is preferable, where possible, to use
decision outcomes that have equal expected values when examining the eect
of framing.
1As above in 3.3.1, it is assumed that w(p) = p as the outcomes are presented proba-

























Figure 26: Two possible value functions showing the dierential eect of a
costs regime on litigant behaviour. Figure (a) illustrates how costs could
lead positively framed litigants to show a clear preference for settlement.
Figure (b) presents an alternate function which lessens the dierence in value
between trial and settlement and shows how positively framed litigants could
prefer trial over settlement.
151The following chapter presents three experiments using the scenario eval-
uation paradigm. The aim was to investigate whether or not the inclusion of
costs (thereby unbalancing the expected values) removes the eect of frame,
and whether this may explain the absence of framing eects in Study 4. To
this end, Study 5 presented the scearios and costs regime used in Study 4




The participants were 144 psychology students (39 males) at the University
of Adelaide who received course credit for their participation. They were
aged between 17 and 38 (M = 20, SD = 3:96) and were randomly assigned
to one of four groups. There were no other exclusion criteria.
Materials and Procedure
This study was presented online and closely followed the format of Studies 1
and 2. However, this study used the three scenario cover stories developed
for the simulated negotiations conducted in Studies 3 and 4. The full text of
these scenarios, as adapted for the online scenario-evaluation paradigm, are
presented in Appendix E. In order to make up the four scenarios required of
152the Latin Squares counter-balancing procedure (the same as that described
in Study 1 above at section 3.1.1), the defamation dispute from Studies 1
and 2 was also included.2 This scenario was chosen as it had demonstrated
the strongest framing eect in the previous studies and therefore seems most
likely to show an eect here.
The format of these scenarios diered from Studies 1 and 2 in two main
ways. Firstly, the way the outcome of the trial { the judgment { was de-
termined was altered. As explained in Studies 3 and 4 (above in section
4.2.1), the new scenarios informed participants that the outcome of the trial
would depend entirely upon which of two judges was allocated to the case.
Participants therefore had a 50 percent chance of winning. This was done in
an attempt to anchor subjective estimates to the objective probability.
Secondly, these scenarios also incorporated the same structure of legal
fees as laid out in Study 4. That is, participants were told that settling out
of court would incur $2,500 in legal fees (per party), that was to be paid
individually in addition to any settlement. Thus, the pre-trial settlement
of $10,000 would result in the plainti ending up with $7,500, while the
defendant would have to pay a total of $12,500. Alternatively, participants
were informed that proceeding to trial would increase the fees to $3,500 each,
which would be distributed on a `loser pays' basis. This means that if the
plainti won in court, they would receive the full $20,000 (with no legal fees),
2In Studies 1 and 2 the defamation scenario was presented rst, while in the current
study it was presented last.
153while the defendant would have to pay a total of $27,000. Meanwhile, if the
defendant won, they would pay nothing, but the plainti would have to pay
$7,000 in legal fees.
As with the previous scenario evaluation studies, after reading the facts
participants were asked to state their subjective probability of winning, the
maximum (if the defendant) or minimum (if the plainti) oer they would
be willing to accept, and to indicate whether or not they would accept a last
minute settlement oer of $10,000.
5.2.2 Results
Settlement Rates
Figure 27 shows the overall proportion of accepted settlements collapsed over
scenario as a function of legal role and frame. The pattern of results is similar
to that found in Studies 1 and 2, with positively framed litigants more likely
to settle than their negatively framed counterparts. However, this dierence
was not statistically signicant, 2(1) = 1:36, p = :243. Further analysis
revealed a signicant eect of role, 2(1) = 7:30, p = :007, and no interac-
tion between role and frame, (p = :987). Interestingly, the overall rate of
settlement for both plaintis and defendants (60% and 48.9% respectively,
averaged across frame) is lower than that found in Study 2 which did not in-
corporate legal fees (63.2% and 56.7% for plaintis and defendants, averaged

























Figure 27: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
(plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) averaged across
scenarios.
suggested that the inclusion of costs increased the rate of settlement.
Figure 28 shows the pattern of results for each scenario. Consistent with
the overall analysis, there is no obvious eect of frame in any of the scenarios
(p > :1 in all cases), including scenario 4, which had demonstrated strong
framing eects in Studies 1 and 2. The eect of role was signicant only
in scenario 4 (2(1) = 10:5, p = :001) where plaintis were more likely to
settle than defendants. This nding is consistent with the results of Studies
1 and 2 for that scenario. Scenario 2 shows a marginally signicant interaction
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Figure 28: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role















































Figure 29: Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function of
role/frame condition averaged across all scenarios.
156Subjective Probability
Figure 29 shows the average subjective probability of a plainti win as a
function of role/frame condition. Analysis of variance revealed a signicant
main eect for role (F(1;572) = 18:05, p < :001),3 and no eect of frame,
F(1;572) = 4:03, p = :045.4 There was no interaction eect, and no dif-
ference between scenarios, 2(3) = 4:02, p = :259, by Friedman's test. The
role eect is broadly consistent with Studies 1 and 2 in that participants
revealed a self-serving bias in their probability estimates. That is, defen-
dants' estimates of the plainti's chance of winning were lower than those
of the plaintis (M = 45:25, SD = 13:84 and M = 50:85, SD = 14:25,
respectively).
These results are also broadly consistent with those of Studies 3 and 4,
which used a similar way of describing how the judgment at trial would be
made (ie. pre-determined based on the selection of the judge). This leads
to the suggestion that the manipulation had the desired eect of reducing
the variance in participants' subjective probability of winning. Interestingly,
there was no statistical dierence between the subjective probabilities pro-
vided for the defamation case in Studies 1 and 2 (combined M = 50:22,
SD = 18:0) and those from the same scenario of the current study (pre-
sented as scenario 4; M = 52:38, SD = 16:53), t(550) = 1:27, p = :205.
3 Despite being highly signicant, the eect size was small (partial eta squared = .031),
explaining only 3.1% of the variance.
4Levene's test for equality of error variances was signicant, suggesting a more stringent
signicance criterion (p < :01) should be used.
157The settlement data were re-analysed using subjective probability esti-
mates as a co-variate. Subjective probability of winning was a signicant pre-
dictor of settlement (p < :001) for all except the rst scenario, 2(1) = 1:63,
25:06, 36:87 and 35:73, respectively. There was no eect of role or frame for
any scenario, and the interactions for scenario 2 almost reached signicance,
(2(3) = 3:82, p = :051).
5.2.3 Discussion
While there were many procedural changes made to this study compared to
the previous scenario evaluations, the results suggest that the introduction
of legal fees has masked or otherwise removed the eect of framing on the
decision making process. This interpretation is also consistent with the pre-
dictions of prospect theory as outlined above in section 5.1. This may also
help to explain why no framing eects were found in the simulated negotia-
tion experiments presented in the previous chapter.
As discussed, the literature on framing and litigation gives little consider-
ation as to the possible impact of legal costs on the decision-making process.
This gap is problematic given that a costs regime is largely unavoidable, both
experimentally and in the real world. The simulated negotiation experiments
presented in the previous chapter suggest that at least some form of costs
regime is required in order to ensure an acceptable level of participant en-
gagement and an appropriate rate of settlement. In terms of real litigation,
neither a pro bono lawyer nor self-representation will eliminate the incursion
158of legal fees. Appearing before a court of any level usually incurs fees, and ju-
risdictions which implement the `loser-pays' system (such as Australia) create
the additional risk of having to pay the other party's costs. Thus, legal fees
are unavoidable and therefore their impact on framing should be properly
considered.
The basic experimental design used in this thesis has sought, where possi-
ble, to balance the expectancies for both plaintis and defendants for positive
and negative frames, in order to clearly dierentiate the eects of role and
frame. It is not clear that this is possible with the inclusion of a realistic fee
structure, given that the goal is to provide an incentive for parties to settle.
The results of this study, in combination with the above analysis of
prospect theory (summarised in Figure 26), appear to suggest that a rel-
atively small dierence of expected values between settlement and trial (as
caused by the implementation of legal fees), may eliminate the eect of fram-
ing. This is problematic for the framing theory of litigation as it will often
be the case that the expected values will be unbalanced, given the signicant
costs involved with going to trial.
However, there is some inconsistency in the data which suggests that
the absence of framing eects in this study may not be due solely to the
introduction of costs. Based on Studies 3 and 4, it was assumed that the
eect of costs would be to increase the rate of settlement by making a trial
appear relatively less attractive (in terms of expected value). Although this
assumption appeared to t the data, an analysis of the eect of costs using
159prospect theory (as shown in Figure 26) suggested that this is not necessarily
the case. Furthermore, as shown in the previous section, the same increase
in the rate of settlement was not evident between Study 2 (without costs)
and Study 5 (with costs).
One possible explanation for this is that the new scenario cover stories
may have led to a lower base rate of settlement than the cover stories in
Studies 1 and 2, regardless of the implementation of a costs regime. That
is, Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated signicant between-scenario dierences in
the rate of settlement, an eect largely driven by estimates of the subjective
probability of winning. It is possible that such dierences existed in the new
scenarios, which could have altered both the eect of frame and the base rate





There were 112 participants in this study (50 males), which was made pub-
licly available online. However, the majority of participants were psychology
students at the University of Adelaide who received course credit for their
participation. They were aged between 17 and 66 (M = 31:7, SD = 14:23)
160and were randomly assigned to one of four groups. There were no other
exclusion criteria.
Materials and Procedure
This study was the same as Study 5 except that participants were asked to
disregard the possibility of legal fees. Accordingly, all information relating to
the costs regime was removed from the scenarios, an example of which can be
found in Appendix F. This meant that the instructions given to participants
were exactly the same as those used in Studies 1 and 2 (Appendix B).
5.3.2 Results
Settlement Rates
Figure 30 shows the overall proportion of accepted settlements collapsed
over scenario as a function of legal role and frame. The pattern of results is
dierent from that found in previous studies. There is a role eect (2(1) =
5:75, p = :016) and no eect of frame (2(1) = 0:44, p = :506). Figure 30 also
shows a signicant interaction between role and frame (2(1) = 4:33, p =
:037) which had not been found in previous studies. The rate of settlement
for plaintis and defendants (61.6% and 50.4% respectively, averaged across
frame) was similar to that found in Study 5 (60% and 48.9%, respectively).
Figure 31 shows the proportion of accepted settlements for each scenario.

























Figure 30: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role




















Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 31: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
















































Figure 32: Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function of
role/frame condition averaged across all scenarios.
tween role and frame for any scenario (p > :1 in all cases). Only scenarios
3 and 4 demonstrated a signicant role eect, 2(1) = 6:26, p = :012 and
2(1) = 14:67, p < :001, respectively.
Subjective Probability
Figure 32 shows the average subjective probability of the plainti winning as
a function of role/frame condition. Analysis of variance revealed a main eect
of role (F(1;444) = 24:41, p < :001), a marginal eect of frame (F(1;444) =
3:67, p = :056) and an interaction eect (F(1;444) = 6:302, p = :012).
The settlement data were re-analysed using subjective probability as a co-
variate. Subjective probability of winning was a highly signicant predictor
163(p < :001) for all four scenarios. There was no eect of frame in any scenario
(p > :1 in all cases), and the eect of role was signicant only in scenario 4,
2(1) = 4:85, p = :028.
5.3.3 Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to determine whether framing eects (similar
to those found in Studies 1 and 2) could be detected using the scenario cover
stories from Study 5 without the costs regime. This would have lent further
support to the assertion that it was the implementation of costs that removed
the eect of frame in Studies 4 and 5, and not some other extraneous variable.
However, somewhat surprisingly this experiment also failed to demonstrate
any eect of frame, which suggests that the introduction of costs alone cannot
explain the results.
Other than legal fees, there are two remaining dierences between the
scenarios used in Studies 1 and 2 (which did nd framing eects) and the
current series of experiments which have not. Firstly, the scenario cover
stories themselves were changed. Studies 1 and 2 used four cover stories which
consisted of disputes about defamation, real property, contractual obligations
and inheritance (presented in that order). Scenario 2, the property dispute,
was based closely on a scenario used by Rachlinski (1996). Studies 5 and 6 (as
well as the simulated negotiations presented in the previous chapter) made
use of three new cover stories: one copyright dispute and two contractual
disputes (however these involved two very dierent contexts). Scenario 2,
164a contractual dispute concerning the sale of a racehorse, was based on a
vignette used by van Koppen (1990).5 All scenarios followed the same basic
outline, and were matched for length (excluding the information regarding
costs) and detail.
While it is possible that simply changing the cover stories removed the
eects of role and frame, this seems unlikely given that all three scenario
evaluation studies had one cover story in common: the defamation dispute.
The defamation dispute (presented rst in Studies 1 and 2, and last in Study
5) was selected to be repeated as it yielded some of the strongest framing
eects in the rst two studies. However, as was demonstrated above in
section 5.2.2, there was no evidence of either a role or frame eect in the
defemation dispute in Study 6. One possibility is that this may be due to
order eects as, regardless of which version of the questionnaire they received,
all participants responded to the scenarios in the same order. As mentioned,
this meant that participants in Studies 1 and 2 responded to the defamation
dispute rst, while participants in the current study responded to it last.
While it is possible that this, combined with the new cover stories, could
account for the lack of framing eects in the current study, this explanation
seems unlikely.
The second possibility is the way the outcome of the trail was described.
This alteration was made in order to anchor the subjective probability of
5Van Koppen's original vignette was actually about a puppy, which was changed to a
racehorse for these studies in order to make the sum of $20,000 more plausible.
165winning more closely to the objective probability (50 percent). This alter-
ation was used in both simulated negotiation experiments and, as discussed,
appeared to have some (limited) success in narrowing the range of responses.
In Study 5, the judgment manipulation appears to have had little eect on
the subjective probabilities provided by participants, as based on the com-
parison of the defamation dispute across Studies 1, 2 and 5. Additionally,
analysing the settlement data using subjective probability as a co-variate
made little dierence to the results. However, the best way to test this is to
conduct an experiment which uses the new cover stories, but describes the
possible outcomes of a trial in exactly the same way as in Studies 1 and 2.




The participants were 189 psychology students (77 males) at the University
of Adelaide who received course credit for their participation. They were
aged between 18 and 46 (M = 20:1, SD = 3:7) and were randomly assigned
to one of four groups. There were no other exclusion criteria.
166Materials and Procedure
This study was the same as Study 6 except that the judgment was described
in the same way as that used in Study 2. That is, instead of being told that
the outcome of the trial depended on which judge heard the case, participants
were informed that their lawyer had advised that they had a `40-60 percent
chance of winning' depending on whether the judge accepted a particular
factual assertion.6 This means that the defamation dispute was presented in




Figure 33 shows the overall proportion of accepted settlements collapsed over
scenario as a function of legal role and frame. The results suggest a slight
framing eect, consistent with Studies 1 and 2, however this dierence is
not signicant, 2(1) = 1:09, p = :297. Analysis also revealed a signicant
eect of role, 2(1) = 6:94, p = :008, and no interaction, 2(1) = 0:06,
p = :805. Figure 34 shows the probability of settlement for each condition in
each scenario. This reveals a variable eect of role and frame, with a signif-
icant framing eect in scenario 1, 2(1) = 6:40, p = :011, and a signicant
6Study 1 advised participants that they had a 50 percent chance (rather than 40 - 60).
As shown by the re-analysis of studies 1 and 2 in section 3.3, there seems to be little

























Figure 33: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role




















Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 34: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
















































Figure 35: Average subjective probability of a plainti win as a function of
role/frame condition averaged across all scenarios.
role eect in scenario 4, 2(1) = 32:44, p < :001. None of the role/frame
interactions were signicant (p > :1 in all cases).
Subjective Probability
Figure 35 shows the average subjective probability of the plainti winning as
a function of role/frame condition. Analysis of variance revealed a signicant
eect of role (F(1;752) = 37:28, p < :001), with plaintis and defendants
both exhibiting a slight self-serving bias (M = 51:72, SD = 17:69 and M =
44:18, SD = 16:23, respectively). There was no frame or interaction eect
(p > :1).
169The settlement data were re-analysed using subjective probability as a co-
variate. Subjective probability of winning was a highly signicant predictor
(p < :001) for all four scenarios. Scenario 1 revealed an eect of frame
(2(1) = 9:17, p = :002) and scenario 4 demonstrated a role eect, 2(1) =
8:90, p = :003. There was no other eect of role, frame or their interaction
in the remaining scenarios.
5.4.3 Discussion
As with previous studies, this study did not nd any consistent eect of role
or frame.
5.4.4 Comparison of Studies 5 - 7
Settlement Rates
Figure 36 compares the overall proportion of accepted settlements collapsed
over scenario as a function of role and frame for Studies 5, 6 and 7. The eect
of legal role is signicant (p < :01) for all three studies, 2(1) = 7:30, 5.75
and 6.94 respectively, with plaintis more likely to settle than defendants in
all three studies. The eect of frame is not signicant in any study, and the
interaction between role and frame is signicant in Study 6, 2(1) = 4:33,
p = :037.
Figure 37 shows a comparison of the settlement rate for the defamation
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Figure 36: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
(plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) averaged across



















Study 1 Study 2 Study 5 Study 6 Study 7
Figure 37: Proportion of settlement acceptances as a function of legal role
(plainti vs. defendant) and frame (positive vs. negative) for the defama-
tion dispute for each of the scenario evaluation studies. This scenario was
presented to participants rst in Studies 1 and 2 and last in Studies 5-7.
171the similar pattern of results across all ve studies, regardless of the order
of presentation (rst or last), legal fees or how the judgment was described.
The data demonstrate a signicant eect of role in all ve studies and a
signicant eect of frame for Studies 1 and 2.
Subjective Probability
A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to examine the eect of the
`judgment' manipulation on estimates of subjective probability for Studies
5, 6 and 7, collapsed across scenarios. The data violated the assumption
of homogeneity of variance (Levene's test, F(2;1777) = 10:123, p < 0:001),
thus the more robust Brown-Forsythe test was used, but found no dierence
between the three studies, F(2;1566:08) = 0:078, p = :925. Figure 38 demon-
strates this, but also suggests that there is some slight anchoring caused by
the `judgment' manipulation, as evident from the slight decrease in the pro-
portion of participants who reported `50%' as their subjective probability of
winning in Study 7.
The settlement data from each study were re-analysed using subjective
probability estimates as a co-variate. These results suggest that while sub-
jective probability remained a signicant predictor of settlement (except for
scenario 1 of Study 5), role and frame had only a variable and intermittent
in
uence. Furthermore, the experimental manipulations that were imple-


























Figure 38: Distribution of subjective probability estimates (chance of defen-
dant winning) collapsed across scenario for Studies 5, 6 and 7.
173Costs
As discussed, the scenarios used in Study 5 incorporated information about
legal fees in order to consider the impact of this upon settlement rates. A
formal analysis of the eect of costs is dicult given that neither Study 5
nor Study 6 (the two studies dier only on the consideration of costs) show
any systematic dierences on settlement rates across conditions. Similarly,
while the formal analyses illustrate some dierences between the two studies,
there does not appear to be any discernable pattern. Thus, it is dicult
to determine whether dierences are due to costs, or to some other factor
entirely.
5.5 Summary of Studies 5, 6 and 7
The result of Studies 5, 6, and 7 is that the framing eects, which were strong
and consistent in the rst two studies, appear to have vanished. The eect
of legal role has also become more unpredictable. There are a number of
possible explanations for this { the inclusion of costs, the altered judgments,
the new cover stories or possible order eects. However, as will now be
discussed, none of these possibilities provide a satisfactory explanation for
the current results.
The rst explanation to consider for the contrasting results is possible
demographic dierences between the samples. However, there does not ap-
pear to be anything obviously dierent between the samples used in Studies
1745, 6 and 7, compared with those of Studies 1 and 2. While most studies were
available publicly online, the majority of participants were rst year psychol-
ogy students at the University of Adelaide, who participated for course credit.
The exception to this is Study 6, for which participants were recruited mostly
through the acquaintance of the researcher. This is re
ected through a higher
mean age compared with the other studies, and a more even proportion of
male and female participants. However, slight demographic dierences in the
sample for Study 6 do not explain the contrasting results for the reminaing
four studies. Furthermore, the samples for all ve studies were completely
independent, and the online booking system prevented students from partic-
ipating more than once (it is technically possible that students could have
accessed the questionnaire publicly without using their student number, al-
though they would have no motivation to do so). It therefore seems unlikely
that the contrasting results were caused by sampling issues.
The defamation dispute cover story (presented as scenario 1 in Studies 1
and 2, and as scenario 4 in Studies 5, 6 and 7), was selected to be repeated
as it yielded some of the strongest role/frame eects in the rst two studies.
Thus, the presentation of this scenario in Study 7 was exactly the same as in
Study 2 (except for possible order eects, which will be discussed below). As
was demonstrated by Figure 37, the results for this scenario still revealed a
signicant role eect for Study 7, although there is no eect of frame. Given
that this scenario, which previously demonstrated such robust eects, also
yielded inconsistent data, it seems unlikely that the new cover stories are the
175sole cause of these results.
While the new cover stories do not appear to have caused the change in
results, it is possible that there are order eects evident in the scenarios. Re-
gardless of which version of the questionnaire they received, all participants
responded to the scenarios in the same order. As mentioned, this means that
participants in Studies 1 and 2 responded to the defamation dispute rst,
while participants in Studies 5, 6 and 7 responded to it last. Thus, the re-
sults cannot be directly compared. It is worth noting, however, that Studies
1, 2 and 7, which all followed the same basic format,7 have the same pattern
of results for the rst scenario: subjective probability of winning as a signif-
icant predictor of settlement, with no role eect, but a signicant framing
eect. Studies 5 and 6 do not adhere to this pattern, although this could
be due to the experimental manipulations of costs and judgment. However,
while Studies 1 and 2 follow the same pattern of signicant role/frame eects
for each scenario except the last (for scenario 4, both studies found signicant
eects for subjective probability and role, however Study 2 found a framing
eect while Study 1 did not), Study 7 follows the pattern only for scenario
1. Studies 5 and 6 do not follow any of these patterns, but as mentioned this
could be due to other experimental manipulations. Thus, any order eects
that may exist are slight and can only be explored by a fully crossed experi-
7 Study 1 did not ask participants for an estimate of their maximum or minimum
price, and the questions regarding subjective probability and the settlement oer were in
the reverse order from Studies 2 and 7. However, order here does not seem to have had
an eect (see the re-analysis of Studies 1 and 2 at section 3.3).
176mental design. Even if the order eect is real, it appears to be minor and it
seems unlikely it could explain all of these results.
Thus, there does not appear to be any obvious explanation for the results
of Studies 5, 6 and 7. Perhaps the best explanation would be a combination of
the new cover stories and order eects for the defamation dispute, however
this is not overly compelling. Therefore, the only conclusions that can be
drawn from these studies is that while there are role and frame eects, they
do not appear to be systematic. This is discouraging in that one of the aims
of this research was to be able to predict framing eects, so that they could
be manipulated in order to induce out of court settlement.
Importantly, one nding that is reasonably consistent across all ve stud-
ies is that role and frame are independent constructs. This suggests that
there is still potential for framing to in
uence a litigant's perspective over
and above the eect of legal role. This provides some hope that if the fram-
ing eect can be unravelled, it may still be possible to use it to increase the




This thesis had three main aims. The rst was to examine whether deci-
sion making during litigation is subject to framing eects, as predicted by
Kahenman and Tversky's prospect theory. If so, the second goal was to in-
vestigate whether framing is independent of legal role. Prior research had
assumed that frame is determined by role and concluded that plaintis are
risk averse while defendants are risk seeking. The nal aim of this thesis was
to explore whether framing could be used to increase the chance that a liti-
gant would settle. This was investigated through the simulated negotiation
studies, which are the rst to consider framing and litigation.
This thesis has presented seven studies which have been separated into
three groups. The principle conclusion to be drawn from these experiments
178is that the eect of frame does not appear to be a strong determinant of
litigant behaviour. Each of these studies will now be reviewed, and then the
overall ndings will be discussed in more detail.
6.1.1 Studies 1 and 2
The rst two studies were a direct application of the Asian disease problem to
establish that settlement decisions in litigation are subject to framing eects
as predicted by prospect theory. They used the scenario evaluation paradigm
to examine whether the eects of role and frame could be dissociated, and
to build on the results of Gilliland and Dunn (2008, Experiment 1). Study 1
asked participants to indicate whether or not they should accept a $10,000
settlement oer, and to state their subjective probability of winning in court.
Overall, the results revealed a strong framing eect with no eect of role and
no interaction with role. Study 1 also highlighted the substantial (and unex-
pected) distinction between subjective and objective probability estimates.
This nding is new to litigation research on framing. Subjective probabilities
showed a high level of agreement between conditions and a slight self-serving
bias. Study 1 also explored participants' perceptions of which party was the
more morally justied in their behaviour for each scenario cover-story. The
data suggest a strong positive correlation between morality and subjective
probability.
Study 2 built on these ndings by examining the reservation price of
each party. These results demonstrated a high level of inconsistency (ie.
179participants violating their reservation prices), which suggests that responses
may be more indicative of an individual's expectations, rather than an actual
`bottom line'. Overall, the responses of plaintis and defendants to this
question created a negative settlement window which does not re
ect the
relatively high rate of settlement which was observed. Study 2 also addressed
the possibility of order eects arising from Study 1.
Taken together, the results of Studies 1 and 2 support the ndings of
Gilliland and Dunn (2008) and suggest that role and frame are independent
constructs. More importantly, they suggest that after controlling for sub-
jective probability, frame is a stronger in
uence on the rate of settlement
than role. As would be expected, the data show that subjective probability
is a strong predictor of settlement. The surprising result is just how much
variance was evident in the estimates of subjective probability, a trend which
was consistent throughout the experiments presented in this thesis. It was
predicted that while there may be some deviation, the majority of responses
would closely adhere to the objective estimate. This was not the case and
the implications of this will be discussed in more detail below. The ndings
of Studies 1 and 2 provided the experimental groundwork for the simulated
negotiations which followed.
6.1.2 Studies 3 and 4
The aim of Studies 3 and 4 was to determine whether the ndings of the pre-
vious studies could be replicated using the simulated negotiation paradigm
180similar to that used by Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) and Babcock et al.
(1997). To my knowledge, this has not been done before. Study 3 was the
rst simulated negotiation experiment, implemented as a pilot for Study 4.
The materials followed the same format as the scenario evaluation experi-
ments but used dierent cover stories and a dierent explanation for how the
outcome of the trial would be determined.
Preliminary analysis of the negotiation data did not indicate any framing
eects. It is possible that this was due (at least in part) to the low rate
of settlement achieved by negotiating pairs, which may have masked any
eects. The low rate of settlement may have re
ected the diculty of the
task (actually negotiating a settlement with another person is much harder
than simply responding `yes' or `no' to a single oer) but may also have been
due to a lack of incentive to reach an agreement. That is, with no costs
regime, and no real consequences for participants, there was little incentive
to settle. Study 4 sought to resolve this issue by introducing a schedule of
legal fees into the stimulus materials. The structure of the legal fees made it
benecial to both parties to achieve an out of court settlement. Study 4 was
the same as Study 3 in all other respects.
The introduction of court costs did increase the rate of settlement from
53.4 percent in Study 3 to 65.5 percent in Study 4. While this is still sig-
nicantly below the rate of settlement in real litigation (approximately 95
percent) it does suggest that participants incorporated the information when
making their decisions. It seems likely that paying participants contingent
181upon their negotiated outcome may be the optimal strategy to ensure maxi-
mum engagement and realism. The introduction of costs also decreased the
size of the negative settlement window determined through the reservation
price of plaintis and defendants. This suggests that the introduction of fees
made both parties more risk averse, as evidenced by more generous reserva-
tion prices.
Despite the increased rate of settlement, the results of Study 4 did not
demonstrate any consistent framing eect. Indeed, contrary to the predic-
tions of prospect theory, the positive pairing (P+D+) exhibited the lowest
rate of settlement, although this dierence was not signicant. Furthermore,
framing does not appear to have aected the bargaining behaviour of paired
litigants. That is, there was no dierence between the conditions in terms
of the size of the settlement (when achieved), the number of rounds com-
pleted or the number of oers made. These results are not consistent with
previous research on two-party negotiations (see for example Neale & Bazer-
man, 1992) which has found that positively framed negotiators exhibit more
concessionary behaviour than their negatively framed counterparts.
Given that there were a number of changes to the stimulus materials,
it was unclear whether the absence of framing eects was a result of the
paradigm shift to simulated negotiations, the introduction of legal fees, or
some other seemingly minor experimental manipulation. Studies 5-7 aimed
to investigate this further.
1826.1.3 Studies 5-7
The purpose of Study 5 was to determine whether framing eects were present
in a scenario evaluation study which incorporated costs. As was discussed,
the eect of costs on the rate of settlement cannot be clearly predicted by
prospect theory given that the exact shape of the value function is unknown.
Study 5 therefore sought to determine whether the absence of framing eects
in Study 4 was a result of the experimental design (simulated negotiations
versus scenario evaluations) or due to the introduction of court costs. Study
5 followed the same format as Studies 1 and 2 but used the cover-stories
and costs regime from Study 4. As reported, the data did not indicate any
consistent eect of frame.
The aim of Studies 6 and 7 was to conrm that it was the introduction
of court costs and not some other factor which had eliminated the framing
eect in Studies 4 and 5. Study 6 was the same as Study 5 except that it
did not include the costs regime. Study 7 was the same as Study 6 except
that the `judgment' was described in the same manner as in Studies 1 and 2.
Surprisingly, neither study found an eect of frame, despite their high degree
of similarity with Studies 1 and 2.
6.1.4 Conclusions
There appears to be no neat explanation for the somewhat inconsistent re-
sults presented in this thesis. However, it does seem likely that prospect the-
183ory cannot provide an adequate explanation of litigant decision making in a
realistic setting. Although Studies 1 and 2 (and Experiment 1 of Gilliland &
Dunn, 2008) found strong framing eects across all scenarios, these ndings
must be moderated by the results of Studies 5 - 7. The absence of fram-
ing eects in these latter studies was surprising and suggests two possible
explanations.
Firstly, it is possible that the eect of framing in litigation is fragile and
depends on the exact circumstances of the dispute (ie. the cover-stories).
That is, the particular disputes outlined in the rst two studies were somehow
more conducive of a framing eect than those outlined in the nal three
studies. This seems unlikely given that the defamation dispute scenario was
common to all scenario evaluation studies (albeit in a dierent order).
The second possibility is that the results of Studies 1 and 2 (and Exper-
iment 1 of Gilliland & Dunn, 2008) are type I errors, and that there is in
fact no eect of framing in litigation. This also seems unlikely, given both
the sample size and the consistency of the eect. Likewise, it is possible
that Studies 6 and 7 are type II errors and have failed to show an eect
when in fact an eect exists. This would interpretation would make it di-
cult to determine whether the results of Study 5 are due to the addition of
costs, or some other factor. Thus, both of these explanations are somewhat
dissatisfying.
The simulated negotiation experiments presented in Chapter 4 suggest
that, regardless of the interpretation of results given to the scenario evalu-
184ation studies, framing does not have an impact on litigant behaviour. As
discussed, the simulated negotiations also showed no framing eects. Again,
there are two possible explanations for this, neither of which support the
application of prospect theory to litigation.
Firstly, it is possible that, as discussed in section 5.2.3, the introduction
of legal fees and court costs unbalances the expected values of settlement
and trial enough to overpower any eect of frame. As explained, this is
problematic as it is almost impossible to avoid legal fees during litigation,
especially with a loser-pays cost allocation system like that used in Australia.
The second possibility is that framing simply does not have a signicant
eect on the complex and dynamic process of legal decision-making. That
is, framing can explain and predict decisions with a simple structure, as
exemplied by the Asian disease problem. Thus, the scenario evaluations
in Studies 1 and 2, which were heavily based on the Asian disease problem,
demonstrated framing eects. Framing has also been used to explain to
multi-stage decision making (see for example Kahneman & Tversky, 1984;
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).
However, there is little evidence to suggest that framing impacts upon
multi-attribute decision making (Dyer, Fishburn, Steuer, Wallenius, & Zionts,
1992), such as that encompassed by litigation. For example, even the rel-
atively simple scenarios used in Studies 3 and 4 prompted participants to
consider issues such as time, stress, personal satisfaction, moral justica-
tion and ongoing business relationships in addition to the obvious nancial
185concerns.1
Like framing, prospect theory is also unable to account for contextual
and other external factors which help to dene the decision making process
(Leven & Levine, 1996), such as the nature of the dispute or the strategy
adopted by the other party. As Leven and Levine point out, \prospect theory
does not capture many of the contextual and dynamic in
uences which are
fundamental to the phenomena being studied" (1996, p. 273). They go
on to add that prospect theory does not make any comment about how
the interaction between internal and external variables may in
uence the
decision making process. In combination, these issues lead to the conclusion
that prospect theory and framing may not provide a good explanation of
litigant behaviour.
6.1.5 Key Findings
One of the most consistent ndings of this thesis is that role and frame
are independent constructs. That is, the majority of analyses showed no
interaction eect between role and frame, and those that were signicant were
usually explained in terms of dierences in subjective probability of winning.
This nding has two main implications. Firstly, as discussed in the previous
chapter, the distinction between role and frame allows for the possibility that
framing manipulations may be used to increase the probability of settlement.
The extent to which this may be an eective strategy, however, appears
1 Evidence of this can be found in the qualitative data collected from Studies 3 and 4.
186limited in light of the results presented here, particularly in Studies 3 and 4.
The second implication of distinguishing role and frame is that it sug-
gests dierent interpretations of previous ndings in research on framing and
litigation. For example, Rachlinski (1996) analysed the trial outcomes of
over 500 civil disputes and claimed to nding evidence of a framing eect.
As discussed in Chapter 2 (above at 2.3.2), Rachlinski found that plaintis
made more `errors' by going to trial than defendants, but that the cost of
those errors was higher for defendants2. Rachlinski interpreted this result as
evidence of framing eects in real litigation. However, this assumption was
based on the belief that frame is dened by role. The experiments conducted
in this thesis show that this is not necessarily the case and suggest that this
dierence is best interpreted as a role eect, not a framing eect. Further
research is required to determine what is driving this role eect, given that
it does not appear to be framing.
One of the aims of this thesis was to consider whether the simulated
negotiation paradigm, as used in other elds of negotiation research, is an
eective method for investigating litigation. The results of Studies 3 and 4
are promising in that they demonstrate that simulations are able to generate
a high level of engagement in participants in a relatively short space of time.
This knowledge will aid in designing future experiments.
2As explained previously, cases were coded as `plainti error' if the trial outcome was
below the defendant's nal oer. That is, if the plainti would have been better o
(nancially) if they had accepted the out of court settlement oer, rather than going to
trial. Cases were coded as `defendant error' if the trial outcome was higher than the
plainti's nal oer.
187Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) also used simulated negotiations (the
`Texas tort case') to investigate decision making in litigation, with a partic-
ular focus on self-serving bias. The material provided to participants in that
series of experiments were signicantly more extensive (27 pages versus just
one in the current studies) and the subsequent negotiation was also longer
(30 as opposed to eight minutes). Given the dierences between the Texas
tort case and the current research, it is dicult to compare relatively levels
of engagement. However, one possible point of comparison is the rate of set-
tlement. The rate of settlement in civil disputes is approximately 95 percent,
which suggests that real litigants feel a strong incentive to settle. Babcock
and Loewenstein (1997) reported settlement rates of between 60 and 85 per-
cent (depending on condition), which is slightly above the negotiations in
Studies 3 and 4 (53.4 and 65.5 percent respectively). This could indicate
a higher level of engagement in the more extensive experiment, although it
is dicult to tell given the signicant dierences between experiments. An
investigation of the factors which are most important in increasing engage-
ment would therefore benet future research in this eld. For example, if
settlement can be considered an indicator of engagement, there appears to
be a relatively low incremental increase caused by the measures taken by
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) to improve engagement. In addition to
more extensive materials and a longer negotiation period, participants in
the Texas tort case also received payment contingent upon their outcomes.
It would be helpful to know which of these factors are most important for
188improving engagement, which would in turn improve the generalisability of
experimental work in this area.
6.2 Future Research: Questions & Directions
6.2.1 If not prospect theory then what?
Multi-Attribute Decision-Making Models
The preceding discussion has made it clear that legal decision making is a
complex and dynamic process. It is therefore apparent that in order for
a theory to accurately describe (and predict) litigant behaviour, it must
be able to adequately deal with multi-attribute decision contexts which are
continually updating. There is also a need to consider how the interaction of
internal and external in
uences may alter the decision outcome. For example,
a litigant who is willing to compromise and co-operate (internal factors) may
react negatively to an opponent that adopts an aggressive strategy (external
factor).
Unsurprisingly, there are currently no decision making theories that are
suciently comprehensive to account for complex litigant behaviour. In-
deed, as Lai and Sycara (2009) point out, multi-attribute negotiation is still
relatively under-studied. They propose a model which is able to take into
account some limited factors such as strategy adoption and incomplete in-
formation. However, a model that simply describes litigant behaviour (while
189impressive) only does half of the job. One of the principle aims of this thesis
was to investigate a means by which the rate of pre-trial settlement could be
increased. For example, it was hoped that a negatively framed litigant could
be positively re-framed in order to induce a settlement. Models such as that
proposed by Lai and Sycara (2009) provide no such mechanism. Therefore,
while further development of such multi-attribute models is required, it is
not clear that they will provide much guidance on this issue.
Crisis Bargaining Literature
This thesis has dened litigation as a form of crisis bargaining. As discussed,
literature on crisis bargaining has been relatively under-developed. The con-
cept was popular among psychologists in the 1970s and 1980s, but interest
appears to have declined during the 1990s. This could in part be due to its
perception as providing a more socially focused theory of decision making,
rather than having a strong cognitive focus (Bazerman et al., 2000). In re-
cent years, research into crisis bargaining has enjoyed a resurgence, possibly
due in part to the current policy climate in international relations and the
increasing level of interdependence of national economies due to globalisa-
tion.
Unlike the literature on multi-attribute decision making, crisis bargaining
research is focused on developing measures to not only describe the process of
negotiations, but also to alter the outcome of such disputes. For example, a
recent article by Leventoglu and Tarar (2008) examined the eect of private
190information on the likelihood of two nations going to war. They consider
how third parties (such as international organisations or foreign mediators)
could help to facilitate ongoing negotiations, even when facing incomplete
information.
Research such as this could have implications for the role of lawyers and
mediators during pre-trial negotiations. It therefore seems likely that further
development of the crisis bargaining literature could help to resolve many of
the issues posed by litigation.
6.2.2 Additional Points of Interest
The exploratory nature of the experimental work presented here means that
several ndings have arisen which are ancillary to the original aims of this
thesis, but which should be discussed. In particular, the ndings relating to
the subjective probability of winning and reservation price potentially have
both experimental and theoretical implications, and are worthy of further
research.
Subjective Probability of Winning
One of the most pervasive ndings of this thesis is that participant's sub-
jective estimates of their probability of winning consistently deviated from
objective estimates. This tendency was also fairly resistant to the experi-
mental manipulations which were implemented to more closely anchor the
subjective estimate to the 50 percent level. It is unclear whether this nd-
191ing is re
ective of a real-world tendency or simply an experimental artefact.
There is much legal literature to support the proposition that trial is a re-
sult of a predictive error on behalf of one or both parties (see for example
Cooter & Rubineld, 1989). This literature is lacking in strong empirical
evidence and could benet from further research. For example, it could be
that a litigants' subjective estimate is partly the result of a cognitive bias
such as over-condence (see for example Birke & Fox, 1999), or even perhaps
an illusion of control over the trial process. If this were the case, it would be
interesting to know whether lawyers are equally susceptible to such bias. If
so, this could have implications for legal practice.
Reservation Price and Settlement Windows
The data relating to reservation price and settlement windows generated
some interesting and unexpected results. For example, past research has
suggested that reservation price and settlement window are good predic-
tors of settlement (see for example Blount-White & Neale, 1994). The data
presented here are not consistent with this nding. As reported, both the
scenario evaluation studies and the simulated negotiations yielded negatively
settlement windows (averaged across individuals), despite a relatively high
rate of settlement. Furthermore, participants appeared reasonably willing
to violate their reservation prices, as demonstrated by the high level of in-
consistencies (ie. individuals who either accepted an oer which was less
favourable than their reservation price, or who rejected oers that were more
192favourable than their reservation price). As was discussed above at 3.2.3, it
therefore seems likely that participants were indicating values more indica-
tive of their aspirations (expectations) than their actual reservation price.
Aspiration points have also been considered strong predictors of settlement
(see for example Van Poucke & Buelens, 2002). Such an interpretation raises
the issue of how to distinguish between reservation and aspiration points be-
fore the commencement of a negotiation. That is, a value of $x may indicate
one outcome if it is a reservation price or a dierent outcome if it is prop-
erly interpreted as an aspiration price. Establishing a method for the correct
identication of these two values is necessary before either can be used to
predict the outcome of negotiations.
6.3 Conclusion
Consistent with the aims, this thesis has demonstrated that framing can,
under some circumstances, eect litigant decision making. The experimen-
tal work presented here suggests that role and frame are indeed separate
constructs that may be independently manipulated. However, the simulated
negotiation studies suggest that framing may not be a useful tool for increas-
ing the likelihood of reaching an agreement due to the complex nature of
decision making in a legal setting.
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This appendix contains one version of the questionnaire used in Study 1,
as presented to participants. This includes the instruction sheet, the four
scenarios and the questions regarding moral right. Participants were naive
to their role/frame condition, and the headers for each scenario were not





The Psychology of Litigation Settlement 
 
Traditionally, legal theory has been based on theories of economic utility but these 
theories fail to account for the psychological factors which effect human decision 
making. The aim of the current study is to explore how individuals make decisions in a 
legal setting. It is hoped that a greater understanding of this process will lead to an 
increase in out of court settlements, thereby reducing pressure on the court system. 
 
The following questionnaire describes four legal scenarios, each involving a dispute of 
some kind. For each scenario, you will be asked to evaluate the facts and indicate whether 
or not, if placed in that situation, you would accept the proposed settlement offer. You 
will also be asked to indicate, based on the facts, what you believe to be your chances of 
winning in court. 
 
The aim of this study is to determine how individuals make decisions. For this reason, the 
scenarios should not be considered as moral dilemmas, as both parties will feel they are 
correct. There are also no right or wrong answers. Similarly, when making your decision, 
do not consider legal fees or court costs as this is not the focus of the study. 
 
Each scenario is independent of the others (ie. the facts of each case are in no way related 
and do not carry on from each other) and your judgement should be based only on the 
individual merits of each. It is important to read each scenario carefully, and to pay 
particular attention to your lawyer’s advice. 
 
There is no time limit, but normally the questionnaire will take approximately 15-20 
minutes to complete. If you are a Psychology I student, you will be asked to provide your 
student ID number in order to ensure you receive course credit for you participation. 
Please make sure you sign up for this study through the online booking sheet on 
experiment central (it doesn’t matter what time you choose, as you have already 
completed the questionnaire). If you do not do this you cannot be credited for your 
participation. Completion of this questionnaire is worth 30 minutes credit.  
 
Once completed, please return the entire questionnaire (including the cover sheet) to the 
box in the Psychology Office.  
 
For any further information regarding this study, please feel free to contact either the PhD 
student or supervisor involved, as below. For any questions concerning the ethics of this 
request, please contact the convener of the Subcommittee for Human Research in the 
Department of Psychology, Dr Paul Delfabbro, 8303 5744. 
 
 
   
 SCENARIO 1 – Positive Plaintiff 
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are the 
owner of a small gourmet deli. Recently, a local newspaper published a series of articles 
entitled “Are these the city’s worst employers?” The articles discussed a number of small 
businesses in the area and accused them of underpaying their staff and providing sub-
standard working conditions. While no names were given, you feel that as a consequence 
of these articles, customers stayed away and your business suffered $20,000 in lost 
income.  
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for 
restitution. Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with the newspaper on your behalf. 
You are seeking $20,000 in compensation. The newspaper denies the claim on the basis 
that they did not identify your business, and that the descriptions given in the articles 
could have referred to any number of businesses. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the newspaper and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial 
date has now been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on 
whether or not the judge feels you can be definitively identified from the facts given in 
the articles. Your lawyer has estimated that you have a 50% chance that the judge will 
rule in your favour and you will receive $20,000 in compensation and a 50% chance that 
the judge will rule against you and you will receive nothing in compensation. 
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that the newspaper 
has offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you would receive $10,000 in 
compensation. This is the final offer before the trial and your decision must be made 
before the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
Your lawyer has advised that you have a 50% chance of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
   SCENARIO 2 – Negative Plaintiff 
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are the 
owner of an investment property 200km from the city. Recently, the bed and breakfast 
next door to your property built an extra cabin. You have discovered that this extra cabin 
actually extends onto your property. 
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for 
restitution. Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with the bed and breakfast on your 
behalf. Since land value in the area is rising rapidly, you are seeking $40,000 in 
compensation based on the expected increase in the future value of the land. The bed and 
breakfast has refused to pay that much, claiming they should only have to pay the current 
market value of the land, which is half that amount. In this case you would face a loss of 
$20,000 in future earnings. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the bed and breakfast and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial 
date has now been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on 
the judge’s interpretation of a council by-law which determines how a dispute of this kind 
is to be resolved. Your lawyer has estimated that you have a 50% chance that the judge 
will rule in your favour and you will lose nothing and a 50% chance that the judge will 
rule against you and you will lose $20,000 in future earnings. 
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that the bed and 
breakfast has offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you would lose 
$10,000 in future earnings. This is the final offer before the trial and your decision must 
be made before the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
Your lawyer has advised that you have a 50% chance of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
   SCENARIO 3 – Negative Defendant 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are 
part-owner of a gym. While your partner was overseas, you installed a vending machine 
on the premises without consulting him. During this time, the machine generated $40,000 
in income.  
 
On his return, your partner claims that as he is an equal partner in the gym, he is owed 
half of the profits and that he has suffered $20,000 in lost income. You deny this claim on 
the basis that the vending machine was not part of the gym. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with your partner and no settlement 
has been reached. He has decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now 
been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or 
not the judge feels that the vending machine was part of the joint business enterprise. 
Your lawyer has estimated that you have a 50% chance that the judge will rule in your 
favour and you will have to pay nothing and a 50% chance that the judge will rule against 
you and you will have to pay $20,000 to your partner. 
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that your partner 
has offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you will have to pay $10,000 to 
your partner. This is the final offer before the trial and your decision must be made before 
the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
Your lawyer has advised that you have a 50% chance of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
   SCENARIO 4 – Positive Defendant 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. Your aunt 
recently died and, having no children of her own, left the bulk of her estate to you and 
your cousin. As prescribed by the will, you each received $10,000. You also received an 
additional portfolio of shares, worth approximately $20,000.  
 
However, your cousin has claimed that the portfolio should have gone to her since your 
aunt had promised it to her before she died. You deny the claim, since the will left the 
portfolio to you. You feel that your cousin should receive only the $10,000 left to her. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with your cousin and no agreement 
has been reached. She has decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now 
been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or 
not the judge accepts your cousin’s evidence of your aunt’s promise to give her the 
portfolio. Your lawyer has estimated that you have a 50% chance that the judge will rule 
in your favour and you will receive $30,000 from your aunt’s estate and a 50% chance 
that the judge will rule against you and you will receive only $10,000. 
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that your cousin 
has offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you would receive $20,000 from 
the estate. This is the final offer before the trial and your decision must be made before 
the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
Your lawyer has advised that you have a 50% chance of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
   MORAL RIGHT 
 
Regardless of whether you accepted or rejected each settlement offer, please indicate 
which party you thought was more morally justified in their claim for each scenario. That 
is, whether you felt the plaintiff or the defendant ‘was in the right’, or whether you felt 
they were about equal. Circle the number that best corresponds to your position. 
 
Scenario number 1:      
1  2  3  4  5 
Plaintiff  Plaintiff  Plaintiff &  Defendant  Defendant 
definitely  mostly  Defendant  mostly  definitely 
in the right  in the right  equally right  in the right  in the right 
 
 
Scenario number 2: 
1  2  3  4  5 
Plaintiff  Plaintiff  Plaintiff &  Defendant  Defendant 
definitely  mostly  Defendant  mostly  definitely 
in the right  in the right  equally right  in the right  in the right 
 
 
Scenario number 3: 
1  2  3  4  5 
Plaintiff  Plaintiff  Plaintiff &  Defendant  Defendant 
definitely  mostly  Defendant  mostly  definitely 
in the right  in the right  equally right  in the right  in the right 
 
 
Scenario number 4 
1  2  3  4  5 
Plaintiff  Plaintiff  Plaintiff &  Defendant  Defendant 
definitely  mostly  Defendant  mostly  definitely 









This appendix contains the legal scenarios used for the simulated negotia-
tions in Study 3, as presented to participants. Participants were given the
instruction sheet, and then asked to read each scenario before commencing
the round of negotiations associated with that dispute. Participants were
naive to their role/frame condition, and the headers for each scenario were
not present in the original.
228Negotiation in Civil Disputes – Information Sheet  
 
Traditionally, legal theory has been based on models of economic utility, however these 
theories fail to account for the psychological factors which effect human decision making. 
The aim of the current study is to explore how individuals make decisions in a legal setting. It 
is hoped that a greater understanding of this process will lead to an increase in out of court 
settlements, thereby reducing pressure on the court system. Specifically, this study aims to 
explore how plaintiffs and defendants negotiate and evaluate out of court settlements during 
litigation. In order to do this, you will be asked to participate in three separate negotiations, 
each with a different opponent. The format of the study is outlined below.   
 
You will be placed into pairs and given a legal scenario to read. Each scenario outlines a real 
legal dispute between a plaintiff and defendant involving $20,000. You will be asked to 
imagine how you would feel in such a situation, and to negotiate accordingly. After you have 
considered the facts of the case for several minutes, you will be asked to negotiate with your 
opponent by making written offers and counter-offers. In each case, the plaintiff will begin by 
asking the defendant for the full $20,000. The defendant will then decide whether to accept 
the offer or make a counter offer, and so the negotiation will proceed. Each round of 
negotiations will go for five minutes. If your negotiation ends before that time (either due to 
settlement or impasse), you can simply wait until time runs out. If you do not reach a 
settlement, your case will proceed to trial, and the actual judgment from this case will 
determine who wins at trial. As the round progresses, you will be asked to record each offer 
and counter-offer. To ensure that everyone understands what to do, there will be a practice 
round first.  
 
In total, there will be three rounds of negotiations using three different legal scenarios. Each 
negotiation will be done with a different person. At the end of the final round, you will be 
informed of the actual outcome of each trial and you will receive further information about 
the specific aims of this study. The entire study will take approximately one hour to 
complete. Your participation is greatly appreciated and you are free to withdraw at any time 
throughout the study.  
 
For any further information regarding this study, please feel free to contact either the PhD 
student or supervisor involved, as below. For any questions concerning the ethics of this 
request, please contact the convener of the Subcommittee for Human Research in the 
Department of Psychology, Dr Paul Delfabbro, 8303 5744. 
 
 
PhD Student: Victoria Gilliland   
victoria.gilliland@adelaide.edu.au   
 
Primary Supervisor: John Dunn 
john.c.dunn@adelaide.edu.au 
 COPYRIGHT POSITIVE PLAINTIFF – 1A 
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are a 
freelance graphic designer, who specialises in magazine advertisements. Some time ago you 
submitted an idea for an ad campaign to a small advertising company, AdCo. The company 
rejected your idea, saying it was not suitable for their clients. However, you recently noticed 
an advertising campaign published by AdCo that bears a striking resemblance to your 
submission.  After some inquiries you discover that the client paid AdCo $20,000 for artwork 
which you believe belongs to you.  
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for restitution. 
Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with AdCo on your behalf. You are seeking 
$20,000 in compensation. AdCo denies the claim on the basis that the design team who 
created the campaign were unaware of your submission, and that regardless of this the two 
ideas vary significantly. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the advertising company and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date 
has now been set. Based on previous cases, your lawyer has advised that the success of your 
case depends on whether or not the judge feels you have provided appropriate evidence that 
the original idea was yours alone, and that the design team were aware of your submission. 
The outcomes of these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has 
estimated that you have a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge rules in your 
favour, you will receive $20,000 in compensation; if the judge rules against you, you will 
receive nothing in compensation. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the defendant (AdCo). AdCo has agreed to this, and the negotiations will 
begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from AdCo in 
order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price (between $0 and 
$20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $...................................  COPYRIGHT NEGATIVE PLAINTIFF -  1B  
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are a 
freelance graphic designer, who specialises in magazine advertisements. Some time ago you 
submitted an idea for an ad campaign to a small advertising company, AdCo. The company 
rejected your idea, saying it was not suitable for their clients. However, you recently noticed 
an advertising campaign published by AdCo that bears a striking resemblance to your 
submission.  After some inquiries you discover that the client paid AdCo $20,000 for artwork 
which you believe belongs to you.  
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for restitution. 
Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with AdCo on your behalf. You are seeking 
$20,000 in lost income. AdCo denies the claim on the basis that the design team who created 
the campaign were unaware of your submission, and that regardless of this the two ideas vary 
significantly. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the advertising company and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date 
has now been set. Based on previous cases, your lawyer has advised that the success of your 
case depends on whether or not the judge feels you have provided appropriate evidence that 
the original idea was yours alone, and that the design team were aware of your submission. 
The outcomes of these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has 
estimated that you have a 40-60% chance of winning in court.  If the judge rules in your 
favour, you will lose no income; if the judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 in 
income. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the defendant (AdCo). AdCo has agreed to this, and the negotiations will 
begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from AdCo in 
order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price (between $0 and 
$20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $................................... COPYRIGHT POSITIVE DEFENDANT – 1C  
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You own a 
small advertising agency, AdCo, which specialises in magazine advertisements. You recently 
designed an advertising campaign for a client, for which you were paid a commission of 
$20,000.  
 
However, a local freelance designer has brought an action against you for restitution of lost 
income. She claims that your campaign is based on a submission she sent you sometime 
earlier, and that consequently she should receive $20,000 for lost income. You deny the claim 
on the basis that the design team who created the campaign were unaware of her submission, 
and that regardless of this the two ideas vary significantly. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the designer and no settlement has 
been reached. The designer has decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now 
been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or not the 
judge feels you have provided appropriate evidence that the idea for the campaign was 
original and that the design team were unaware of the earlier submission. The outcomes of 
these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has estimated that you 
have a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge rules in your favour, you will get to 
keep the $20,000 commission; if the judge rules against you, you will get to keep none of the 
commission.  
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the plaintiff (the designer). The designer has agreed to this, and the 
negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the designer in 
order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the maximum price (between $0 and 
$20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... COPYRIGHT NEGATIVE DEFENDANT – 1D 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You own a 
small advertising agency, AdCo, which specialises in magazine advertisements. You recently 
designed an advertising campaign for a client, for which you were paid a commission of 
$20,000.  
 
However, a local freelance designer has brought an action against you for restitution of lost 
income. She claims that your campaign is based on a submission she sent you sometime 
earlier, and that consequently she should receive $20,000 for lost income. You deny the claim 
on the basis that the design team who created the campaign were unaware of her submission, 
and that regardless of this the two ideas vary significantly. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the designer and no settlement has 
been reached. The designer has decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now 
been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or not the 
judge feels you have provided appropriate evidence that the idea for the campaign was 
original and that the design team were unaware of the earlier submission. The outcomes of 
these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has estimated that you 
have a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge rules in your favour, you will lose 
none of the commission; if the judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 of commission. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the plaintiff (the designer). The designer has agreed to this, and the 
negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the designer in 
order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the maximum price (between $0 and 
$20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... RACE HORSE POSITIVE PLAINTIFF – 2A  
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are the 
owner of a horse stable called the Parsley Stud, which breeds racehorses. You recently 
purchased a promising yearling for $20,000. However, two weeks after it arrived at your 
stables, it died of complications arising from a heart condition. You believe the heart 
condition was pre-existing and that the sale should be void. 
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for restitution. 
Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with the previous owner on your behalf. You are 
seeking $20,000 in compensation. The previous owner denies the claim on the basis that he 
had no prior knowledge of the heart condition.  
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the previous owner and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date 
has now been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether 
or not the judge feels the previous owner had a duty to test for congenital disease prior to 
sale. The outcomes of these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer 
has estimated that you have a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge rules in your 
favour, you will receive $20,000 in compensation; if the judge rules against you, you will 
receive nothing in compensation. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the defendant (the previous owner). The previous owner has agreed to this, 
and the negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from the 
previous owner in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price 
(between $0 and $20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $...................................  RACE HORSE NEGATIVE PLAINTIFF – 2B  
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are the 
owner of a horse stable called the Parsley Stud, which breeds racehorses. You recently 
purchased a promising yearling for $20,000. However, two weeks after it arrived at your 
stables, it died of complications arising from a heart condition. You believe the heart 
condition was pre-existing and that the sale should be void. 
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for restitution. 
Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with the previous owner on your behalf. You are 
seeking $20,000 in compensation. The previous owner denies the claim on the basis that he 
had no prior knowledge of the heart condition.  
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the previous owner and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date 
has now been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether 
or not the judge feels the previous owner had a duty to test for congenital disease prior to 
sale. The outcomes of these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer 
has estimated that you have a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge rules in your 
favour, you will lose nothing on the sale; if the judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 
on the sale. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the defendant (the previous owner). The previous owner has agreed to this, 
and the negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from the 
previous owner in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price 
(between $0 and $20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $................................... RACEHORSE POSITIVE DEFENDANT – 2C 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are the 
owner of a horse stable which breeds racehorses. You recently sold a promising yearling to 
the Parsley Stud and made a $20,000 profit.  
 
However, two weeks after it left your stables, the horse died of complications arising from a 
heart condition. The new owner claims that the heart condition was pre-existing and that the 
sale should be void. She is seeking $20,000 in compensation. You deny the claim on the basis 
that you had no prior knowledge of the heart condition. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the Parsley Stud and no settlement 
has been reached. The Stud has decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now 
been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or not the 
judge feels you had a duty to test for congenital disease prior to sale. The outcomes of these 
sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has estimated that you have 
a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge rules in your favour, you will get to keep 
$20,000 of the sale profits; if the judge rules against you, you will get to keep none of the sale 
profits.  
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the plaintiff (the Parsley Stud). The Stud has agreed to this, and the 
negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the Parsley 
Stud in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the maximum price (between $0 
and $20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... RACEHORSE NEGATIVE DEFENDANT – 2D 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are the 
owner of a horse stable which breeds racehorses. You recently sold a promising yearling to 
the Parsley Stud and made a $20,000 profit.  
 
However, two weeks after it left your stables, the horse died of complications arising from a 
heart condition. The new owner claims that the heart condition was pre-existing and that the 
sale should be void. She is seeking $20,000 in compensation. You deny the claim on the basis 
that you had no prior knowledge of the heart condition. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the Parsley Stud and no settlement 
has been reached. The Stud has decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now 
been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or not the 
judge feels you had a duty to test for congenital disease prior to sale. The outcomes of these 
sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has estimated that you have 
a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge rules in your favour, you will lose none of 
the sale profits; if the judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 of the sale profits.  
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the plaintiff (the Parsley Stud). The Stud has agreed to this, and the 
negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the Parsley 
Stud in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the maximum price (between $0 
and $20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... SOLAR PANELS POSITIVE PLAINTIFF – 3A 
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You own a 
manufacturing business and have recently been investigating the possibility of using solar 
energy for your warehouse, but are concerned about the cost. You make some enquiries with 
a company, Aurora, which specialises in the installation of solar panels. They tell you of a 
new government rebate on solar panels which will save you $20,000. This means that you 
can afford to ‘go green’ and you hire Aurora to install the panels. However, when it comes 
time to claim your rebate, you discover that your business is not eligible for the government 
incentive. Since it was Aurora who provided the incorrect information, you feel they should 
have to cover the difference in cost. 
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for restitution. 
Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with Aurora on your behalf. You are seeking 
$20,000 in compensation. Aurora denies the claim on the basis that it is your responsibility to 
investigate your own eligibility for the government rebate. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with Aurora and no settlement has been 
reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now been set. 
Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or not the judge 
feels Aurora made your own responsibilities and liabilities regarding the rebate adequately 
comprehensible. The outcomes of these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and 
your lawyer has estimated that you have a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge 
rules in your favour, you will receive $20,000 in compensation; if the judge rules against you, 
you will receive nothing in compensation. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the defendant (Aurora). Aurora has agreed to this, and the negotiations will 
begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from the 
Aurora in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price (between $0 
and $20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $................................... SOLAR PANELS NEGATIVE PLAINTIFF – 3B 
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You own a 
manufacturing business and have recently been investigating the possibility of using solar 
energy for your warehouse, but are concerned about the cost. You make some enquiries with 
a company, Aurora, which specialises in the installation of solar panels. They tell you of a 
new government rebate on solar panels which will save you $20,000. This means that you 
can afford to ‘go green’ and you hire Aurora to install the panels. However, when it comes 
time to claim your rebate, you discover that your business is not eligible for the government 
incentive. Since it was Aurora who provided the incorrect information, you feel they should 
have to cover the difference in cost. 
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for restitution. 
Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with Aurora on your behalf. You are seeking 
$20,000 in compensation. Aurora denies the claim on the basis that it is your responsibility to 
investigate your own eligibility for the government rebate. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with Aurora and no settlement has been 
reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date has now been set. 
Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on whether or not the judge 
feels Aurora made your own responsibilities and liabilities regarding the rebate adequately 
comprehensible. The outcomes of these sorts of cases are notoriously difficult to predict, and 
your lawyer has estimated that you have a 40-60% chance of winning in court. If the judge 
rules in your favour, you will lose nothing from the rebate; if the judge rules against you, you 
will lose $20,000 of the rebate. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the defendant (Aurora). Aurora has agreed to this, and the negotiations will 
begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from the 
Aurora in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price (between $0 
and $20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $................................... SOLAR PANELS POSITIVE DEFENDANT – 3C 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You own a 
company called Aurora, which specialises in the installation of solar panels. You recently 
completed a large installation for a manufacturing company, and made a $20,000 profit.   
 
However, the price you quoted the company was based on their eligibility for a government 
rebate. The company has since discovered they are not eligible for the rebate and believe you 
are responsible for providing inaccurate information. The company is seeking $20,000 in 
compensation. You deny the claim on the basis that it was the responsibility of the company 
to investigate their own eligibility for the government rebate. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the manufacturing company and 
no settlement has been reached. The company has decided to pursue the matter in court and a 
trial date has now been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on 
whether or not the judge feels you made the company’s own responsibilities and liabilities 
regarding the rebate adequately comprehensible. The outcomes of these sorts of cases are 
notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has estimated that you have a 40-60% chance 
of winning in court. If the judge rules in your favour, you will get to keep $20,000 of the 
installation profits; if the judge rules against you, you will get to keep none of the profits 
from installation. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the plaintiff (the manufacturing company). The company has agreed to this, 
and the negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the 
manufacturing company in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the maximum 
price (between $0 and $20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... SOLAR PANELS NEGATIVE DEFENDANT – 3D 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You own a 
company called Aurora, which specialises in the installation of solar panels. You recently 
completed a large installation for a manufacturing company, and made a $20,000 profit.   
 
However, the price you quoted the company was based on their eligibility for a government 
rebate. The company has since discovered they are not eligible for the rebate and believe you 
are responsible for providing inaccurate information. The company is seeking $20,000 in 
compensation. You deny the claim on the basis that it was the responsibility of the company 
to investigate their own eligibility for the government rebate. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the manufacturing company and 
no settlement has been reached. The company has decided to pursue the matter in court and a 
trial date has now been set. Your lawyer has advised that the success of your case depends on 
whether or not the judge feels you made the company’s own responsibilities and liabilities 
regarding the rebate adequately comprehensible. The outcomes of these sorts of cases are 
notoriously difficult to predict, and your lawyer has estimated that you have a 40-60% chance 
of winning in court. If the judge rules in your favour, you will lose none of the installation 
profits; if the judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 of the installation profits. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the plaintiff (the manufacturing company). The company has agreed to this, 
and the negotiations will begin shortly. 
 
Obviously, this scenario may not reflect a situation you personally have faced, however 
they are based on actual situations that people have found themselves in. It is important 
to the study that you think about what it would be like to be in this situation, so before 
proceeding you will have a couple of extra minutes to imagine yourself in this situation. 
Try to think about how you would want to act if you really had to deal with this 
scenario.  
 
Before proceeding to the negotiation round, please take a moment to consider the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the 
manufacturing company in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the maximum 
price (between $0 and $20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... 
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Study 4 Framing Interventions
242Positive frame for parties reaching settlement: 
 
You have agreed upon a settlement where the defendant will pay the plaintiff $x. Before you 
sign the court documents which will make this contract legally binding, I need to make sure 
that you both fully understand the deal you have made. 
 
Plaintiff, this means that you will receive $x in compensation, less $2500 in legal fees.  
 
Defendant, this means that you will get to keep $20,000 – x, less $2500 in legal fees.   
 
Positive frame for parties not reaching settlement: 
 
You have decided to proceed to trial rather than settling this case. Before you do so, I need to 
make sure that you both fully understand the possible consequences of going to court. You 
have been informed that the outcome of this case depends entirely upon which judge is 
allocated to the trial. If you do not negotiate a settlement and instead proceed to trial, each 
party will be charged a total of $3,500 in legal fees, which will be distributed on a loser-pays 
basis.  
 
Plaintiff, if the judge rules in your favour, you will receive the full $20,000; if the judge rules 
against you, you will receive nothing, but have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 
Defendant, if the judge rules in your favour, you will get to keep the $20,000; if the judge 
rules against you, you will keep nothing, and have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 
Negative frame for parties reaching settlement: 
 
You have agreed upon a settlement where the defendant will pay the plaintiff $x. Before you 
sign the court documents which will make this contract legally binding, I need to make sure 
that you both fully understand the deal you have made. 
 
Plaintiff, this means that you will lose $20,000 – x, in lost income, minus a further $2,500 in 
legal fees. 
Defendant, this means that you will lose $x, minus a further $2,500 in legal fees.  
 
Negative frame for parties not reaching settlement: 
 
You have decided to proceed to trial rather than settling this case. Before you do so, I need to 
make sure that you both fully understand the possible consequences of going to court. You 
have been informed that the outcome of this case depends entirely upon which judge is 
allocated to the trial. If you do not negotiate a settlement and instead proceed to trial, each 
party will be charged a total of $3,500 in legal fees, which will be distributed on a loser-pays 
basis.  
 
Plaintiff, if the judge rules in your favour, you will lose nothing; if the judge rules against 
you, you will lose $20,000 in lost income and have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 
Defendant, if the judge rules in your favour, you will lose nothing; if the judge rules against 
you, you will lose the $20,000 commission and have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 Appendix E
Study 5 Scenarios
This appendix contains one version of the questionnaire used in Study 5.
This includes the instruction sheet and the four scenarios. Participants were
naive to their role/frame condition, and the headers for each scenario were
not present in the original.
244Negotiation in Civil Disputes – Information Sheet 
 
Traditionally, legal theory has been based on theories of economic utility but these 
theories fail to account for the psychological factors which effect human decision 
making. The aim of the current study is to explore how individuals make decisions in 
a legal setting. It is hoped that a greater understanding of this process will lead to an 
increase in out of court settlements, thereby reducing pressure on the court system.    
 
The following questionnaire describes four legal scenarios, each involving a dispute 
of some kind. For each scenario, you will be asked to evaluate the facts and indicate 
whether or not, if placed in that situation, you would accept the proposed settlement 
offer. You will also be asked to indicate, based on the facts, what you believe to be 
your chances of winning in court and what your final settlement offer would be.   
 
The aim of this study is to determine how individuals make decisions. For this reason, 
the scenarios should not be considered as moral dilemmas, as both parties will feel 
they are correct. There are also no right or wrong answers. When you are making your 
decisions please consider the impact of court costs (as outlined in the scenarios). 
 
Each scenario is independent of the others (ie. the facts of each case are in no way 
related and do not carry on from each other) and your judgement should be based only 
on the individual merits of each. The facts of these disputes have been taken from real 
cases, and the probability of winning in court is a realistic estimate. It is therefore 
important to read each scenario carefully, and to pay particular attention to your 
lawyer’s advice.    
 
There is no time limit, but normally the questionnaire will take approximately 30 
minutes to complete. If you are a Psychology I student, you will be asked to provide 
your student ID number in order to ensure you receive course credit for you 
participation. Please make sure you sign up for this study through the online booking 
sheet on research central (it doesn’t matter what time you choose, as you have already 
completed the questionnaire). If you do not do this you cannot be credited for your 
participation. Completion of this questionnaire is worth 30 minutes credit.    
 
For any further information regarding this study, please feel free to contact either the 
PhD student or supervisor involved, as below. For any questions concerning the ethics 
of this request, please contact the convener of the Subcommittee for Human Research 
in the Department of Psychology, Dr Paul Delfabbro, 8303 5744.    
 
PhD Student: Victoria Gilliland 
victoria.gilliland@adelaide.edu.au 
 
Supervisor: John Dunn 
john.c.dunn@adelaide.edu.au COPYRIGHT POSITIVE PLAINTIFF – 1A 
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are a 
freelance graphic designer, who specialises in magazine advertisements. Some time 
ago you submitted an idea for an ad campaign to a small advertising company, AdCo. 
The company rejected your idea, saying it was not suitable for their clients. However, 
you recently noticed an advertising campaign published by AdCo that bears a striking 
resemblance to your submission.  After some inquiries you discover that the client 
paid AdCo $20,000 for artwork which you believe belongs to you.  
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for 
restitution. Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with AdCo on your behalf. You 
are seeking $20,000 in compensation. AdCo denies the claim on the basis that the 
design team who created the campaign were unaware of your submission, and that 
regardless of this the two ideas vary significantly. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the advertising company 
and no settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court 
and a trial date has now been set. The discovery process has taken place, and lawyers 
on both sides have reviewed all the available evidence and entered all relevant legal 
arguments. The outcome of these sorts of cases is notoriously difficult to predict, and 
no further legal argument remains which can alter your chance of winning. Instead, 
your lawyer advises that the success of your case depends on which of two judges is 
assigned to your trial. Justice Parkes is a strong advocate of intellectual property 
rights and likely to rule in your favour. Alternatively, Justice Deacon is more 
concerned by evidentiary issues, and is likely to rule against you. The allocation of 
judges is a random process and will not be known until the trial commences. You 
therefore have a 50% chance of winning at trial, based upon which judge is selected. 
If the judge rules in your favour, you will receive $20,000 in compensation; if the 
judge rules against you, you will receive nothing in compensation. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another 
round of negotiations with the defendant (AdCo). Before considering any offers from 
AdCo, you need to understand the fee structure associated with the litigation process. 
Should you reach a negotiated settlement, your lawyer will charge you a flat rate of 
$2,500, which will come out of any money you receive from the defendant. If you do 
not negotiate a settlement and instead proceed to trial, each party will be charged a 
total of $3,500 in legal fees, which will be distributed on a loser-pays basis. This 
means that should the judge rule in your favour, you will receive the full $20,000 in 
compensation. However, if the judge rules against you, you will receive nothing, but 
have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 
Before considering the final offer, please take a moment to answer the following 
questions.  
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from 
AdCo in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price 
(between $0 and $20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $...................................  
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that AdCo has 
offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you would receive $10,000 in 
compensation (minus legal costs). This is the final offer before the trial and your 
decision must be made before the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
YES / NO 
   RACE HORSE NEGATIVE PLAINTIFF – 2B  
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are 
the owner of a horse stable called the Parsley Stud, which breeds racehorses. You 
recently purchased a promising yearling for $20,000. However, two weeks after it 
arrived at your stables, it died of complications arising from a heart condition. You 
believe the heart condition was pre-existing and that the sale should be void. 
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for 
restitution. Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with the previous owner on your 
behalf. You are seeking $20,000 in compensation. The previous owner denies the 
claim on the basis that he had no prior knowledge of the heart condition.  
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the previous owner and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a 
trial date has now been set. The discovery process has taken place, and lawyers on 
both sides have reviewed all the available evidence and entered all relevant legal 
arguments. The outcome of these sorts of cases is notoriously difficult to predict, and 
no further legal argument remains which can alter your chance of winning. Instead, 
your lawyer advises that the success of your case depends on which of two judges is 
assigned to your trial. Justice Payne is a strong advocate of consumer rights and likely 
to rule in your favour. Alternatively, Justice Deane is more concerned by evidentiary 
issues, and is likely to rule against you. The allocation of judges is a random process 
and will not be known until the trial commences. You therefore have a 50% chance of 
winning at trial, based upon which judge is selected.  If the judge rules in your favour, 
you will lose nothing on the sale; if the judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 
on the sale. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another 
round of negotiations with the defendant (the previous owner). Before considering 
any offers from the previous owner, you need to understand the fee structure 
associated with the litigation process. Should you reach a negotiated settlement, your 
lawyer will charge you a flat rate of $2,500, which will come out of any money you 
receive from the defendant. If you do not negotiate a settlement and instead proceed 
to trial, each party will be charged a total of $3,500 in legal fees, which will be 
distributed on a loser-pays basis. This means that should the judge rule in your favour, 
you will lose nothing. However, if the judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 
on the sale and have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 
Before considering the final offer, please take a moment to answer the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court?  
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from 
the previous owner in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the 
minimum price (between $0 and $20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $................................... 
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that the 
previous owner has offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you would 
lose $10,000 on the sale (plus legal costs). This is the final offer before the trial and 
your decision must be made before the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
YES / NO 
  SOLAR PANELS NEGATIVE DEFENDANT – 3D 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You 
own a company called Aurora, which specialises in the installation of solar panels. 
You recently completed a large installation for a manufacturing company, and made a 
$20,000 profit.   
 
However, the price you quoted the company was based on their eligibility for a 
government rebate. The company has since discovered they are not eligible for the 
rebate and believe you are responsible for providing inaccurate information. The 
company is seeking $20,000 in compensation. You deny the claim on the basis that it 
was the responsibility of the company to investigate their own eligibility for the 
government rebate. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the manufacturing 
company and no settlement has been reached. The company has decided to pursue the 
matter in court and a trial date has now been set. The discovery process has taken 
place, and lawyers on both sides have reviewed all the available evidence and entered 
all relevant legal arguments. The outcome of these sorts of cases is notoriously 
difficult to predict, and no further legal argument remains which can alter your chance 
of winning. Instead, your lawyer advises that the success of your case depends on 
which of two judges is assigned to your trial. Justice Potts is a strong advocate of 
corporate responsibility and likely to rule against you. Alternatively, Justice Dowd is 
more concerned by policy issues, and is likely to rule in your favour. The allocation of 
judges is a random process and will not be known until the trial commences. You 
therefore have a 50% chance of winning at trial, based upon which judge is selected. 
If the judge rules in your favour, you will lose none of the installation profits; if the 
judge rules against you, you will lose $20,000 of the installation profits. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another 
round of negotiations with the plaintiff (the manufacturing company). Before 
considering any offers from the company, you need to understand the fee structure 
associated with the litigation process. Should you reach a negotiated settlement, your 
lawyer will charge you a flat rate of $2,500, which will be in addition to any money 
you pay the plaintiff. If you do not negotiate a settlement and instead proceed to trial, 
each party will be charged a total of $3,500 in legal fees, which will be distributed on 
a loser-pays basis. This means that should the judge rule in your favour, you will lose 
nothing. However, if the judge rules against you, you will lose the $20,000 of 
installation profits and have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 
Before considering the final offer, please take a moment to answer the following 
questions. 
 Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the 
manufacturing company in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the 
maximum price (between $0 and $20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... 
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that the 
manufacturing company has offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you 
would lose $10,000 of the installation profits (plus legal costs). This is the final offer 
before the trial and your decision must be made before the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
YES / NODEFAMATION POSITIVE DEFENDANT – 4C 
 
You are the defendant in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are 
the editor of a free, local newspaper. You recently published a series of articles 
entitled “Are these the city’s worst employers?”  The articles discussed a number of 
small businesses in the area and accused them of underpaying their staff and 
providing sub-standard working conditions. While no names were given, as a 
consequence of these articles, your circulation grew and you gained $20,000 in 
additional advertising income. 
 
However, the owner of a local gourmet deli has brought an action against you for 
restitution of lost income. She claims that as a consequence of these articles, 
customers stayed away from her business and she suffered $20,000 in lost income. 
She is seeking $20,000 in compensation. You deny the claim on the basis that you did 
not identify her business and that the descriptions given in the articles could have 
referred to any number of businesses. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the deli owner and no 
settlement has been reached. She has decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial 
date has now been set. The discovery process has taken place, and lawyers on both 
sides have reviewed all the available evidence and entered all relevant legal 
arguments. The outcome of these sorts of cases is notoriously difficult to predict, and 
no further legal argument remains which can alter your chance of winning. Instead, 
your lawyer advises that the success of your case depends on which of two judges is 
assigned to your trial. Justice Penn is a strong advocate of media responsibility and 
likely to rule against you. Alternatively, Justice Davies is more concerned about free 
speech, and is likely to rule in your favour. The allocation of judges is a random 
process and will not be known until the trial commences. You therefore have a 50% 
chance of winning at trial, based upon which judge is selected. If the judge rules in 
your favour, you will get to keep $20,000 of the new income; if the judge rules 
against you, you will get to keep none of the new income. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another 
round of negotiations with the plaintiff (the deli owner). Before considering any offers 
from the deli owner, you need to understand the fee structure associated with the 
litigation process. Should you reach a negotiated settlement, your lawyer will charge 
you a flat rate of $2,500, which will be in addition to any money you pay the plaintiff. 
If you do not negotiate a settlement and instead proceed to trial, each party will be 
charged a total of $3,500 in legal fees, which will be distributed on a loser-pays basis. 
This means that should the judge rule in your favour, you get to keep $20,000 of the 
new income. However, if the judge rules against you, you will keep none of the new 
income and have to pay a total of $7,000 in legal fees. 
 Before considering the final offer, please take a moment to answer the following 
questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the 
details provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in 
court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a defendant, what is the maximum amount of compensation you would pay the 
deli owner in order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the maximum price 
(between $0 and $20,000) you would give to avoid going to court? 
 
Maximum offer of $................................... 
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that the deli 
owner has offered to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you would keep 
$10,000 of the new income (minus legal costs). This is the final offer before the trial 
and your decision must be made before the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 




This appendix contains one version of Scenario 1, as adapted for use in Study
6 (without legal costs). Participants were naive to their role/frame condition,
and the headers for each scenario were not present in the original.
254COPYRIGHT POSITIVE PLAINTIFF – 1A 
 
You are the plaintiff in a litigation suit, for which the details are as follows. You are a 
freelance graphic designer, who specialises in magazine advertisements. Some time ago you 
submitted an idea for an ad campaign to a small advertising company, AdCo. The company 
rejected your idea, saying it was not suitable for their clients. However, you recently noticed 
an advertising campaign published by AdCo that bears a striking resemblance to your 
submission.  After some inquiries you discover that the client paid AdCo $20,000 for artwork 
which you believe belongs to you.  
 
You have been to see your lawyer and he has advised that you have a claim for restitution. 
Your lawyer has entered into negotiations with AdCo on your behalf. You are seeking 
$20,000 in compensation. AdCo denies the claim on the basis that the design team who 
created the campaign were unaware of your submission, and that regardless of this the two 
ideas vary significantly. 
 
You have been involved in lengthy legal negotiations with the advertising company and no 
settlement has been reached. You have decided to pursue the matter in court and a trial date 
has now been set. The discovery process has taken place, and lawyers on both sides have 
reviewed all the available evidence and entered all relevant legal arguments. The outcome of 
these sorts of cases is notoriously difficult to predict, and no further legal argument remains 
which can alter your chance of winning. Instead, your lawyer advises that the success of your 
case depends on which of two judges is assigned to your trial. Justice Parkes is a strong 
advocate of intellectual property rights and likely to rule in your favour. Alternatively, Justice 
Deacon is more concerned by evidentiary issues, and is likely to rule against you. The 
allocation of judges is a random process and will not be known until the trial commences. 
You therefore have a 50% chance of winning at trial, based upon which judge is selected. If 
the judge rules in your favour, you will receive $20,000 in compensation; if the judge rules 
against you, you will receive nothing in compensation. 
 
Your lawyer has advised that before proceeding to court, you should attempt another round of 
negotiations with the defendant (AdCo). Before considering the final offer, please take a 
moment to answer the following questions. 
 
Your lawyer has advised you of your chances of winning in court. Based on the details 
provided, what chance (as a percentage) do YOU think you have of winning in court? 
 
Approximately _______% chance of winning. 
 
As a plaintiff, what is the minimum amount of compensation you would accept from AdCo in 
order to settle out of court? That is, what would be the minimum price (between $0 and 
$20,000) you would want to avoid going to court? 
 
Minimum offer of $...................................  
 
The night before the trial is due to begin, your lawyer calls to tell you that AdCo has offered 
to settle out of court. If you accept this offer, you would receive $10,000 in compensation. 
This is the final offer before the trial and your decision must be made before the morning. 
 
Will you accept the offer? 
 
YES / NO 